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Introduction
This thesis consists of four essays on the political economy of foreign aid. These essays
cover issues related to the allocation, the timing, and the economic consequences of for-
eign aid for recipient countries (Figure I). Elevating the living standards, capabilities,
and dignity of the poorest people of the world and enabling poor countries to increasing
the quality of life of their population remain among the most pressing challenges in the
world today. Despite the increasing importance of private financial flows to developing
countries, (monetary) assistance by governments of, mainly richer, countries remains a
popular instrument for supporting financially poor people and countries. The bulk of
these aid flows has been and is provided by member states of the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD’s Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) defines what can be counted as Official Development Aid (ODA) and
gathers information on these flows. The information collected by the OECD is the main
data source used by academics to study aid allocation and performance.
Given the scarcity of public resources and the enormous challenges in developing coun-
tries, the effectiveness of development assistance is a topic of great public interest and
academic inquiry alike. While much of the public debate takes it for granted that more
funds lead to more development, skepticism is widespread among academic economists
and political scientists. The debate runs from the macro level – can foreign assistance
eliminate extreme poverty and trigger growth – to the micro level – was a specific project
effective? The methodological challenges for the identification of causal effects associated
with each of the different levels of analysis and their respective ability to create actionable
knowledge for policy makers and aid organizations are too numerous to discuss here. It is
up to researchers (and practitioners) to overcome these problems and seek to understand
how and why development works if aid is to be justifiably used as one means to address
poverty globally.
Introduction
Figure I: The different stages of the aid disbursement cycle and the corresponding chapters in this thesis
Notes: This representation of the foreign aid disbursement cycle is simplified and displays the stages of the cycle relevant for this thesis. Notable omissions
are the differences between the allocation of the foreign aid budget across donor countries’ ministries and the distinction between the commitment and the
disbursement stage. Moreover, the aid disbursement process is nested; some decisions in the aid disbursement cycle are made simultaneously, notably (A),
(B) and (C), and thus may influence each other.
2
Introduction
Applied economists are often required to strike a balance between relevance and method-
ological rigor when analyzing development processes and other complex social and eco-
nomic interactions. Applied economists should neither let methodology determine the
research question nor should they use relevance as a justification for not applying the
most stringent methods available. Over the last decade, the emphasis on rigor has in-
creased in applied economics and at least since Angrist and Pischke (2010) proclaimed
“the credibility revolution in empirical economics,” the most credible identification strate-
gies (or ‘research designs’) have required that variation in the data be as good as randomly
assigned. This led to a rise in popularity of natural (e.g., Rosenzweig and Wolpin 2000;
Angrist and Krueger 2001), field (e.g., Duflo et al. 2007; Levitt and List 2009) and labo-
ratory (quasi-) experiments (e.g., Kahneman and Smith 2002; Croson and Gächter 2010),
which allow for a causal interpretation of relationships between two variables.
The designation of experiments, by some, as superior tool of knowledge creation (i.e.m
the ‘gold standard’) has provoked heated debates in the blogosphere and among academic
economists, particularly in the field of development economics. Among the most vocifer-
ous critics of the general superiority of experiments are Nobel Prize winner Angus Deaton
(e.g., Deaton 2009) and, mostly on randomized controlled trials, Lant Pritchett (e.g.,
Pritchett 2015). Allegedly, researchers make causal claims about complex socio-economic
problems without understanding the mechanisms at work just because the experimental
methods suggest causal interpretation is in principle possible. What is more, the search for
random or exogenous variation has driven some researchers to (implicitly) let the avail-
able estimator determine the parameter of interest, thus limiting research to marginal
questions. Even if the research questions they pose are important, some of these (quasi-)
experimental methods risk leading to a policy-irrelevant focus on marginal cases for which
causal inference is possible. The temporary conclusion that can be drawn from this de-
bate is that most economists welcome the increasing methodological rigor associated with
the ‘credibility revolution’ and acknowledge a role for experiments in economic research,
especially for the evaluation of interventions, but fight the claim of their superiority in all
circumstances.
The credibility revolution in economics was pioneered in applied microeconomics, a
field which is concerned with individuals’ (economic) decision-making. Despite this, the
causality discourse has also influenced which research is considered the most credible in the
field of international political economy, which studies aggregate outcomes and institutions.
Satisfying the standards of causality is particularly challenging for scholars interested in
comparative research on institutions and events that are few in numbers. What is more,
institutions often emerge slowly and institutional changes are policy responses to social
and economic problems, making them endogenous to many outcomes of interest. In
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my dissertation, I have aimed to combine my desire to improve our understanding of
interesting and important macro-economic questions about institutions with the most
rigorous analytical methods available to study them.
The four chapters in this thesis take an (international) political economy view on of
stages of the foreign aid disbursement cycle as illustrated in Figure I: the motives for
using different types of foreign aid (Chapter 1), the timing of spending within a donor
country’s fiscal year (Chapter 2), the complementarity between aid channels (Chapter 3),
and the consequences of political motives for effectiveness of foreign aid (Chapter 4).
The political economy lens focuses on the ways in which politics and institutions shape
the distribution of resources and influence their efficiency and effectiveness. This thesis
contributes to the literatures on foreign aid allocation and aid effectiveness within the field
of development economics, to the branch of research evaluating the effects of institutions
on fiscal performance within the field of public finance, and to the literature on the role
of multilateral organizations in the international political economy.
Chapter 1 – Chapter 3 consider donor countries’ motives for the use of different aid chan-
nels. Specifically, these chapters investigate questions raised by the changes in the fund-
ing mechanisms of multilateral organizations over the last two decades (Figure II). Until
recently, academic research has been silent on the rise in earmarked aid provided to mul-
tilateral organizations although this is widely discussed in aid agencies. This “academic
silence” is in contrast to the academic reflection of policy debates about aid effectiveness
triggered by the Millennium Development Goals or the new principles developed around
the Paris Declaration. Jointly with Bernhard Reinsberg’s (2016b) thesis and Bernhard’s
and my work with several co-authors, the papers in these chapters are thus the foundation
of a new sub-strand in the literature on foreign aid. Earmarked aid is also referred to as
‘multi-bi’ aid because it is a hybrid between the bilateral and multilateral aid channels.
Given the absence of previous research on multi-bi aid, field work and exchanges with
staff at international organizations and donors’ aid agencies proved essential for better
understanding the rise of earmarked aid. In the research project on The Proliferation of
Multilateral Funds, we conceptualize earmarked aid from the perspective of multilateral
organizations (Reinsberg et al. 2015) and with Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2017) we make
a new dataset on multi-bi aid available to the research community.
Traditionally, donor countries faced the choice between two channels for ODA-spending,
namely the bilateral and the multilateral channel. Donors now increasingly use a hybrid
of the two: multi-bi aid, which provides funds to a multilateral development organization
for implementation but restricts the use of these funds to specific areas. Given these
earmarks by donor countries, the governance body of the multilateral organization re-
ceiving the funds has no authority over the allocation of these resources but is merely
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the implementing agent. This distinguishes multi-bi aid from traditional ‘core’ funding
to multilateral organizations that is allocated at the discretion of the multilateral orga-
nization. An additional difference is that multi-bi contributions are voluntary in nature
and thus offer more flexibility to donor governments. Figure III illustrates the differences
among the three channels for aid.
When defining multi-bi aid from the perspective of the multilateral implementing or-
ganization, Reinsberg et al. (2015) distinguish between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ multi-bi
aid. Direct multi-bi aid (marked by an asterisk in Figure III)is held by the receiving
multilateral organization in trust funds, which are based on a contract between the or-
ganization and the donor(s). This contract determines the trust fund’s purpose and the
decision-making rule for the allocation of trust fund aid to projects that the multilateral
organization subsequently implements. Individual trust funds may hold small amounts
but they are numerous. For example, the World Bank managed more than 900 active
trust funds in June 2013 (World Bank 2013). In contrast, indirect multi-bi aid (marked
by two asterisks in Figure III) is channeled to multilateral organizations via ‘pass-through’
multilaterals, which are limited in number to a few dozen. Pass-through multilaterals tend
to have narrow thematic or regional mandates and have no implementing capacities of
their own. Multilateral organizations implement the projects funded by donors via pass-
through multilaterals. In summary, the main distinction between indirect and direct aid
is the ‘detour’ via a pass-through multilateral in indirect aid (for a detailed discussion see
Reinsberg et al. 2015). Despite the best efforts of my co-authors and myself, causality
cannot be established for some of the results on earmarked aid (Chapter 1 – Chapter 3).
However, the academic and policy interest in the data and in the research findings about
multi-bi aid at conferences indicate their relevance and stimulating impact on the discus-
sions in the respective communities. Using a political economy perspective on foreign aid
and a large literature in economics and political science discussed below, the first three
chapters all address the role of politics and institutional rules in shaping the allocation of
earmarked aid. Specifically, earmarked aid is related to donor countries’ desire to delegate
implementation and responsiblity while keeping control over the allocation of their foreign
aid. Foreign aid is considered one of the most powerful political and strategic instruments
in international relations.
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Figure II: Multi-bi aid over time (1990-2012)
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Figure III: Bilateral, multilateral and multi-bi aid
Notes: When multi-bi aid is defined from the perspective of the multilateral organization,
* represents ‘direct’ multi-bi aid while
** represents ‘indirect’ multi-bi aid that is channeled via a ‘pass-through’ multilateral to the multilateral organisation.
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The last chapter of this thesis examines whether the political motives underlying (the
allocation of) aid has opportunity costs. Acknowledging the crowdedness of the literature
on the aid-and-growth relationship, my co-authors and I chose to rely on specifications
from the most widely-cited papers in the aid effectiveness literature. We extend their data
to provide a rigorous causal analysis of the consequences of (short-term) political motives
for aid effectiveness. Aggregated ODA flows are used in this last chapter because of the
lack of long time series on multi-bi aid.
Besides the conceptualization and description of (the evolution of) the new phenomenon
of earmarked aid, an essential part of ‘frontier’ research such as on earmarked aid is to
identify the most relevant structures, actors, and interactions.
Chapter 1: The Politics of Special Purpose Trust Funds
In The Politics of Special Purpose Trust Funds in Chapter 1, Simon Hug and I offer
such a framework by proposing a formal principal-agent model that focuses on essential
interactions between donor countries and a multilateral organization. This allows us to
investigate some of the incentives underlying the recent shift towards country- and issue-
specific earmarked funding and the potential consequences thereof. Our game-theoretic
model features multiple principals and a multilateral agent. This allows studying how the
interaction between donor preferences, voter concerns and special interest groups in the
donor country, the voting rules at the multilateral organization, and the presence of special
purpose trust funds influence aid allocation. Donor countries pay their (fixed) membership
fee to the multilateral organization and then choose how to spend the remainder of their
(fixed) aid budget: as bilateral aid, (direct) multi-bi aid, or voluntary multilateral core
contributions.1 An important feature of the model is the assumption that earmarked
aid is less effective than multilateral aid because, by definition, earmarking restricts the
re-allocation of aid to the most effective project. This inhibits flexible adjustments when
new information appears. Donors accept this cost associated with earmaking as they gain
the ability to steer the multilateral organization to implement projects in their preferred
sector or country.
We show that multilateral organizations with majority rules are more likely to receive
discretion and thus voluntary core contributions than those with unanimity requirements.
The introduction of earmarking as possibility decreases donors’ contributions to the mul-
tilateral’s discretionary core budget as well as bilateral aid provision. In contrast to much
of the literature dealing with issues of delegation in bi- and multilateral aid, our model
suggests non-monotonic effects of donors’ preference heterogeneity among donor coun-
tries on aid allocation decisions. This result is obtained for some parameter combinations
1The term special purpose trust funds as understood in this chapter applies both to trust funds (direct
multi-bi aid) and large pass-through multilaterals (indirect multi-bi aid).
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when SPTFs are an option and are due to the trade-off between effectiveness and control.
We provide evidence suggestive of the empirical importance of the theoretically derived
implications. Specifically, we find the expected positive relationship between increased
preference heterogeneity among donor countries and the level of voluntary core funding.
We also find that better-evaluated multilateral agencies attract more multi-bi aid and we
find support for the implied positive relationship between bilateral aid and the public’s
opinion about the merits of bilateral aid.
Chapter 2: December Fever in Public Finance
In December Fever in Public Finance, Chapter 2, I study the incidence and reasons for
above-average spending at the end of fiscal years. year-end spending spikes (YESS) are
prevalent in public and private organizations with annually lapsing budgets. They are
generally perceived as being “unhealthy” and wasteful, exemplified by their nicknames
such as “December Fever” or “March Madness.” Although the potentially lower returns
to such expenditures amount to large sums, academic research into the causes and con-
sequences of YESS is scarce. Chapter 2 of this thesis provides the first analysis of YESS
across countries. I make use of data for direct and indirect multi-bi aid contributions
to the World Bank. Using panel-econometric methods to exploit variation in donors’
fiscal years, I find evidence for YESS in contributions to all types of funds at the daily,
monthly, and quarterly level for a sample of 27 OECD countries over the 2002–2013 pe-
riod.2 I argue that bureaucratic quality affects the size of YESS and test this argument
empirically using different measures of bureaucratic quality. I also test the two main alter-
native explanations proposed in the literature: precautionary savings and procrastination
by bureaucrats. The paper proposes a new explanation for the size of spending spikes,
bureaucratic quality, and provides the first econometric evidence of this and two further
mechanisms proposed in the literature. I find robust support for the mitigating role of
bureaucratic quality on the size of year-end spending spikes but not for the other two
mechanisms.
Chapter 3: Poverty and Policy Selectivity of World Bank Trust Funds
In the paper The Policy and Poverty Selectivity of World Bank Trust Funds in Chapter 3,
Stephen Knack and I compare World Bank trust fund aid to other aid flows at the allo-
cation stage of the aid cycle.3 We focus on donors’ multi-bi aid to the World Bank due
to the availability of high quality data for this multilateral organization.
Donors’ earmarking to their preferred recipient countries and/or issues has raised con-
cerns among the Bank’s management and shareholders about the alignment of trust funds
2In this chapter, the words trust funds and funds will be used interchangeably.
3Chapter 3 analyzes only the allocation of direct multi-bi aid received by the World Bank.
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with the performance-based allocation of concessional loans by the International Devel-
opment Association (IDA), the World Bank’s concessional lending arm. More generally,
the specific role of this new aid channel in the international aid architecture is yet to be
determined. The paper finds that the cross-country allocations of aggregate trust fund aid
are poverty- and policy-selective. In this respect, trust fund allocations resemble those of
the IDA much more closely than those of bilateral donors. The allocations of trust fund
types that are more closely controlled by donor countries – namely, recipient-executed
and single-donor trust funds – are more closely related to the strategic interests of donor
countries than trust fund aid in general. Trust funds for health and education aid are
poverty-selective and positively correlated with the World Bank’s assessment of the quality
of countries’ sector policies while environmental trust funds are neither poverty-selective
nor correlated with the assessed quality of countries’ environmental policies. Overall, the
evidence indicates that multi-bi funds administered by the World Bank do not undermine
the IDA’s allocation criteria. The paper leaves for future research the question of whether
the increase in (indirect and direct) multi-bi aid has affected core contributions to the
IDA and other multilateral organizations.
While earmarked aid has sometimes been associated with the “results agenda” devel-
oped in the context of the Paris Declaration, in The Poverty and Policy Selectivity of
World Bank Trust Funds, Chapter 3 of this thesis, and Eichenauer and Knack (2015),
Stephen Knack and I provide evidence that donor countries’ political and economic in-
terests influence the allocation of trust fund aid across recipient countries. Since Maizels
and Nissanke (1984) and Frey and Schneider (1986), evidence has accumulated that the
allocation of bilateral (e.g., Burnside and Dollar 2000; Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Faye
and Niehaus 2012) and multilateral aid (e.g., Dreher et al. 2009a; Kersting and Kilby
2016) is associated with the various political, strategic and economic interests of donor
countries.
This politically- rather than purely poverty- or performance-driven allocation of aid
may be deplorable from a normative perspective. However, in a “politics-free” world, no
foreign aid might be given or ODA levels are lower. This would be to the detriment of
developing countries – if aid is effective. If donors’ motives impact on the effectiveness of
aid in recipient countries, the normative question of politically motivated selection of aid
recipients becomes an economic one.4 While the importance of politics in the allocation
of foreign aid is generally acknowledged in the research community, this is not the case
for the effectiveness of aid as we describe in Chapter 4.
4There are also opportunity costs associated with the politically motivated allocation of aid if the returns
to foreign aid differ across countries.
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Chapter 4: Geopolitics, Aid and Growth
With Geopolitics, Aid and Growth, Chapter 4, Axel Dreher, Kai Gehring and I contribute
to the large literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid by examining whether the short-
term political interests of donor countries reduce the effectiveness of aid on growth in
recipient countries. Specifically, we test whether the effect of aid on economic growth is
reduced by the share of years a recipient country served on the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) in the period the aid is committed. This provides quasi-random varia-
tion in aid. For causal inference about the relative effectiveness of politically motivated
aid, we make use of the econometric property that the interaction term between an en-
dogenous and an exogenous variable can be estimated consistently under a reasonable set
of assumptions. We argue and provide evidence that these assumptions are fulfilled in
our case. Our results show that the effect of aid on growth is significantly lower when
aid is committed during a country’s tenure on the UNSC. This holds when we restrict
the sample to Africa, which follows the strictest norm of rotation on the UNSC and thus
where UNSC membership can most reliably be regarded as exogenous. We derive two
conclusions from this finding. First, short-term political favoritism reduces the effective-
ness of aid. Second, political interest variables as instruments for overall aid arguably
estimate the effect of politically motivated aid and thus represent a lower bound for the
effect of all aid on growth.
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CHAPTER1
The Politics of Special Purpose Trust Funds
Joint with Simon Hug
Largely unnoticed by academia, a new way of funding development cooperation now
accounts for twelve percent of all aid committed by the OECD’s donor club (OECD 2012:
16). Labeled as earmarked, non-core or multi-bi aid, these contributions are managed
by multilateral organizations in special purpose trust funds (SPTF) that operate outside
of the multilateral’s official governance structure.1 Since 2003 total contributions to the-
matic or country-specific SPTFs at the World Bank have exceeded contributions to the
International Development Association, the highly concessional lending arm of the World
Bank and the world’s oldest multilateral development institution (IEG 2011a: vii, 2). In
2012, the Bank managed almost US$ 30 billion in more than a thousand SPTFs (World
Bank 2012a). For the United Nations (UN) and its funds and programmes the growth
of non-core aid is similarly impressive; non-core resources grew by 450 percent in real
terms between 1994 and 2009. In contrast, core resources, which consist of mandatory
and voluntary unearmarked contributions, stagnated (United Nations 2011: 2).
Despite the rapid increase in the volume of earmarked aid and the number of trust
funds in which the earmarked aid is held, evaluations of the reasons for and consequences
of these trends are still largely missing. In this Chapter, we seek to gain an understanding
about the factors that lead donor governments to eschew traditional channels of aid giv-
ing, namely multilateral and bilateral aid, in favor of earmarked funds. More specifically,
we want to understand how preference heterogeneity, decision-making rules, the effective-
ness of multilateral institutions and voter concerns affect the decision to choose multi-bi
aid. A clearer understanding of the donor motives underlying the trend towards multi-bi
aid will allow researchers to address yet unanswered questions related to accountability,
aid (in)efficiency and aid (in)effectiveness. To do so we propose a game-theoretical model
1The term special purpose trust funds as used in this chapter applies both to trust funds (direct multi-bi
aid) and large pass-through multilaterals (indirect multi-bi aid).
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that allows us to show how the interaction between donor preferences and the decision
rule at the multilateral agency influences donors’ aid allocation decisions. Specifically,
our model shows that the choice of aid channel is affected by the decision rule in place in
the multilateral aid organization, the multilateral’s level of expertise, the importance of
domestic voter concerns for donor governments, and the preference heterogeneity among
donors. Preference heterogeneity, however, contrary to previous work on principal-agent
relationships with multiple principals, does not have a monotonic effect on aid allocation
decisions. More precisely, if preference heterogeneity among donors in an institution in-
creases there is a non-monotonic transition from core contributions to SPTFs and bilateral
aid.
The remainder of the Chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we document
the increasing use of SPTFs by donors and the, so far, largely policy discussions on the
topic. Section three presents the literature relevant for our undertaking, namely work on
tax earmarking, principal-agent models, and foreign aid. In Section four we present the
proposed game-theoretical model that we analyze for its equilibrium characteristics. We
derive several propositions from these equilibria. Section five discusses implications and
provides the descriptive evidence suggestive of these implications. Section six concludes.
1.2 The Trend Toward Special Purpose Trust Funds
Until recently, donor governments provided foreign aid to developing countries either by
giving multilateral core aid to an international organization or by implementing their
own projects through their bilateral aid agency.2 Traditional multilateral aid consists of
assessed contributions (typically membership fees) and non-earmarked voluntary (discre-
tionary) contributions to the core account of the multilateral organization (OECD 2012:
23). These multilateral core funds are pooled by the organization and their allocation
across developing countries and sectors is determined jointly by the member states ac-
cording to the organization’s decision rule. In contrast, SPTFs allow donor governments
to circumvent these often slow and cumbersome decision making processes and have the
multilateral organization implement their allocation preferences. It is only within the last
two decades that multilateral organizations started to accept earmarked contributions
from donor governments (Graham 2017). SPTFs are set up by one or several donors
of the multilateral organization in order to support thematic, country- or region-specific
2Bilateral policies are not coordinated with third countries and only involve interaction between the
donor government and the recipient government or its citizens. Bilateral aid channeled through
donor- or recipient-country based NGO! is allocated and monitored by the donor country and thus,
in a broad understanding, implemented by the bilateral agency.
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priorities or any combination thereof (e.g., the Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Program or
the Indonesia Multi-Donor Trade and Investment Trust Fund).
Figure 1.1 shows that donors’ use of multi-bi aid increased over time. Figure 1.2 shwos
that the use of multi-bi aid varies across donors and that some of the larger donors in the
2006-2012 period are donors with small- or medium-sized aid budgets.3
Figure 1.1: Evolution of different aid channels over time (1990-2012)
What drives this trend to earmarking?4 First and foremost, donor governments and
multilateral organizations both have interests in the existence of SPTFs. SPTFs allow
donors to target their aid strategically according to their preferences including commer-
cial, security and political interests. SPTF aid is similar to bilateral aid in this respect
(IEG 2011a: 5). Donors use trust funds to increase the visibility of their multilateral aid
to national constituencies and recipient countries (OECD 2010: 39). Moreover, the volun-
tary character of multi-bi aid, enhances donors’ financial flexibility across years. Donors
3Multi-bi aid figures are based on the multi-bi aid dataset (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2017), while other
ODA data come from OECD (2015).
4In 2010, almost one third of the Official Development Aid channeled through the multilateral system
may be counted as multi-bi aid, amounting to almost US$ 17 billion in 2010. This is more than any
bilateral donor, except for the United States, provided in that year. For comparison, net bilateral
aid disbursements by the United Kingdom in the same year were US$ 13 billion and the European
Union (EU) institutions provided US$ 12.9 billion (OECD 2015). Together, core and non-core use of
the multilateral system accounted for 40 percent of gross ODA (see OECD 2012: 4).
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Figure 1.2: Average share of multi-bi aid in total aid by donor country (2006-2012)
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may also use SPTFs to delegate the responsibility for implementing risky development
programs and projects to a multilateral organization.
Contributions and contribution volumes to the numerous thematic and country-specific
trust funds suggest donor-specific preferences (OECD 2012; Reinsberg et al. 2017). This
finding is in line with the observation that donors’ use of the multilateral system varies
across donors (e.g., Milner 2006; Dietrich 2016).5 For multilateral organizations, the funds
in SPTFs allow growth in staff, size and possibly influence, as predicted by Public Choice
theory, which states that bureaucracies, including international ones, strive to increase
resources and power (Vaubel 2006; Vaubel et al. 2007).
The proliferation of trust funds provides opportunities for the international develop-
ment system but also creates risks for development effectiveness and for the reputation
and organizational efficiency of multilateral organizations. Through trust funds, donor
countries risk gaining undue influence over a multilateral’s priorities because its core activ-
ities are increasingly co-funded by trust funds (Reinsberg 2016a). Trust funds may create
5While our theoretical model developed below does not explicitly address the difference between single-
and multi-donor SPTFs, these two types of funds are endogenously determined as a function of our
models variables.
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reputational risks for the multilateral organization when they incentivize the agency to en-
gage in new countries and types of activities or cooperation(e.g., World Bank 2012a). For
example, the World Bank may become active in post-conflict or post-disaster situations,
which are in contrast to the Bank’s country-based on economic lending to (relatively)
stable governments. What is more, multilateral efficiency as a whole might be impaired
if multilateral organizations venture into new areas of activity due to the financial incen-
tives created by earmarked aid (“forum shopping”). For example, the UNDP may seek
to obtain aid earmarked to climate action, which traditionally has been implemented by
the UN Environment Progamme.6
In terms of aid effectiveness, the use of SPTFs risks undermining the alleged advantages
of multilateral aid implementation through politicizing multi-bi aid and narrowing devel-
opment objectives (Dreher and Michaelowa 2010; Kilby 2013, 2015; Dreher et al. 2016).
For example, donors may use trust funds to jump on trends in aid delivery modes or to
mainly fund sectors and one-off aid projects which have easily quantifiable impacts and
high visibility (e.g., number of immunized children or schools constructed). This can leave
substantial and long-term support efforts like building healthcare systems or maintaining
schools to multilateral organizations with decreasing core budgets and creates coordina-
tion costs to dovetailing parallel development programs. Multi-bi aid also risks duplicating
organizational structures (Reinsberg 2016a) and thus increases the overhead costs of aid
(Tortora and Steensen 2014). Co-financing by trust funds tends to draw project man-
agers’ attention away from managing and monitoring the project implementation towards
reporting on the use of trust fund money.7
Despite these and further risks, SPTFs may benefit the international aid system. The
smaller groups of donors that control a SPTF allows for quicker decision-making than slow-
moving “traditional” multilaterals, giving donors a better chance of responding within the
window of opportunity presented by new challenges or catastrophes. By raising funds from
multiple sources SPTFs may act as a forum for donor coordination (although the limited
evidence suggests otherwise, see IEG 2011a: 43; Barakat et al. 2012: 34f), reducing
fragmentation in recipient countries (IEG 2011a). Moreover, trust funds might induce
competition among multilateral institutions, leading to more innovation and higher value
for aid money and thus more effectiveness.
6Donors also use trust funds to fill “gaps in the multilateral system,” in particular to provide a rapid
response to “emergencies such as natural disasters, disease outbreaks, and the end of armed conflict,
where donors want to coordinate their bilateral aid and where the multilateral development banks
(MDBs) do not grant resources to engage on a sufficient scale” (IEG 2011a: 5).
7World Bank staff reported in interviews that the administrative burden of reporting on the use of trust
funds is heavy. For some, transaction costs were prohibitively high and they stopped applying for
funds from SPTFs.
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1.3 Existing Literature
To study the development of SPTFs we rely on three strands of literature. First, we draw
on the public finance literature because earmarking is a longstanding practice in national
public accounting. Second, we find inspiration in the literature on principal-agent models,
in particular models with multiple principals. Finally, this research relates to the literature
on donor motives for foreign aid in general and multilateral aid in particular.
The term earmarking originates from the literature on public finance where it describes
the “practice of designating or dedicating specific revenues to the financing of specific
public services” (Adugna 2009: i). In domestic politics, earmarking is used by governments
to avoid the standard budgeting procedure whereby tax revenue is pooled into a general
fund before it is allocated across separate spending programs. Earmarking thus constrains
the legislature’s (in our case the multilateral agent’s and its governing organs’) ability to
reduce or even eliminate funding for a benefiting program. As critics contend, earmarking
may lead to a misallocation of funds. By diminishing the legislature’s budgetary flexibility,
earmarking impedes its ability to draft an overall budget that is based on funding priorities
and accounts for changes in circumstances and assessments over time. Finally, earmarking
can increase administrative and compliance costs by incurring the costs of, for example,
separate management of cash flows and reporting. For supporters of earmarking, the
constraint on the legislature guarantees a steady and reliable funding source of favored
programs.8
Early models dealing with tax earmarking assumed that the relative shares of resources
from the general fund spent on various public goods are exogenously fixed (e.g., Buchanan
1963). Given that these models simultaneously assumed that citizens have control over the
level of taxes, it seems rather odd that citizens have no control over allocation decisions
(see for this critique Goetz 1968; Goetz and McKnew 1972; Browning 1975; Athanassakos
1990). Implicitly, the same assumption characterizes models dealing with (non-) ear-
marked contributions to charities/non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (e.g., Bilodeau
and Slivinski 1997; Toyasaki and Wakolbinger 2014). In these models, the relative share of
funds spent on particular projects is decided by the charities/NGOs themselves (normally)
without any influence from donors.
This assumption of an exogenous budget allocation of the general fund is also unrealistic
8Recent work on earmarking (e.g., Anesi 2006; Jackson 2013) focuses on legislative decision-making and
argues that earmarking ensures funding of particular public goods over several legislative periods,
which is not the case for public goods financed through the general fund. Thus, earmarking ties
decision-makers’ hands. This is less the case when earmarking occurs in aid, as the funds always have
a set time for delivery and use (i.e., both earmarked and unearmarked voluntary funds are committed
and provided by donor governments, e.g., for certain emergency situations, for a year, for a specific
fund).
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if these models are adapted to the allocation decisions of multilateral agents. The use
of general fund contributions is either set out in the organization’s charter specifying
its mandate, or involves the member states of the organization in one way or another.9
Consequently, allocation decisions of a multilateral organization are better conceived as
decisions reached collectively by its member states.10
Principal-agent models constitute the second relevant strand of literature. While stan-
dard principal-agent models rely on one principal and one agent, Bernheim and Whinston
(1986) propose a general model of common agency, i.e., a situation where an agent’s ac-
tions are influenced by multiple principals.11 The principal-agent literature with multiple
(and possibly heterogeneous) principals suggests that preference heterogeneity among
principals will result in greater agent discretion, making it more difficult to control them
(see Nielson and Tierney 2003; Lyne et al. 2006; Graham 2013).12 However, Copelovitch
(2010) argues that the effect of heterogeneous preferences within a collective principal is
theoretically undetermined. For example, heterogeneity among the largest shareholders of
the IMF might lead to distributional conflict or “logrolling” in some circumstances while
in others it increases the autonomy of the staff (Hernandez 2013; Bresslein and Schmaljo-
hann 2013: for evidence on the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank
see).
Third, this research relates to the literature on the provision of foreign aid in general
and the financing of international organizations in particular. The main explanations for
governments’ foreign aid provision are a desire to satisfy recipient needs13 and to advance
political and economic interests of the donor country (for an early discussion, see Frey
1984: 86ff). Much of the empirical literature finds that the allocation patterns of both
bilateral and multilateral foreign aid is not solely explained by variables of economic need
but that donors’ strategic and economic interests influence allocation among comparably
9For a discussion of these principles, mostly in the context of the UN, see Hüfner (2003) and Graham
(2014, 2017).
10Lyne et al. (2006) address this issue at the empirical level by determining what characterizes the
preferences of various possible coalitions for adopting a particular lending decision.
11Surprisingly Lake and McCubbins (2006: 362, footnote 12), argue that “the closest analog to multi-
ple principals is the practice of voluntary contributions to multilateral organizations, as opposed to
assessed dues, that allow each member to make their payments contingent on certain activities or con-
ditions.” This argument is only correct if we assume that such voluntary contributions are managed
in a large pot without individual accounting. Thus, dependent on the exact way in which voluntary
contributions are handled, it might, in most cases, be much closer to multiple simple one-principal
one-agent relationships, possibly with strategic interactions between principals, which gets interesting
when increasing returns of scale or scope are present.
12Our model (see below) suggests otherwise: with considerable preference heterogeneity donors have
strong incentives to limit the multilateral agent’s discretion.
13One might argue that even “altruistic” aid is motivated by long-term interests because donors eventually
benefit as developing countries become stable and grow, leading to improvements in global health,
security and increased demand for goods produced in the donor country and so forth.
19
1 The Politics of Special Purpose Trust Funds
poor countries (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000; Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Dreher et al.
2009a). Theoretical arguments suggest that multilateral aid might be less politicized
than bilateral aid because the multilateral agent enjoys more discretion in her allocation
decisions and because she might be pressured by more diverse interest groups than a donor
government (e.g., McKeown 2009).14 Summarizing the empirical evidence, Milner (2006:
109) notes that “a good deal of research suggests [. . . ] that bilateral aid is more tied to
donor interest than is multilateral aid, which is often more needs-based in orientation.”15
Regarding explanations for why donor governments provide multilateral instead of bi-
lateral aid, Milner and Tingley (2013: 314) write that “[t]heories and evidence about why
governments choose multilateralism are few.” Nevertheless, some arguments have been
advanced. First, multilateral agencies are better at providing the collective good “infor-
mation,” for example about the economic and political situation in developing countries,
which is important for monitoring recipients (Milner 2006; Schneider and Tobin 2011).
Second, governments delegate when there is a need to pool resources and to coordinate
the provision or prevention of international public goods and bads respectively (Schnei-
der and Tobin 2011). Third, governments delegate for strategic reasons, for example by
shifting responsibility for implementation of risky projects to a multilateral organization
to blur accountability for potential ineffectiveness. Fourth, a model by Mavrotas and Vil-
langer (2006) suggests that when giving to a particular recipient, a donor’s choice between
multilateral or bilateral aid depends on another donor’s pressure on that recipient.16
Evidence from a survey among donor officials suggests that multilateral aid is mo-
tivated by a perception of higher effectiveness and efficiency of multilateral institutions
OECD (2012); IEG (2011b). Nevertheless, most aid is still given bilaterally (OECD 2015).
Combining these two observations of donor practice suggests that the advantages of mul-
tilateral aid matter only under certain conditions.17 Delegation is likely to depend on the
characteristics of the specific multilateral organization.
Schneider and Tobin (2011) propose to move away from a “dichotomous choice” (Schnei-
14In contrast, the qualitative analysis of historical key documents containing US decision-makers’ as-
sessment of their control of multilateral organizations by Keohane et al. (2009) suggests that the US
administration considers multilateral organizations to be instruments of its foreign policy, just like
bilateral aid.
15Moreover, multilateral institutions may be better able to impose and enforce conditionality because of
their lower politicization. For instance Lebovic and Voeten (2009: 109), argue that “a multilateral
institution may be seen as an aid giving cartel, designed to maximize donors’ influence by presenting
a unified front to the recipients.”
16On a related note, Bayer and Urpelainen (2013) propose a model in which an aid recipient requests
funding and two donors have to decide whether to provide this aid bilaterally or multilaterally and in
the latter case, how the costs are shared among themselves.
17Milner (2006) argues that multilateral aid allows the donor government to credibly signal to its voters
about the non-politicized use of foreign aid and thus solves a principal-agent problem in domestic
politics.
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der and Tobin 2011: 2) framework in which bilateralism is the default way of providing
aid. In a more complex framework, a donor may choose from several organizations and
provide its multilateral aid to the organizations most closely aligned to its preferences.18
Most recently, Schneider and Tobin (2011) argue that governments build a portfolio of
several multilateral organizations by optimizing the efficiency of implementation and the
similarity of allocation policies.
In this Chapter, we study yet another donor strategy in delegation choices to minimize
the trade-off between loss of control and gain in effectiveness.19 In Schneider and Tobin’s
(2011) parlance, the existence of a large number and variety of SPTF multiplies donor
governments’ possibilities for strategic aid portfolio building. Earmarking is likely to in-
crease donors’ utility beyond what “traditional” aid channels can offer because SPTFs are
a cost-effective way to improve the targeting of contributions based on donors’ priorities.20
1.4 A Model
To get a better understanding of the politics of SPTFs we propose a game-theoretical
model. This model builds on well-known models of principal-agent relationships, draws on
the literature on tax-earmarking, and adds an explicit decision-making stage, where donors
can influence the allocation of aid-funds. Our setup is quite general with a multilateral
aid agency and multiple donor as players that choose to allocate aid between two aid
projects. Before describing the detailed setup and assumptions of the game, we give a
first intuition of the model. Figure 1.3 depicts a simplified extensive form of our game.
The game starts with nature (N) choosing the value of k. Without knowing this value, the
multilerateral organizationm proposes a constraint for her budget allocation (sA, sA). The
set of donors D then decides whether or not to accept this constraint, followed by them
making aid allocation decisions (i.e., choosing their bilateral and SPTF contributions to
projects A and B (bAdi , b
B
di
, cAdi , c
B
di
)) while the remainder of the aid budget goes as voluntary
18The literature on charitable giving (e.g., Bilodeau and Slivinski 1997) also emphasizes this point.
19This Chapter’s argument thus has some similarity to Sridhar and Woods (2013)’ Trojan Horse argu-
ment. In the global health sector, they observe a move away from the governance and funding of
traditional multilateral institutions reflecting “a desire by participating governments, and others, to
control multilateral agents more tightly.” (p. i). According to them, material incentives are used to
reward and punish actions and behavior.
20 Despite the large number of SPTFs, this new type of portfolio building should not entail high search
and decision costs for donors: First, donors themselves can set up an SPTF corresponding to its
preferences. Second, SPTFs tend to have narrowly defined objectives. Thus, it is relatively easy
for donors to check the overlap with their own priorities. Third, SPTFs do not have their own
implementing agencies in recipient countries and thus rely mostly on multilateral institutions such as
the World Bank and UN agencies for implementation. Therefore donors are already informed about
the respective effectiveness of these multilateral organizations, which is one of the allocation criteria
for donors. However, SPTFs increase overhead and transaction costs as discussed above.
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contributions to the core fund (cCvdi ).
21 After observing these funding decisions, m chooses
whether or not to collect information on the value of k and then either based or not based
on this information decides on the aid allocation (sA ∈ [sA, sA] and sB = 1− sB).
Figure 1.3: Game tree
In presenting the game we follow Rasmusen’s (1989) list to define its necessary elements
before presenting its extensive form. The game models the interaction between two sets of
players, namely a multilateral agent m and a set of donor countries, D, with |D| = n ≥ 2.
All donors are members in the multilateral organization m. These two sets of players may
take a set of actions in the following sequence of play.
First, m proposes a range or value of discretion sA, which corresponds to the share of
the core fund net of costs cm (these costs incurred by m will be discussed below) devoted
to project A, that m agrees to implement (i.e., a set (sA, sA) s.t. 0 ≤ sA ≤ sA ≤ 1).22 The
share devoted to project B, sB, has the property sA + sB = 1.23 Consequently, if sA = 1
and sA = 0 m may devote any share of its aid budget to project A (and thus also to
project B, while sA = 12 and s
A = 12 implies that m has to fund equally the two projects.
The set of donors D either accepts or rejects this proposal according to the decision rules
21To derive the results for five donors and the more general ones (see below) we use the additional (weak)
assumption that indifferent donors will choose the aid channel which gives them most control, i.e., if
indifferent between voluntary core and multi-bi aid (or bilateral aid) they will chose multi-bi aid (or
bilateral aid), while if they are indifferent between multi-bi and bilateral aid, they willchoose bilateral
aid. This is akin to the remark by Mavrotas and Villanger (2006) that, all else equal, governments
like to be in the driver’s seat.
22Consequently, m proposes either a range or a value for sA that she will choose. This would allow for
an extension where D may monitor the value of sA and punish m in case of non-compliance (the
proposal by m might also comprise a schedule of assessed contributions for each di ∈ D).
23Projects A and B and corresponding donor preferences may represent sectors, countries, or implemen-
tation modes (e.g., recipient government vs. NGOs vs. private enterprises).
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that prevail in the governing body of the multilateral organization. Individual decisions
about the discretion request are denoted by padi , the probability of accepting a proposal.
In case of rejection we assume a default level of discretion:
Assumption 1. If m’s proposal for discretion is rejected by D the default level sA =
sA = 12 is imposed.
We also assume
Assumption 2. If a donor is indifferent between the discretion proposed by m and sA =
sA = 12 (i.e., no discretion), she votes for no discretion.
After this decision-making stage and taking into account the level of discretion granted
to m, each donor di ∈ D (i = 1, ..., n) chooses her aid allocation. Aid allocation is subject
to a binding and exhausted budget constraint formed by ydi×tdi×adi , where adi is the share
of the budget devoted to aid,24 and the budget is generated by a flat tax rate tdi imposed
on national income in each donor country ydi . Donors first contribute multilateral core
aid cCdi to the general fund of the multilateral agency through assessed contributions or
membership fees cCadi , which are exogenously determined. The first option for allocating
aid is to make voluntary multilateral contributions cCvdi . For notational clarity, let c
C
di
be a donor’s total multilateral core contributions that consist of assessed and voluntary
contributions (cCdi = c
Ca
di
+ cCvdi ). We furthermore assume for every donor that c
Ca
di
> 0
and cCvdi ≥ 0.25 While we could allow for donor-specific membership fees cCadi , which are
common in multilateral organizations, we assume the same level of assessed contributions
cCa for all donors.
Second, donors may also provide aid to any of the two special purpose (non-core) funds
for projects A and B through contributions cAdi and c
B
di
so that for every donor di, cAdi ≥ 0
and cBdi ≥ 0. Third, may also provide bilateral aid bAi and bBi to projects A and B
respectively, so that for every donor bAi ≥ 0 and bBi ≥ 0.
After observing the allocation decisions by all donors di ∈ D, the agent m decides
whether to obtain information about how aid translates into output. She invests costs cm
24 For an identical assumption, see Mavrotas and Villanger (2006), as adi might also be considered as
the optimal choice by governments given their reelection considerations.
25 At first glance, voluntary core contributions give the multilateral agency essentially the same discretion
as over assessed contributions because the allocation of both voluntary unearmarked and assessed
contributions are subject to the decisions by the multilateral agent’s governing body where donors
are represented. However, this first impression is deceiving: voluntary contributions constitute a
mechanism of control because donors have the right to supply their contribution (or not) as they see
fit, which, in the model, is a function of the discretion granted. For example, each state can determine
for itself what the proper goal of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) should be,
and if it disagrees with its objectives or is dissatisfied with its performance, it is unconstrained by
others in adapting its funding amounts accordingly. Therefore, the level of the core budget is not
a formal decision by multilateral governing bodies, but is instead the aggregate outcome of donors’
decisions (see Graham 2013).
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(cm = cm) or not (cm = 0) to learn the value k ∈ {k, k} which determines the respective
“development effectiveness” of the two projects.26 More specifically, if k is equal to k
then project A offers better value for the money spent, while projet B is preferable if k
is equal to k. Consequently, the two values of k simply indicate which project is more
efficient. Higher (lower) values for k (k) suggest that the differences in terms of efficiency
between the two projects become larger, which may come about by m being more efficient
in handling aid projects. For these variables we assume the following:
Assumption 3. ∑di cCadi ≥ 2cm
Assumption 4. −k = k ∈ (0, 1)
Assumption 3 ensures first of all that learning by m is not constrained by the available
assessed funds. Second, it ensures that for some values of k there exist discretion values
sA such that agent m will actually have an incentive to learn about the effectiveness, k.
Assumption 4, on the other hand, restricts the difference in the development effectiveness
k provided by projects A and B respectively.27
If m decides to invest costs cm = cm, she obtains private information about the ef-
fectiveness k of projects A and B. The multilateral organization m chooses sA and
sB constrained by the rule collectively adopted by the donors D (i.e., sA ∈ [sA, sA]).
Jointly with SPTF contributions from donors, this determines multilateral aid allocations
aA = sA(∑di cCdi − cm) +∑di cAdi and aB = sB(∑di cCdi − cm) +∑di cBdi to projects A and B
respectively. With regard to aid effectiveness, we assume that bilateral aid produces aid
output but it is less “effective” by having contributions weighted by (1− k).28
The aid input from multilateral and bilateral sources thus produces “development”
output for projects A and B according to the value of the effectiveness parameter k:
oA = (1 + k)aA + (1− k)∑di bAdi and oB = (1− k)aB + (1− k)∑di bBdi .29
We further assume
Assumption 5. If m is indifferent among all sA ∈ [sA, sA] then sA∗ = sA+sA2 .
26This is akin to the assumption that multilateral organizations have fixed costs, see Mavrotas and
Villanger (2006).
27As a consequence of this assumption one of the two projects always provides “more bang for the buck,”
and each project provides at least some “bang for the buck.”
28 This imposes an order in terms of aid effectiveness: core contributions, under the assumption of m
learning, translate via the factor (1 + k) into aid output, multi-bi aid by factor 1 and bilateral aid by
factor (1− k). As we discuss below, however, we assume that bilateral aid generates a “premium” in
domestic voter support to donor governments. For a similar assumption, see Mavrotas and Villanger
(2006). Tortora and Steensen (2014) provide evidence that donors consider multilateral aid as more
effective than bilateral aid. The view that multilateral aid is more effective than multi-bi aid is founded
on its flexibility; unlike multilateral aid, multi-bi aid cannot be reallocated to the more effective project
from funds in a SPTF, meaning that misallocation can occur.
29 1
1+k and
1
1−k thus correspond to unit prices of aid output for multilateral aid.
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The informational structure we assume is that the value of k is unknown to both sets
of players, except if m decides to bear the costs for learning its value. Thus the game is
one of imperfect information that we transform into one of incomplete information, by
letting nature N choose the value of k without informing any of the actors we model.
We assume that m and d ∈ D have a common prior belief p(k = k) = 12 about the
value k.
The strategies the two sets of actors may adopt can be characterized as follows. Each
donor di ∈ D chooses bilateral aid (bAdi , bBdi), contributions to SPTFs (cAdi , cBdi) and volun-
tary core contributions (cCvdi ) as well as a voting rule indicating which of m’s proposals
for ranges of sA (and thus also for sB) are accepted, and which are not. The multilateral
agent m, on the other hand, chooses whether to spend cm and, based on the information
obtained (or not), selects sA ∈ [sA, sA] (and thus also sB = 1− sA).
The payoffs for both sets of players are a function of the aid output generated by projects
A and B and, for D, a voter-induced benefit due to bilateral aid. We specify for both
sets of actors very general utility functions. For the set D, with elements {d1, d2, ...dn}
and d1 = 1 and dn = n, we assume the following general utility function:
Udi(oA, oB|di) = wdioA + (1− wdi)oB + vdi(bAdi + bBdi)
where wdi is a weighting factor for the two types of aid outputs, while vdi reflects the
fact that bilateral aid may generate benefits to a donor government independent of aid
output, namely increased voter support. While we could allow for donor-specific values
for vdi , in what follows we will use the same value of v and make the following assumption
Assumption 6. v < 1− k
With this assumption we ensure that the effectiveness of bilateral aid is weakly worse
than all possible expected effectiveness from contributions to special purpose trust funds.30
The view that multilateral aid is more effective than multi-bi aid is founded on its flex-
ibility; unlike multilateral aid, multi-bi aid cannot be reallocated to the more effective
project from funds in a SPTF, meaning that misallocation can occur.
For the distribution of the weighting factors we assume a very general form:
Assumption 7. wdi = F (g(di))
where g is any real-valued function and F has the general properties of a cumulative
density function (i.e., F (−∞) = 0, F (∞) = 1 and F ′ ≥ 0). For our main illustration
we will assume that F is the uniform distribution and g is assumed to be α + βdi with
30 This assumption translates on the one hand the common view held in the literature that international
aid agencies have more capacities, and on the other hand does not preclude that in equilibrium donors
will choose bilateral aid.
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α = −1
n−1 and β =
1
n−1 . Consequently for each di, wi is equal to
di−1
n−1 resulting in the
following utility function:
Udi(oA, oB|di) =
di − 1
n− 1 o
A + n− di
n− 1 o
B + v(bAdi + b
B
di
) (1.1)
The utility function of m is defined as follows:31
Um(oA, oB) = oA + oB
From this it follows that the outcomes of the game are the aid outputs oA and oB.
Given that the specified game is one of incomplete information, the Bayesian subgame
perfect equilibrium concept would be appropriate. As any private information can only
be obtained by agent m after D’s last decision-node, we can solve the game, however, by
backward induction to derive the subgame perfect equilibria.
1.4.1 Analysis: Implications
The game allows us to derive numerous insights into the interplay between donor prefer-
ences and decision-making in multilateral organizations. In this section we first present a
general result before developing our intuition about the model with an equilibrium anal-
ysis of the model restricted to five donors as this is the lowest uneven number for which
unanimity and majority rule lead to different outcomes. Based on this intuition we then
present a set of general results independent of the number of donors n and their preference
distribution, F .
To arrive at these results we solve the game by backward induction and analyze m’s
last two decision nodes (information collection and aid allocation) jointly. Under the
assumption that the range of discretion is centrally located among the preferences of the
set D (i.e., sA = 1− sA),32 we first assess the expected utility for m in the case where she
refrains from collecting information (cm = 0): We find that m is indifferent between all
allocation combinations between projects A and B (sA and sB) and by assumption 5 she
chooses sA = 12 = s
B.33
If m decides to invest cm = cm to learn the effectiveness value k, the agent m’s expected
utility has to be calculated conditional on the information she obtains (using the property
31 As the information gathering cost born by m (i.e., cm) reduces the possible aid output, these costs
indirectly reducem’s utility. Also note thatm is considered a “benevolent” aid allocator in this model.
Future work might consider a more budget-maximizing version, e.g., Um(aA, aB , cm) = aA +aB − cm.
The utility function specified for m assumes risk-neutrality, which might be justified by the fact that
m only cares about output generated by funds made available by other actors than herself, and she
has to exhaust the available funds for aid.
32 Assumption 7 and the restrictions on dis’ preferences (see above) ensure that this is part of any possible
equilibrium.
33 We present the derivations of this and the following findings in the appendix.
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that sB = 1 − sA).34 In what follows we replace sA|(k = k) = sB|(k = k) with s∗ and
sB|(k = k) = sA|(k = k) with 1 − s∗ (by symmetry). In addition we will systematically
use k for situations where the value of k is known (and by assumption 4 we can replace k
with 1-k). In the case of indifference, we assume m will collect information. Comparing
the expected utilities for the two cases of cm allows us to determine the conditions under
which m will acquire information, namely if
EUm(cm = cm) ≥ EUm(cm = 0)∑
di
cCdi(2ks
∗ − k)− cm(1− k + 2ks∗) ≥ 0
∑
di c
C
di
(2ks∗ − k)
1− k + 2ks∗ ≥ cm (1.2)
Assuming fixed ∑di cCdi we may use equation 1.2 to determine the lowest value of dis-
cretion s∗ so that m will collect information. This is the case when s∗ =
k(
∑
di
cCdi
−cm)+cm
2k(
∑
di
cC
di
−cm) .
As by assumption 3 the minimal amount to be found in the core fund through assessed
contributions is larger than the costs for collecting information, and the latter costs are
strictly positive, this minimal value for s∗ is strictly larger than 12 .
35 We can state this
result in the following proposition as a set of comparative statics results:
Proposition 1. With increasing core funds (∑di cCdi), higher values for k and sA, m is
more likely to collect information, provided, in the two former cases, the condition sA > 12
holds.
The proof of Proposition 1 immediately follows from equation 1.2 and taking derivatives
with respect to the three variables.
In a next step, we solve the game for its equilibria under two decision-making rules,
namely unanimity and majority rule with five donors. Given our assumptions regarding
34 Strictly speaking, for the two conditional utilities (depending on the value of k) we also have two sets
of conditional share parameters (i.e., sA|(k = k) and sB |(k = k), resp. sA|(k = k) and sB |k = k)).
By symmetry we know that sA|(k = k) = 1− sB |(k = k) and the same for k = k. As the values for k
are such that k = −k we also know that sA|(k = k) = sB |(k = k) (i.e., irrespective of which project
yields more “bang for the buck,” the share devoted to the more effective one will be the same).
35 Assumption 3 in addition guarantees that some k exists such that this lower bound for sA does not
exceed 1. This is used as part of the proof of Proposition 6 in the appendix.
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the distribution of weighting factors the five donors have the following utility functions:
EUd1 = oB + v(bAd1 , b
B
d1)
EUd2 =
1
4o
A + 34o
B + v(bAd2 , b
B
d2)
EUd3 =
1
2o
A + 12o
B + v(bAd3 , b
B
d3)
EUd4 =
3
4o
A + 14o
B + v(bAd4 , b
B
d4)
EUd5 = oA + v(bAd5 , b
B
d5)
We first derive the optimal allocation rules for five donors, which depend on the discretion
(sA, sA) given to m, the utility donors obtain from voters and interest groups by giving
bilateral aid (v), and the importance of m’s knowledge (k).36 Figure 1.4 depicts the
optimal voluntary aid allocations for possible values of k.
The figures show that all non-extremist donors, for particular values of the relevant
variables, might provide any of the voluntary aid categories. The two extreme donors d1
and d5 will never provide voluntary core contributions. Using the “no-discretion” equi-
librium value for sA, namely 12 , that results from a unanimity voting rule and employing
the insights depicted in Figure 1.4 we can generate the equilibrium aid allocations for the
five donors as a function of k and v. Figure 1.5 depicts the aid allocation decisions made
by the five donors under unanimity for all possible combinations of these two variables.37
Figure 1.5 shows that when the gain through the knowledge of m (k) is large (or the
effectiveness of bilateral aid is small) compared to the utility a donor might get from
voters (v), multi-bi aid is the most attractive option for donors.38 As voter concerns loom
larger compared to the gain due to knowledge, bilateral aid, first for “moderate” donors
and then increasingly for more extremist donors, becomes more attractive.
Figure 1.6 depicts which discretion levels will be adopted by majority rule and the
resulting aid allocation decisions for all possible combinations of k and v.39 The compar-
ison of Figure 1.6 with Figure 1.5 shows how decision-making rules affect aid allocation
decisions and the use of multi-bi aid by donors. Under unanimity (Figure 1.5) we noted
that for high effectiveness gains for the multilateral relative to the importance of voters,
multi-bi aid is attractive to all donors, except the median donor d3. Donor d3 makes
either voluntary core or bilateral contributions. Under majority rule there is a range for
high values of k such that a majority of donors gives m maximum discretion and as a
36 We present the derivation of these allocation rules in the appendix.
37 These results are formally stated and proven in the appendix.
38 In the appendix we also derive and illustrate the equilibrium discretion and aid allocation decisions
under the assumption that SPTFs are not available.
39 These results are again stated formally and proven in the appendix.
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Figure 1.4: Aid allocation decisions of donors in equilibrium
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Figure 1.5: Equilibria under unanimity (which implies sA = 12)
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consequence the donors make voluntary core contributions (Figure 1.6). As k decreases,
a majority no longer supports any level of discretion and thus there is no advantage in
core contributions. Thus, for low values of v, and just as under unanimity, multi-bi is
attractive for all donors except the median one because multi-bi aid is more effective than
bilateral aid. As v becomes more important relative to k, first the median donor switches
to bilateral aid before the remaining donors start joining her. Finally, all donors give
bilateral aid (for relatively high values of v compared to k). Under unanimity rule, m
is less likely to receive any voluntary core contributions at all than under majority rule
and, even if she receives any, she gets less. This occurs because under unanimity only
d3 contributes voluntary core resources and even then she contributes for a smaller range
of values of k and v than under a majority regime where discretion is granted to m. By
exclusivity of a contribution, multi-bi aid is used less in the majority rule situation.40
40 These main results for a model with five donors can easily be extended by dropping the assumption
of a uniform distribution of donors’ preferences. If we assume that donors d1 and d5 have the same
preferences as donors d2 and d4 respectively it is easy to show that discretion is granted under certain
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Figure 1.6: Equilibria under majority rule
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1.4.2 General Results
Having developed our intuition for the game we now turn to a set of general results that
apply to any number of donors n and any preference distribution F . To generate these
general results we note first that in equilibrium only donors who might give voluntary core
contributions will vote for any level of discretion for m (i.e., sA 6= 12 6= sA). Consequently,
we will first assess the optimal aid allocation rule for a generic donor di and, based on this,
analyze undhich er what circumstances an unanimous or majority decision might lead to
giving m discretion. Based on this we will then assess what the optimal aid allocation
conditions to m even under unanimity rule. The outcomes in terms of discretion and aid allocation
become very similar to those depicted in Figure 1.6. Assessing the consequences of majority rule
unsurprisingly shows that the same equilibrium outcomes result, as any decision on discretion in
practice involves all donors. If we assume that the distribution of preferences is more centered (i.e.,
d1 = 14 , d2 = d3 = d4 =
1
2 ), we again find that under unanimity discretion may be granted to m and
the resulting outcomes in equilibria are very similar to those depicted in Figure 1.6. Under majority
rule, however, discretion is always granted to m. As a consequence it is much more likely that donors
give voluntary core aid, while multi-bi aid becomes much less popular in equilibrium.
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rules for all donors D are and derive a set of general propositions.
Proposition 2. Under unanimity discretion is only granted to m if ∀ di
wdi ∈ max((
1− k − 2ksA + 2v
2(1− k) ,
1− k
2 − ks
A),min(1− k2 + ks
A,
1− k + 2ksA − 2v
2(1− k) )).
(1.3)
The proof of Proposition 2 (see Section 1.A) relies on assessing the set of weighting
factors wdi for which voluntary core contributions are optimal. The Proposition also
nicely shows why in our example with five donors and a uniform preference distribution
discretion was never granted under unanimity. As the expression 1+k2 − ksA is strictly
positive (and 1−k2 +ksA < 1 ), with a uniform distribution of preferences the most extreme
donors will always have a wdi that falls outside of the interval specified in Proposition 2.
A corollary follows immediately from Proposition 2:
Corollary 1. Under q-majority discretion is only granted to m if the set W , which con-
tains all di for which wdi ∈ max((1−k−2ksA+2v2(1−k) , 1−k2 − ksA),min(1−k2 + ksA, 1−k+2ks
A−2v
2(1−k) ))
fulfills the condition |W |
n
≥ q.
As Corollary 1 covers unanimity as a limiting case (i.e., q = 1) we derive two general
equilibrium propositions under q-majority rule:
Proposition 3. If the conditions |W |
n
≥ q and k+k22 ≥ v hold then the following strategies
form the unique subgame perfect equilibrium:
m :
{s
A = 1, cm = cm, sA = 1} if k = k
{sA = 1, cm = cm, sA = 0} if k = k
∀di ∈ D :

{padi(sA ∈ [12 , 1]) = 1, cCvdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa}
∀di s.t. wdi ∈ (1−k2 , 1+k2 )
{padi(sA 6= 12) = 0, cBdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa} ∀di s.t. wdi ∈ (12 − k−v1−k , 1−k2 ]
{padi(sA 6= 12) = 0, cAdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa} ∀di s.t. wdi ∈ [1+k2 , 12 + k−v1−k )
{padi(sA 6= 12) = 0, bBdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa} ∀di s.t. wdi ∈ [k−vk , 12 − k−v1−k ]
{padi(sA 6= 12) = 0, bAdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa} ∀di s.t. wdi ∈ [12 + k−v1−k , vk ]
{padi(sA 6= 12) = 0, cBdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa} ∀di s.t. wdi < k−vk
{padi(sA 6= 12) = 0, cAdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa} ∀di s.t. wdi > vk
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while if the conditions |W |
n
≥ q and k+k22 < v hold then the following strategies form the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium:
m :
{s
A = 1, cm = cm, sA = 1} if k = k
{sA = 1, cm = cm, sA = 0} if k = k
∀di ∈ D :

{padi(sA ∈ [12 , 1]) = 1, cCvdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa} ∀di s.t. wdi ∈ (12 − k−v1−k , 12 + k−v1−k )
{padi(sA 6= 12) = 0, bBdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa} ∀di s.t. wdi ∈ [1−k2 , 12 − k−v1−k ]
{padi(sA 6= 12) = 0, bAdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa} ∀di s.t. wdi ∈ [12 + k−v1−k , 1+k2 ]
{padi(sA 6= 12) = 0, cBdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa} ∀di s.t. wdi < 1−k2
{padi(sA 6= 12) = 0, cAdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa} ∀di s.t. wdi > 1+k2
Proposition 4. If the conditions |W |
n
< q and k2 ≥ v hold then the following strategies
form the unique subgame perfect equilibrium:
m :

{sA = 1, cm = 0, sA = 12} if sA = 12
{sA = 1, cm = cm, sA = 1} if sA > 12 and k = k
{sA = 1, cm = cm, sA = 0} if sA > 12 and k = k
∀di ∈ D :

{padi(sA 6= 12) = 0, cBdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa} ∀di s.t. wdi ∈ (1− vk , 12)
{padi(sA 6= 12) = 0, cAdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa} ∀di s.t. wdi ∈ (12 , vk )
{padi(sA 6= 12) = 0, bBdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa} ∀di s.t. wdi ≤ 1− vk
{padi(sA 6= 12) = 0, bAdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa} ∀di s.t. wdi ≥ vk
while if the conditions |W |
n
< q and v < k2 hold then the following strategies form the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium:
m :

{sA = 1, cm = 0, sA = 12} if sA = 12
{sA = 1, cm = cm, sA = 1} if sA > 12 and k = k
{sA = 1, cm = cm, sA = 0} if sA > 12 and k = k
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∀di ∈ D :
{padi(s
A 6= 12) = 0, bBdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa} ∀di s.t. wdi < 12
{padi(sA 6= 12) = 0, bAdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa} ∀di s.t. wdi > 12
A series of implications follows from these three Propositions. First of all, Proposition
2 suggests that if not all donors see at least some benefit in both projects A and B no
amount of specialized information obtainable by m will allow for a unanimous decision
in favor of discretion (it is obvious that less demanding q-majorities will be more easily
attainable). Second, when voter-induced benefits from bilateral aid decrease relative to
the specialized information obtainable by m, discretion becomes more likely. Third, when
voter preferences are more centrally located and less spread out, discretion also becomes
more likely.
Regarding fund allocations, discretion obviously matters as well. First, if such discretion
is not granted and voter concerns loom large compared to the specialized information
obtainable by m (i.e., v ≥ k2 ) then donors will only give bilateral aid (see Proposition
4). If voters’ interests do not loom as large, and discretion is still not granted, the most
moderate donors will contribute to SPTFs, while more extremist donors (preferring either
project A or B much more) will only engage in bilateral aid.
Finally, if discretion is granted it will be supported by centrist donors who will also
contribute voluntary core contributions as a consequence. Contributions to SPTFs will
depend on the interaction of the importance of voters and the donors’ preferences. For
a given combination of importance of voters and the value of specialized information
obtainable by m, donor preferences have non-monotonic effects. More precisely, donors
with more extreme preferences will not necessarily engage in bilateral aid. Under some
circumstances SPTFs are more attractive to such a donor. More extreme donors, however,
will shun voluntary core contributions that are allocated among projects by m. Our
analysis of a version of our game without SPTFs (see appendix) nicely demonstrates
that the commonly assumed notion that preference heterogeneity among donors reduces
multilateral aid only holds if SPTFs are not an option. Consequently, while much of
the literature dealing with issues of delegation and bi- and multilateral aid suggests that
preference heterogeneity has a monotonic effect on the choice of aid channel, our model
suggests its effects are conditional. If the multilateral agent m is completely constrained
then we find that increasing preference heterogeneity will lead to more bilateral aid (even
exclusively if voters’ interest loom large, i.e., if v ≥ k2 ).
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1.5 Discussion
The results of our game-theoretical model clearly show that decision rules in multilateral
organizations and donor preferences interact in more complicated and non-monotonic
ways in aid allocation decisions if SPTFs are available to donors.
Our model first shows that the interaction between decision rules and donor preferences
offers an explanation for the conditions under which SPTFs are attractive for donors.
SPTFs are an appealing alternative, in particular for donors with extreme preferences,
when core contributions do not give substantially more output, and when governments
generate only little utility from bilateral aid through voters and interest groups. If the
latter factor becomes more important, bilateral aid becomes more attractive.
Second, we show that the absence of SPTFs changes the allocation between bilateral
and core voluntary contributions. Under both decision rules we consider, the absence
of SPTFs increases the tendency to provide voluntary core contributions for all donors
and bilateral aid increases relative to a situation with SPTFs. An agent, or a collective
principal, with a preference for voluntary core contributions should not be in favor of
a multilateral aid organization to allow for multi-bi aid. However, if the multilateral
organization and its principals seek to maximize assets managed and implemented by the
organization or to minimize aid channeled bilaterally, with, for example the goal to limit
fragmentation in recipient countries, it is optimal to offer SPTFs.
Given that the propositions derived from our model provide for rich insights related to
the funding of IOs in general and the emergence of SPTFs in particular, in what follows
we offer more precise implications and empirical illustrations related to them.
First, from Propositions 3 and 4 we know that voluntary core-contributions only oc-
cur if a required majority (or unanimity) supports giving the agent m discretion. As
Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 show, with increasing preference diversity, granting discre-
tion becomes less likely. Consequently, with increasing preference diversity we should see
fewer voluntary core contributions and, by implication, larger resistance to increasing as-
sessed core contributions. Figure 1.7 offers some evidence in support of this claim for the
specialized agencies of the United Nations. The horizontal axis depicts the yearly mean
value of a commonly used preference similarity measure (κ) calculated on the basis of all
votes (including consensus actions) on resolutions in the UN General Assembly (Häge and
Hug 2016). The vertical axis shows the share of voluntary (earmarked and unearmarked)
contributions in the total UN budget.41 While the relationship is not strong (with several
outliers) we still find the expected positive trend. As UN members vote more similarly
41Source: Total UN System Contributions Data compiled by Klaus Hüfner (Senior Research Fellow,
Global Policy Forum): https://www.globalpolicy.org/un-finance/tables-and-charts-on-un-finance/un-
system-budget/27505-total-un-system-contributions.html (consulted August 5, 2015).
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in the General Assembly (higher value of κ), the share of voluntary core contributions
increases.42
Figure 1.7: Preference heterogeneity and voluntary contributions to specialized UN
agencies as share of total UN contributions
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Notes: In a regression of the mean value of kappa on the share of voluntary contributions to UN agencies,
the p− value of the coefficient is 0.052. The adjusted R-squared is 0.066.
These changes in relative importance of assessed and voluntary contributions should
be related, according to our model, to the funding types allowed by UN agencies. In an
insightful study of funding rules, Graham (2015) shows that these have evolved quite con-
siderably since the inception of the UN. For our implications two elements from her study
are of crucial importance. First, most specialized UN agencies, especially those founded
in recent times, started off without assessed core contributions as financing mechanism.
Second, especially in the 1970s and 1990s more and more of the agencies opened up the
possibility of allowing voluntary contributions, especially of the earmarked type. If we
relate these changes again to our measure for preference heterogeneity as depicted in Fig-
ure 1.8, it transpires that in both the 1970s and the 1990s the mean value of κ decreased
42While there appears to be a trend towards a higher share of voluntary non-core contributions to the UN
budget (Graham 2015: 180ff), Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2017) note that the quality of the OECD
data has improved over time. As the time trend for our preference heterogeneity measure (see Figure
1.8) is in addition quite different, we consider Figure 1.7 still a plausible indication of the link between
preferences and core contributions.
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considerably, implying that preference heterogeneity increased. As Graham (2015) shows,
the number of multilateral organizations accepting voluntary funding increased in these
two periods.
Figure 1.8: Preference heterogeneity of donors over time based on UN General Assembly
votes
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Propositions 3 and 4 also imply that the increasing importance of voter concerns (v)
and the decreasing expertise of the agent m (k) lead to fewer and lower core contributions
(cCvdi ). Figure 1.9 offers tentative evidence that better evaluated agencies (i.e., those
agencies with a higher k)43 attract more funding for special purpose trust funds (multi-bi
43 The nineteen large Western donor countries organized in the MOPAN jointly assess the organizational
effectiveness of major multilateral agencies. Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Net-
work (MOPAN) scores were coded from Cooperation (2013), which based its scoring on MOPAN
data. The quantitative MOPAN assessments are not publicly available otherwise. Higher scores sig-
nal increasing organizational effectiveness. When we set the scores from any of the individual donor
countries which individually evaluated multilateral organization and made scores publicly available
37
1 The Politics of Special Purpose Trust Funds
aid)44 than others, at least in absolute terms.45
Figure 1.9: Evaluation score by donors and average multi-bi aid and multilateral aid
across multilateral organizations (2008-2012)
AfDB
AsDB
Global Fund
IFAD
OHCHR UNAIDS
UNDP
UNEP
UNFPA
UNHCR
UNICEF
UNODC
UNRWA
WFP
WHO
World Bank
-2
5
0
25
50
75
C
on
st
an
t 2
01
3 
U
S
D
 m
ill
io
n
2.2 2.45 2.7 2.95 3.2
MOPAN
Average multi-bi aid
AfDB
AsDB
IFAD
UNDP
UNFPAUNHCR
UNICEF
UNRWA WFP
World Bank
-2
5
0
25
50
75
10
0
12
5
15
0
17
5
20
0
22
5
C
on
st
an
t 2
01
3 
U
S
D
 m
ill
io
n
2.4 2.6 2.8 3 3.2
MOPAN
Average multilateral aid
Notes: The y-axis shows the annual amount received by different multilateral organizations from all
donors by aid type (in constant 2013 US$ million). The x-Axis shows the performance score given by the
Multilateral Organizations Performance Assessment Network MOPAN.
(i.e., the United Kingdom, Australia, Denmark and Canada) against their use of multi-bi aid we
obtain similar results. For comparative purposes, we transformed all scores to a 4-point scale.
44Multi-bi aid figures are based on the multi-bi aid dataset (Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2017), other ODA
data come from OECD (2015).
45The figure comes, however, also with several caveats. First, both panels of Figure 1.9 are restricted to
those multilateral organizations for which MOPAN evaluation scores are available because there are
no alternative measures of the quality of multilateral organizations. Second, the sample of IOs in the
right-hand panel is further restricted because multilateral (voluntary and assessed) core aid received
by the World Health Organisation (WHO), the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), UNAIDS, the
UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Global Fund is not available from the OECD so that comparability
would not be assured. Furthermore, there might be concerns that the positive relationship between
the amount of multi-bi aid and the MOPAN score is driven by outliers. Note, however, that the “out-
liers”, the World Bank, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the UN Development Programme
(UNDP) are multilateral organizations with broad sectoral and geographical mandates. To never-
theless alleviate these concerns we fitted also for both panels of Figure 1.9 a second line excluding
these “outliers.” Specifically, we fitted the line without the values for the World Bank, UNICEF and
UNDP for the left hand panel and without the World Bank for the right-hand panel. The positive
relationship is less pronounced without these “outliers” but still present.
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Finally, in Figure 1.10 we provide suggestive evidence regarding the role of public
opinion. More precisely, we use data from the Eurobarometer over time to depict the
share of respondents considering national governments as most useful in providing aid and
the share of bilateral aid. The implication from our model is that as voter concerns about
the use of foreign aid increase, i.e., opinion shifting towards bilateral implementation of
foreign aid, the government will move from voluntary core funding and SPTFs to bilateral
aid. The correlational evidence for three major European donor countries in Figure 1.10
support this implication. In the United Kingdom, France and Germany, there is a clear
positive relationship between public opinion and the share of bilateral aid.
Figure 1.10: Public opinion and share of bilateral aid in the aid budget of selected
European countries
1983
1987 1996
2009
2010
5
10
15
%
 o
f r
es
po
ns
es
46 48 50 52 54 56
% of bilateral aid
United Kingdom
1983
1987
1996
2009
2010
0
10
20
%
 o
f r
es
po
ns
es
55 60 65 70 75 80 85
% of bilateral aid
France
1983
1987
1996
2009
20105
15
25
%
 o
f r
es
po
ns
es
55 60 65 70 75
% of bilateral aid
Germany
Notes: The y-Axis shows the average percentage share of affirmative answers to a Eurobarometer question
of the type: “[...]which one do you think provides the most useful help to the Third World countries?”
Response options slightly change between survey waves but always include the national government, inter-
national organizations (UN and other international organizations are distinct options in some years), the
European Community, and NGOs. The x-Axis shows the percentage share of bilateral aid disbursements
of total aid disbursements. Source: http://www.gesis.org/eurobarometer-data-service/data-access/
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1.6 Conclusion
The increasing importance of special purpose trust funds raises a series of questions con-
cerning their consequences for aid effectiveness, recipient countries, and multilateral or-
ganizations. These consequences are, however, hard to ascertain in the absence of a clear
understanding of what leads donors to eschew traditional channels of aid-giving, i.e.,
bilateral or “traditional” multilateral channels.
We propose a simple game-theoretical model as a first stepping stone towards under-
standing this complex situation. The model allows donors not only to provide voluntary
contributions (beyond the compulsory assessed contributions) to a core fund, but also to
disburse additional aid to special purpose trust funds or undertake their own bilateral aid
activities. For simplicity we assumed that the special purpose trust funds only use the
money to finance one specific project, while the multilateral aid agency may divert the
core fund (inside approved bounds) to the more effective project. In addition to allowing
donors to allocate their non-assessed aid budget to the core fund, to a special purpose
trust fund, or to spend it bilaterally, the donors jointly decide the discretion that the
multilateral agent has in allocating her budget. We show that the allocation decisions
depend upon the decision rule, which interacts in non-intuitive ways with the distribution
of preferences among donors. More specifically, contrary to what is normally assumed in
principal-agent approaches when dealing with multiple principals, preference heterogene-
ity does not lead monotonically and uniformly to aid disbursed through channels under
increasingly tighter control of the individual principal. While we can show that this effect
holds if SPTFs are not allowed, this simple relationship breaks down when multi-bi aid
becomes a possibility for donors.
While a complete empirical evaluation of the implications of our model is beyond the
scope of this Chapter, we offered a few suggestive pieces of empirical evidence in support
of the insights gleaned from our model. we offered a few suggestive pieces of empirical
evidence in support of the insights gleaned from our model. Preference heterogeneity
appears to influence the share of core funding and also the adoption of the possibility for
funding aid through SPTFs. Also, we find evidence that SPTFs are mostly established at
multilateral organizations that are evaluated positively, i.e., organizations that are likely
to have more expertise.
Finally,despite the fact that we motivated the model by the rise in SPTFs, its generality
has implications for the study of multilateral organizations and their funding more broadly.
The implications of the model complement those of Hüfner’s (2003) and Mazower’s (2012)
discussion of the changes in the funding of the United Nations system. The finding about
the non-monotonic effect of preference heterogeneity on the choice of the aid channel (and
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delegation more broadly speaking) also questions conclusions casually drawn by scholars
relying on principal-agent approaches.
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1.A Appendix: Formal Derivation of the Model in
“The Politics of Special Purpose Trust Funds”
In this appendix we first derive the donors’ optimal allocation rules for the game with
‖D‖ = 5 before presenting the proofs of the propositions and the lemma that were pre-
sented without proofs in the main text.
Derivation of the Agent’s Utility
The expected utility of m when she abstains from collecting information:
EUm(cm = 0) =
1
2[(1 + k)(s
A
∑
di
cCdi + (1− k)
∑
di
bAdi +
∑
di
cAdi) +
(1− k)(sB∑
di
cCdi + (1− k)
∑
di
bBdi +
∑
di
cBdi)] +
1
2[(1 + k)(s
A
∑
di
cCdi + (1− k)
∑
di
bAdi +
∑
di
cAdi) +
(1− k)(sB∑
di
cCdi + (1− k)
∑
di
bBdi +
∑
di
cBdi)]
= sA
∑
di
cCdi + (1− k)
∑
di
bAdi + (1− k)
∑
di
bBdi +
∑
di
cAdi +
∑
di
cBdi +
(1− sA)∑
di
cCdi
=
∑
di
cCdi + (1− k)
∑
di
bAdi + (1− k)
∑
di
bBdi +
∑
di
cAdi +
∑
di
cBdi (1.4)
The expected utility of m when she collects information:
EUm(cm = cm, k = k) = (1 + k)[s∗(
∑
di
cCdi − cm) + (1− k)
∑
di
bAdi +
∑
di
cAdi)] +
(1− k)[(1− s∗)(∑
di
cCdi − cm) + (1− k)
∑
di
bBdi +
∑
di
cBdi ] (1.5)
EUm(cm = cm, k = k) = (1− k)[(1− s∗)(
∑
di
cCdi − cm) + (1− k)
∑
di
bAdi +
∑
di
cAdi)] +
(1 + k)[s∗(
∑
di
cCdi − cm) + (1− k)
∑
di
bBdi +
∑
di
cBdi ] (1.6)
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Consequently, this unconditional expected utility reduces to (taking into account the
notation introduced above):
EUm(cm = cm) = (1 + k)[s∗(
∑
di
cCdi − cm)] + (1− k)(1− s∗)(
∑
di
cCdi − cm) +
1
2(1 + k)((1− k)
∑
di
bAdi +
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cAdi) +
1
2(1− k)((1− k)
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cBdi)
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∑
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di
bBdi
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∑
di
bBdi +
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di
cAdi +
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di
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∑
di
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cm(1− k + 2ks∗) +
∑
di
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∗ − k) (1.7)
Derivation of the Donors’ Allocation Rules
For d1, we have expected utility
EUd1 =
0
4[
1
2(1− k)[
∑
di6=1
cAdi + c
A
d1 +
∑
di
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1
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Partial derivatives of EUd1 with respect to d1’s choice variables are
δEUd1
δcCvd1
= ksA + 1− k2
δEUd1
δcAd1
= 0
δEUd1
δcBd1
= 1
δEUd1
δbAd1
= v
δEUd1
δbBd1
= (1− k) + v (1.9)
For d2 we have
EUd2 =
1
4[
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+v(bAd2 + b
B
d2) (1.10)
Partial derivatives of EUd2 with respect to d2’s choice variables are
δEUd2
δcCvd2
= ksA + 1− k2
δEUd2
δcAd2
= 14
δEUd2
δcBd2
= 34
δEUd2
δbAd2
= 14(1− k) + v
δEUd2
δbBd2
= 34(1− k) + v (1.11)
For d3, we have the expected utility
EUd3 =
1
2[
∑
di 6=1
cAdi + c
A
d3 + (
∑
di
cCdi − cm)(ksA +
1− k
2 ) + (1− k)b
A
d3)]
+12[
∑
di 6=1
cBdi + c
B
d3 + (
∑
di
cCdi − cm)(ksA +
1− k
2 ) + (1− k)b
B
d3 ]
+v[bAd3 + b
B
d3 ] (1.12)
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Partial derivatives of EUd3 with respect to d3’s choice variables are
δEUd3
δcCvd3
= ksA + 1− k2
δEUd3
δcAd3
= 12
δEUd3
δcBd3
= 12
δEUd3
δbAd3
= 12(1− k) + v
δEUd3
δbBd3
= 12(1− k) + v (1.13)
For d4 and d5, the partial derivatives are symmetric to d2 and d1 respectively, only that
the former preferences lean towards B whereas the later prefer A.
Conditions determining allocation decisions
Now, we look at the determinants of each donor’s aid allocation. First, donor d1 provides
voluntary core resources (i.e., cCvd1 > 0 ) if ksA +
1−k
2 > 1 and ksA +
1−k
2 > (1 − k) + v.
The relevant limits for k are:
ksA + 1− k2 > 1
2ksA − k > 1
k >
1
2sA − 1 (1.14)
and
ksA + 1− k2 > (1− k) + v
2ksA + k > 1 + 2v
k >
1 + 2v
2sA + 1
(1.15)
From this, we may determine the value of v that makes one or the other of these k binding,
1
2sA − 1 >
1 + 2v
2sA + 1
2sA + 1 > 2sA + 4sAv − 1− 2v
1
2sA − 1 > v (1.16)
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Second, the SPTF for project B will receive funds (i.e., cBd2 > 0) if 1 > 1 − k + v and
1 > ksA + 1−k2 . The first inequality holds for k > v. For the second inequality we obtain:
1 > ksA + 1− k2
1
2sA − 1 > k
(1.17)
Thus, we find that for 1
2sA−1 > v, multi-bi aid is provided if
1
2sA−1 > k > v.
Finally, d1 provides bilateral aid for project B (i.e., bBd1 > 0) if 1 − k + v > 1 and
1− k + v > ksA + 1−k2 . The first inequality holds for v > k. For the second inequality we
obtain:
1− k + v > ksA + 1− k2
1 + 2v > 2ksA + k
1 + 2v
2sA + 1
> k (1.18)
Determining the respective v we find:
1 + 2v
2sA + 1
> v
1 + v > 2vsA
1
1sA − 1 > v (1.19)
Donor d2 provides voluntary core funds (i.e., cCvd2 > 0) if ksA +
1−k
2 >
3
4 and ksA +
1−k
2 >
3
4(1− k) + v. We now look for the values of k for which d2 provides voluntary core funds.
ksA + 1− k2 >
3
4
4ksA − 2k > 1
k >
1
4sA − 2 (1.20)
and
ksA + 1− k2 >
3
4(1− k) + v
4ksA + k > 1 + 4v
k >
1 + 4v
4sA + 1
(1.21)
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From this, we may determine the value of v that determines which one of these k is
binding,
1
4sA − 2 >
1 + 4v
4sA + 1
4sA + 1 > 4sA + 16sAv − 2− 8v
3
16sA − 8 > v (1.22)
Second, d2 contributes to the special fund B (i.e., cBd2 > 0) if
3
4 > ks
A + 1−k2 and
3
4 >
3
4(1− k) + v. The relevant constraints for k are:
3
4 > ks
A + 1− k2
1 > k(4sA − 2)
1
4sA − 2 > k (1.23)
and
3
4 >
3
4(1− k) + v
3 > 3− 3k + 4v
k >
4v
3 (1.24)
From this, we may again determine the value of v, for which these limits on k are
binding
1
4sA − 2 > k >
4v
3
3 > 4v(4sA − 2)
3
16sA − 8 > v (1.25)
Finally, d2 provides bilateral aid to project B (i.e., bBd2 > 0) if
3
4(1 − k) + v > ksA + 1−k2
and 34(1− k) + v > 34 . The relevant values for the limits on k are:
3
4(1− k) + v > ks
A + 1− k2
1 + 4v > 4ksA + k
1 + 4v
4sA + 1
> k (1.26)
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and
3
4(1− k) + v >
3
4
3− 3k + 4v > 3
4v
3 > k (1.27)
Next, we determine the values of v that determine which of these limits on k is binding:
1 + 4v
4sA + 1
>
4v
3
3 + 12v > 16vsA + 4v
3
16sA − 8 > v (1.28)
Donor d2 may provide voluntary core contributions to the multilateral, give to SPTFs for
project B or provide bilateral aid for project B.
Because of perfect symmetry, d4 and d5 face exactly the same constraints as d1 and
d2. First, donor d3 will provide core contributions (i.e., cCvd3 > 0) if ksA +
1−k
2 >
1
2 and
ksA + 1−k2 >
1−k
2 + v. The relevant k are:
ksA + 1− k2 >
1
2
2ksA − k > 0
(1.29)
This inequality always holds for k > 0 as long as sA > 12 . Therefore, d3 will always prefer
to give core funding to contributing through any of the SPTF, except if sA = 12 in which
case she is indifferent and will choose one of the SPTFs (by assumption she’s indifferent
between the two SPTFs). We now look at the inequality determining the threshold for
which d3 prefers core over bilateral contributions.
ksA + 1− k2 >
1− k
2 + v
k >
v
sA
(1.30)
Second, d3 provides funds to the special fund B (i.e., cBd3 > 0) if
1
2 > ks
A + 1−k2 and
1
2 >
1
2(1 − k) + v. Because the first inequality never holds when sA > 12 (see above), d3
never contributes to SPTF B (nor A) under these circumstances.
Finally, donor d3 supports project B bilaterally (i.e., bBd3 > 0) if
1−k
2 + v > ksA +
1−k
2
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and 12(1− k) + v > 12 . For the first inequality to hold, we need k such that
1− k
2 + v > ks
A + 1− k2
v
sA
> k (1.31)
As for the later inequality, d3 will provide bilateral aid whenever 2v > k. Looking at the
values of v for the k, we get
v
sA
> 2v
1
2 > s
A (1.32)
By assumption, this will never happen. Thus, d3 never gives multi-bi aid for any value
of v if sA > 12 . Donors d1 and d5 will never make core contributions independent of the
values of sA (and all other variables).
This leads directly to our proposition regarding the equilibrium under unanimity rule:
Proposition 5. With five donors with preferences distributed uniformely under unanimity
rule no discretion is granted to m (sA = 12), who will refrain from learning the value of k.
This proposition follows immediately from the observation that d1 and d5 will make
no voluntary core contributions. As it is only through the latter that donors’ utility is
affected by sA, by assumption 2 d1 and d5 will reject any level of discretion leading to
sA = 12 . Q.E.D.
Proposition 5 suggests that only under majority rule can a subset of the five donors
adopt sufficient discretion for m to engage in learning. As m’s utility is strictly increasing
in sA and in ∑di cCdi we first derive the conditions under which the donors will contribute
core funds under the assumption of sA = 1. Under this assumption the following propo-
sition follows rather simply:
Proposition 6. With five donors with preferences distributed uniformely under majority
rule sA = 1 is accepted by donors d2, d3 and d4 who will give core contributions if and
only if either of the following two sets of conditions is fulfilled:
i) if v < min(1− k, 38) and k > 12
ii) v < 1− k and 38 < v < 5k−14
Proof of proposition 6: We know (from above) that if m obtains information on the
value of k her utility is strictly increasing in sA and ∑di cCdi . Thus, it is in m’s interest
to set (if possible) sA = 1 and have all donors to contribute to ∑di cCdi . Consequently, in
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what follows we determine the conditions under which all donors, only two or only one
contribute(s) to the core fund.
From above we know that d1 contributes to the core fund under two conditions, namely
if either 1−k > v > 1
2sA−1 and k >
1+2v
1+2sA
or v < 1
2sA−1 (and v < 1−k) and k >
1
2sA−1 . The
first condition implies that 1− k > 1
2sA−1 or after rearranging that k(1− 2sA) > 1− 2sA.
This condition can never hold, as the expression in parenthesis is strictly smaller than 0
for all sA > 12 while the right hand side of the expression is strictly positive for all values
for sA. Regarding the second set of conditions the constraint that k > 1
2sA−1 is never
fulfilled as both k and sA can never exceed 1. This proves that d1 (and by symmetry d5)
will never contribute core funds. It also implies that under unanimity rule m will never
get any discretion, as d1 and d5 will vote against any sA 6= 12 .
As any discretion under unanimity is rejected it follows that all donors will make their
aid allocation decision based on sA = 12 . Figure 1.5 in the main text depicts, based on
the optimal allocation rules presented above the outcomes as a function of k and v.
For d2 (and by symmetry d4) we know that she will contribute to the core fund under
two sets of conditions:
1− k > v > 3
16sA−8 and k >
1+4v
1+4sA
and
v < 3
16sA−8 (and v < 1− k) and k >
1
4sA−2
For d3 we know that she will contribute to the core fund under the following condition:
v < 1− k and k > v
sA
An additional lemma allows us to generate the full equilibrium aid allocation decisions:
Lemma 1. With five donors with preferences distributed uniformely under majority rule
m cannot offer less than full discretion (sA < 1) and induce donors d2, d3 and d4 to make
core contributions under other conditions than those specified in proposition 6.
From this lemma it follows that for all other combinations of values for k and v no
majority will support a discretion proposal different from sA = 12 .
Conditions under which donor d3 contributes to the core fund
For donor d3 only two conditions are relevant, namely that v < 1− k and k > v
sA
.
Combining the two (under the assumption of maximum discretion, i.e., sA = 1) results
in the constraint that v < k and k < 1 − v. Consequently, in a space defined by k
horizontally and v vertically, the set of values below both diagonals form the set of values
for k and v that leads d3 to contribute core funds.
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Conditions under which donors d3, d2 and d4 contribute to the
core fund
To assess whether these three donors contribute to the core fund requires combining the
conditions for d3 with either of the two sets for donor d2.
1. The first possible combination (i.e., v < 1 − k and k > v
sA
and 1 − k > v > 3
16sA−8
and k > 1+4v
1+4sA
) implies that
1− k > v > 3
16sA−8
Solving for k results in the constraint k < 16sA−11
16sA−8 which equals
5
8 under the assump-
tion of sA = 1. Consequently if k < 58 and v >
3
8 then d2 will give core funds if
v < 5k−14 from k >
1+4v
1+4sA
with sA = 1. This last constraint holds simultaneously
with v > 38 only if k >
1
2 . This is the small upper-most spike of the triangle on the
right side with sA = 1.
2. The second possible combination (i.e., v < 1 − k and k > v
sA
and v < 3
16sA−8 and
k > 1
4sA−2) implies (combining the first and the last constraint) that
1− v > k > 1
4sA−2 (i.e. k >
1
2) or after rearranging
4sA−3
4sA−2 > v
As v has to be positive, this implies that sA > 34 . As at the same time v <
3
16sA−8
under the assumption that sA = 1 this second constraint is binding (it can be shown
that this latter constraint is binding if sA > 1516 , while the former becomes binding
if v is smaller). This is the rhomboid of the triangle on the right side, from v = 0
up to v = 38 .
Consequently, in the second combination and for sA = 1, d2 will give core aid if
k > 12 , and v < min(
3
8 , 1− k).
Conditions under which all donors contribute to the core fund
In order to have donor d1 (and d5) contribute core funds, we need k > 12sA−1 . For all
values of sA ∈ [12 , 1] this lower limit for k exceeds 1, implying that the two extreme donors
will never make contributions to the core fund.
From this it follows that the following conditions lead to voluntary core contributions
with sA = 1:
i) if v < min(1−k, 38) and k > 12 (Combination 2 before) or v < 1−k and 38 < v < 5k−14
and k < 58 (Combination 1 before) then donors d2, d3, d4 will make core contributions.
ii) if k < min(v, 12) or
1
2 < k and
5k−1
4 < v < 1 − k then only donor d3 will make core
contributions.
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Conditions under which donors prefer agent learning
As the previous derivations were predicated on the assumption that sA = 1 and that m
learned the value of k we next determine the conditions under which each donor prefers
m to spend cm and learn the value of k. We start with d2 whose expected utilities for full
discretion and agent-learning and for no discretion without learning are the following:
E(Ud2|sA = 1, sA = 0) =
1
4[
∑
di 6=1
cAdi + c
A
d2 +
1
2(1 + k)(
∑
di
cCdi − cm) + (1− k)bAd2 ]
+34[
∑
di 6=1
cBdi + c
B
d2 +
1
2(1 + k)(
∑
di
cCdi − cm) + (1− k)bBd2 ]
+v(bAd2 + b
B
d2)
= 14[
∑
di 6=1
cAdi + c
A
d2 ] +
1
2(1 + k)(
∑
di
cCdi − cm) +
1
4(1− k)b
A
d2
+34[
∑
di 6=1
cBdi + c
B
d2 ] +
3
4(1− k)b
B
d2 + v(b
A
d2 + b
B
d2) (1.33)
E(Ud2|sA =
1
2 , s
A = 12) =
1
4[
∑
di 6=1
cAdi + c
A
d2 +
1
2
1
2(1 + k)
∑
di
cCdi +
1
2
1
2(1− k)
∑
di
cCdi
+(1− k)bAd2 ] +
3
4[
∑
di6=1
cBdi + c
B
d2 +
1
4(1 + k)
∑
di
cCdi
+14(1− k)
∑
di
cCdi + (1− k)bBd2 ] + v(bAd2 + bBd2)
= 14[
∑
di 6=1
cAdi + c
A
d2 ] +
1
2
∑
di
cCdi +
1
4(1− k)b
A
d2
+34[
∑
di 6=1
cBdi + c
B
d2 ] +
3
4(1− k)b
B
d2 + v(b
A
d2 + b
B
d2) (1.34)
Find k such that E(Ud2|sA = 1, sA = 0) > E(Ud2|sA = 12 , sA = 12)
1
2(1 + k)(
∑
di
cCdi − cm) >
1
2
∑
di
cCdi
k(
∑
di
cCdi − cm) > cm
k >
cm∑
di c
C
di
− cm (1.35)
Same procedure for d3:
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E(Ud3|sA = 1, sA = 0) =
1
2[
∑
di 6=1
cAdi + c
A
d3 +
1
4(1 + k)(
∑
di
cCdi − cm) + (1− k)bAd3)]
+12[
∑
di 6=1
cBdi + c
B
d3 +
1
4(1 + k)(
∑
di
cCdi − cm) + (1− k)bBd3 ]
+v[bAd3 + b
B
d3 ]
= 12[
∑
di 6=1
cAdi + c
A
d3 ] +
1
2(1 + k)(
∑
di
cCdi − cm) +
1
4(1− k)b
A
d3
+12[
∑
di 6=1
cBdi + c
B
d3 ] +
1
2(1− k)b
B
d3 + v(b
A
d3 + b
B
d3) (1.36)
E(Ud3|sA =
1
2 , s
A = 12) =
1
2[
∑
di 6=1
cAdi + c
A
d3 +
1
4(1 + k)
∑
di
cCdi +
1
4(1− k)
∑
di
cCdi
+(1− k)bAd3)] +
1
2[
∑
di 6=1
cBdi + c
B
d3 +
1
4(1 + k)
∑
di
cCdi +
+14(1− k)
∑
di
cCdi + (1− k)bBd3 ] + v[bAd3 + bBd3 ]
= 12[
∑
di 6=1
cAdi + c
A
d3 ] +
1
2
∑
di
cCdi +
1
2(1− k)b
A
d3
+12[
∑
di 6=1
cBdi + c
B
d3 ] +
1
2(1− k)b
B
d3 + v(b
A
d3 + b
B
d3) (1.37)
Find k such that E(Ud3|sA = 1, sA = 0) > E(Ud3|sA = 12 , sA = 12)
1
2(1 + k)(
∑
di
cCdi − cm) >
1
2
∑
di
cCdi
k(
∑
di
cCdi − cm) > cm
k >
cm∑
di c
C
di
− cm (1.38)
Finally, the same procedure for d1:
E(Ud1|sA = 1, sA = 0) =
∑
di 6=1
cBdi + c
B
d1 + (1 + k)(
∑
di
cCdi − cm) + (1− k)bBd1
+v[bAd1 + b
B
d1 ] (1.39)
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E(Ud1|sA =
1
2 , s
A = 12) =
∑
di 6=1
cBdi + c
B
d1 +
1
2(1 + k)
∑
di
cCdi +
+12(1− k)
∑
di
cCdi + (1− k)bBd1 + v[bAd1 + bBd1 ] (1.40)
Find k such that E(Ud1|sA = 1, sA = 0) > E(Ud1|sA = 12 , sA = 12)
(1 + k)(
∑
di
cCdi − cm) >
∑
di
cCdi
k(
∑
di
cCdi − cm) > cm
k >
cm∑
di c
C
di
− cm (1.41)
Conditions under which all actors prefer agent learning
Thus, all donors prefer that m learns whenever k > cm∑
di
cC
di
−cm . By assumption 3 we know
that the lower bound for k is at most 12 . Thus for all conditions under which a majority
of donors, namely d2, d3 and d4 might give core contributions under the assumption of
agent learning (see above), this lower bound is not binding.
Thus we only need to focus on the conditions under which m will acquire information,
namely if
∑
di
cCdi
(2ks∗−k)
1−k+2ks∗ ≥ cm. In the main text we have shown that the following value
for s∗ is the lowest which ensures that m will engage in learning:
s∗ =
k(
∑
di
cCdi
−cm)+cm
2k(
∑
di
cC
di
−cm)
To be part of an equilibrium with full discretion, this value has to be smaller than 1:
k(∑di cCdi − cm) + cm
2k(∑di cCdi − cm) < 1
k(
∑
di
cCdi − cm)cm < 2k(
∑
di
cCdi − cm)
cm∑
di c
C
di
− cm < k (1.42)
As this is the same condition as the one for the donors, which is fulfilled for all conditions
under which under majority rule core contributions are made by a majority of donors
(under the assumption of agent learning), the conditions specified above characterize the
subgame perfect equilibria. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 1
In the proof of proposition 6 there is only one set of conditions allowing for core aid given
by d2, d3 and d4 which includes an upper bound for sA and thus might induce m to offer
less than full discretion, namely that v < 3
16sA−8 and
1
4sA−2 < k. Together these two
conditions generate an upper and a lower bound for sA of the following form:
1+2k
4k < s
A < 3+8v16v
Solving for v generates the condition v < 3k4 . For the upper bound for sA to be smaller
than 1 requires that 38 < v and for the lower bound to be smaller than 1
1
2 < k has to hold.
These three conditions, however, generate a subset of the values of k and v contained in
proposition 6. Thus, there are no values of k and v under which m might by offering less
than full discretion induce d2 and d4 to contribute core contributions, when full discretion
would fail. Q.E.D.
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Results for Majority and Unanimity Rules Without SPTFs
The partial derivatives with respect to each donor’s choice variables (except that cAd1 and
cBd1 are no choice variables anymore).
• Donor d3 contributes voluntary core funds iff ksA+ 1−k2 >
1
2(1−k)+v. Rearranging
gives that d3 contributes core funds if k > v
sA
• Donors d2 and d4 contribute core funds iff ksA + 1−k2 >
3
4(1 − k) + v. Rearranging
gives that d2 contributes core funds if k > 1+4v1+4sA .
• Donors d1 and d5 contribute core funds iff ksA + 1−k2 > (1 − k) + v. Rearranging
gives that d1 contributes core funds if k > 1+2v1+2sA
Conditions under which d3 contributes to the core fund
For sA = 1, d3 contributes if v < k. For sA = 12 , d3 contributes if v <
k
2 .
Conditions under which d3, d2 and d4 contribute to the core fund
For sA = 1, d3, d2 and d4 contribute if k > 1+4v5 . Here, we have a majority in favor of full
discretion. The function v = 5k−14 cuts v = 1− k at k = 59 .
For sA = 12 , d3, d2 and d4 contribute if k >
1+4v
3 . Here, we do not have a unanimous
decision in favor of full discretion. The function v = 3k−14 cuts v = 1− k at k = 57 .
Conditions under which all donors contribute to the core fund
For sA = 1, all donors contribute if k > 1+2v3 . Here, we have unanimity in favor of full
discretion. The function v = 3k−12 cuts v = 1− k at k = 35 .
Graphical Illustration
Figures A.1 and A.2 show the allocation decisions for a situation without multi-bi aid.
Comparing these figures with each other, we see that under majority rule, voluntary core
contributions are more likely because a majority of donors still contributes to m when
the extreme donors already switched to bilateral aid. For both decision rules, the absence
of SPTFs changes donors’ allocations. Specifically, extreme donors contribute voluntary
core aid for high values of k when no SPTFs exist whereas they never contributed to the
core fund when multi-bi aid is allowed for.
Comparing the situation without SPTFs, figures A.1 and A.2, to the situation with
trust funds, 1.5 and 1.6, shows that the absence of SPTFs has divergent consequences.
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Figure A.1: Equilibria under unanimity rule without special purpose trust funds
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sA = 12multi-bi: d3
bi: d2, d1, d4, d5





+
sA = 12multi-bi: d2, d3, d5
bi: d1, d4
Under unanimity the absence of SPTFs leads to more situations where voluntary core
contributions are given and in addition this involves almost always more donors. At
the same time, bilateral aid also experiences an increase. Thus if the agent has a strict
preference for voluntary core contributions not accepting multi-bi aid is optimal under
unanimity. If, however, the agent wants to minimize aid spent bilaterally and maximize
overall assets under management, then she should accept SPTFs under unanimity. Under
majority rule these same findings hold, but as discussed above core contributions are more
prevalent.
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Figure A.2: Equilibria under majority rule without special purpose trust funds
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sA = 1
core: d2, d3, d5
bi: d1, d4
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Proof of Proposition 2
The general utility function for di is Udi(oA, oB|di) = wdioA + (1−wdi)oB + vdi(bAdi + bBdi).
Given di’s uncertainty concerning aid effectiveness its expected utility function is the
following:
EUdi = wdi [
1
2((1− k)(
∑
dj 6=i
cAdj + c
A
di
+ (1− sA)(cCdi − cm)) +
+(1 + k)(
∑
dj 6=i
cAdj + c
A
di
+ sA(cCdi − cm)) + (1− k)bAdi ] +
+(1− wdi)[
1
2((1− k)(
∑
dj 6=i
cBdj + c
B
di
+ (1− sA)(cCdi − cm)) +
+(1 + k)(
∑
dj 6=i
cBdj + c
B
di
+ sA(cCdi − cm)) + (1− k)bBdi ] +
+v(bAdi + b
B
di
) (1.43)
Taking, as above, partial derivatives of EUdi with respect to di’s choice variables yields
the following expressions:
δEUdi
δcCvdi
= ksA + 1− k2
δEUdi
δcAdi
= wdi
δEUdi
δcBdi
= (1− wdi)
δEUdi
δbAdi
= wdi(1− k) + v
δEUdi
δbBdi
= (1− wdi)(1− k) + v (1.44)
As only donors who will give voluntary core contribution will vote for any amount of
discretion, we need to establish for what values of wdi this is the case. The first case to look
at is when wdi ≤ (1−wdi) (which implies that wdi ≤ 12). For such donors di to contribute
voluntary core contributions the following conditions have to hold: ksA + 1−k2 ≥ (1−wdi)
(which implies for this case that it is also larger than wdi) and ksA + 1−k2 ≥ (1−wdi)(1−
k) + v (which implies that it is also larger than wdi(1− k) + v). From the first expression
it follows that wdi ≥ 1+k2 −ksA while the second implies that wdi ≥ 12− ks
A−v
1−k . It is easy to
show, given our assumptions, that both expressions are smaller than 12 . In the second case
we have (1− wdi) ≤ wdi (which implies that 12 ≤ wdi). For such donors di, to contribute
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voluntary core funds, the following two conditions have to hold: ksA + 1−k2 ≥ wdi (which
implies for this case that it is also larger than (1− wdi)) and ksA + 1−k2 ≥ wdi(1− k) + v
(which implies that it is also larger than (1− wdi)(1− k) + v). From the first expression
it follows that wdi ≤ 1−k2 + ksA while the second implies that wdi ≤ 1−k−2v+2ks
A
2(1−k) . Again,
it can be shown that these upper bounds for wdi are never smaller than 12 . Consequently,
if wdi fulfills both sets of conditions, di will contribute voluntary core funds and thus vote
in favor of discretion. From this, proposition 2 follows immediately. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1
Given the proof of proposition 2 and the definition ofW this corollary follows immediately.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Next we consider fund allocations in equilibrium. If the conditions of Proposition 2
applies to all donors D it follows immediately that all donors will exhaust their budget by
provoding voluntary core contributions (i.e., ∀ dicCdi = ydi× tdi×adi−cCa . If the condition
of Proposition 2 applies only to a q-majority of donors and q is the required majority
to adopt discretion levels, then all donors di for which the condition of Proposition 2
applies will contribute voluntary core contributions (i.e., ∀ di for which wdi ∈ W cCdi =
ydi × tdi × adi − cCa). For all other donors, for which this condition does not hold, either
bilateral aid (i.e., bAdi , resp. b
B
di
) or contributions to a SPTF (i.e., cAdi , resp. c
B
di
) is optimal.
Consider first the case of donors for which wdi ≤ 1−wdi holds, who will choose between
bilateral aid for project B or SPTF B. Two subcases have to be considered. First we
note that the two possible lower bounds and the two possible upper bounds for wdi in
Proposition 2 relate as follows 1+k2 − ksA ≤ 1−k−2ks
A+2v
2(1−k) if
k
2+k
2 ≤ v (which implies also
that 1−k+2ksA−2v2(1−k) ≤ 1−k2 + ksA).
Consequently assume first that k
2+k
2 ≤ v; then following Proposition 2 only dis with
wdi ∈ [1−k−2ksA+2v2(1−k) , 1−k+2ks
A−2v
2(1−k) ] will vote for discretion. Given this, the following alloca-
tion rule follows:
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(cCdi , c
A
di
, cBdi , b
A
di
, bBdi) =

cCdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi ∈ (1−k2 , 1+k2 )
cBdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi ∈ (12 − k−v1−k , 1−k2 ]
cAdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi ∈ [1+k2 , 12 + k−v1−k )
bBdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi ∈ (k−vk , 12 − k−v1−k )
bAdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi ∈ (12 + k−v1−k , vk )
cBdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi < k−vk
cAdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi > vk
Next assume that v ≤ k2+k2 then we know that only dis with wdi ∈ (1+k2 −ksA, 1−k2 +ksA)
will vote for discretion. Under sA = 1 this condition reduces to wdi ∈ (1−k2 , 1+k2 ), which
induces the following allocation rule:
(cCdi , c
A
di
, cBdi , b
A
di
, bBdi) =

cCdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi ∈ (12 − k−v1−k , 12 + k−v1−k )
bBdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi ∈ [1−k2 , 12 − k−v1−k ]
bAdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi ∈ [12 + k−v1−k , 1+k2 ]
cBdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi < 1−k2
cAdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi > 1+k2
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
When the conditions under propositon 2 or Corollary 1 do not hold, no discretion is
granted to m, i.e., sA = sA = 12 . We derive the optimal allocation rules first for all
di for which wdi ≤ 1 − wdi (which implies that wdi ≤ 12). Fur such donors to provide
voluntary core funding it has to be the case that ksA + 1−k2 > 1 − wdi and ksA + 1−k2 >
(1−wdi)(1− k) + v. As with sA = 12 the first expression implies that wdi ≥ 12 which is in
contradiction of the assumption of this case, no voluntary core contributions are given by
donors in this case. By symmetry for all di for which 1−wdi ≥ wdi a similar contradiction
appears, implying that voluntary core funds are never given in the absence of discretion.46
Consequently only bilateral or multi-bi aid will be given voluntarily in equilibrium.
Starting again with the case where wdi ≤ 1 − wdi (which implies that wdi ≤ 12), multi-bi
46Strictly speaking assuming that wdi = 12 means that diis indifferent between making voluntary core
contributions or multi-bi. For simplicity’s sake we do not consider this case here.
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aid will be given if 1− wdi ≥ (1− wdi)(1− k) + v which implies that k−vk . In the second
case where 1− wdi ≤ wdi (which implies that 12 ≤ wdi) for multi-bi aid to be given it has
to hold that wdi < wdi(1− k) + v. This implies that vk > wdi . Consequently two subcases
have to be considered, namely whether k2 ≤ v or not. First, under k2 ≥ v the following
optimal allocation rule in equilibrium follows:47
(cCdi , c
A
di
, cBdi , b
A
di
, bBdi) =

cBdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi ∈ (1− vk , 12)
cAdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi ∈ (12 , vk )
bBdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi ≤ 1− vk
bAdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi ≥ vk
Second, if v ≥ k2 the following optimal allocation rule in equilibrium follows:
(cCdi , c
A
di
, cBdi , b
A
di
, bBdi) =
b
B
di
= ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi ≤ 12
bAdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi ≥ 12
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition with no SPTFs
To prove this Proposition we assess for all wdi ≤ 1 − wdi (which implies that wdi ≤ 12).
For such di to contribute voluntary core contributions it has to hold that ksA + 1−k2 >
(1−wdi)(1− k) + v. This implies that wdi > 12 − ks
A−v
1−k . This lower limit is smaller than
1
2
if v < k (as by symmetry a symmetric upper bound exists for 1−wdi ≤ wdi (which implies
that wdi ≥ 12 , this holds also for these donors). Consequently if v ≥ k no discretion will
be granted and all donors will only give bilateral aid. If v ≤ k holds all di for which
wdi ∈ (12 − ks
A−v
1−k ,
1
2 +
ksA−v
1−k ) holds will vote for discretion. If the resulting W is such
that W
n
≥ q, then all these donors will contribute voluntary core contributions, while the
remaining donors will contribute bilateral aid. If W
n
< q no discretion will be granted.
Consequently, all donors for which di for which wdi ∈ (12 − k−2v2(1−k) , 12 + k−2v2(1−k)) holds would
contribute voluntary core funds. For this set not to be the empty set, v ≤ k2 . All other
donors will provide bilateral aid. All donors will provide voluntary core aid if v ≤ (2k−1)2 .
If v ≥ k the following optimal allocation rule in equilibrium follows:
47For simplicity’s sake we leave aside a decision rule for the donor indifferent between the two aid projects.
We could easily assume that she splits aid contributions equally among the two projects.
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(cCdi , c
A
di
, cBdi , b
A
di
, bBdi) =
b
B
di
= ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi < 12
bAdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi > 12
If v ≤ k the following optimal allocation rule in equilibrium follows:
(cCdi , c
A
di
, cBdi , b
A
di
, bBdi) =

cCdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi ∈ (12 − k−v1−k , 12 + k−v1−k )
and W
n
≥ q
bBdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi ≤ 12 − k−v1−k and Wn ≥ q
bAdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi ≥ 12 + k−v1−k and Wn ≥ q
cCdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi ∈ (12 − k−2v2(1−k) , 12 + k−2v2(1−k))
and W
n
< q
bBdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi ≤ 12 − k−2v2(1−k) and Wn < q
bAdi = ydi × tdi × adi − cCa ∀di s.t. wdi ≥ 12 + k−2v2(1−k) and Wn < q
Q.E.D.
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CHAPTER2
December Fever in Public Finance
The heightened spending by government offices in the quarter, months, and weeks before
the end of the fiscal year is widely acknowledged, nicknamed, and has repeatedly been
discussed as a problem in government reports (e.g., GAO 1985, 1998, 2004; Crawford
et al. 2009).1 Such year-end spending spikes are observed in most organizations with
annually lapsing budgets, including public and private organizations (e.g., Fichtner and
Greene 2014; Baumann 2015; Merchant 1985). The common explanation is that in most
countries and organizations, agencies need to return unobligated funds to the Treasury
general fund at the end of the fiscal year. For the agency, this not only implies a loss of
appropriated resources and the associated utility but is also associated with the fear of
lower appropriations in future years. However, “use it or lose it” rules explain why bud-
gets are spent within the fiscal year but not why heightened spending occurs at the end
of the fiscal year (FY). Despite the omnipresence of the phenomenon and the widespread
perception and plethora of anecdotal evidence that YESS are (partially) inefficient, the-
oretical and quantitative empirical research on the causes and consequences of rushed
end-of-year spending is scarce. Although some literature on policy reforms to curb year-
end spending spikes exists, hard evidence on their effects is lacking.2 The underlying
causes of YESS also seem to be poorly understood in practice. For example, the intro-
duction of carry-forward rules, that allow government units to transfer unspent funds to
the next fiscal year, has not lead to sizeable reductions in year-end spikes in the United
Kingdom (Crawford et al. 2009; Baumann 2015).
This lack of research is in striking contrast to the potential consequences of rushed
spending. Economic theory predicts that agents faced with lapsing funds may spend
inefficiently as their opportunity costs are close to zero Liebman and Mahoney (2017)
are the first to provide rigorous quantitative evidence that funds spent at the end of the
fiscal year provide less value for money. Their finding confirms qualitative and anecdotal
1Fichtner and Greene (2014) provide a review.
2Fichtner and Greene (2014) review these proposals and discuss reform experiences.
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evidence that lapsing budget balances are usually spent on low-priority projects in a rushed
and unplanned manner (e.g., Douglas and Franklin 2006; McPherson 2007; Fichtner and
Greene 2014). Because of rushed decision-making, end-of-year projects and in particular
contracts are particularly prone to cronyism. This might be an additional reason for
lowered efficiency, which is not yet explored in the literature.
The U.S. Senate Subcommittee (1980) notes that although the share of year-end spend-
ing might be small relative to total government budgets, hurry-up spending amounts to
large sums of money and even small efficiency losses lead to major (opportunity) costs.
Research on YESS thus contributes to understanding and ultimately improving fiscal
performance. In public finance, there is a large literature on institutions improving fiscal
outcomes.3 One strand of this literature is concerned with budgetary institutions at the
implementation stage of the budgetary processes. Thereof, two papers using sub-annual
data are most relevant to this study. Liebman and Mahoney (2017) interpret YESS as pre-
cautionary savings by a government agency confronted with uncertain spending demands
while Baumann (2015) explains YESS with the procrastinating behavior of bureaucrats.
Using calibration, both studies find support for their respective theoretical mechanism. I
propose a new explanation for YESS: they result from inadequate planning in ineffective
bureaucracies. I argue that achieving the intended budget balance of zero at the year-end
requires qualified staff, expedient software, and adequate reporting and controlling sys-
tems. Higher administrative capacity is thus associated with smaller YESS. Identifying
the causal mechanism(s) underlying YESS is important because alternative explanations
imply the need for different types of policies to curb heightened year-end spending.
Using detailed accounting data on a specific item in the foreign aid budget for 27
OECD countries over the 2002-2013 period, I econometrically test the existence of YESS
across countries. As comprehensive data on sub-annual spending across countries is not
available, I analyze sub-annual accounting data on a discretionary budget item within
countries’ aid budget. Increasingly, OECD countries channel part of their foreign aid via
large multilateral funds and sector- or country-specific trust funds at the World Bank to
developing countries. Using financial accounting data from the World Bank on contri-
butions to these funds, this Chapter is first to empirically show that YESS exist across
countries. According to the definition of multi-bi aid in the introduction of this thesis,
this analysis looks at donors’ earmarked contributions to multilateral organizations (direct
multi-bi aid) and donors’ unearmarked contributions to pass-through multilaterals (indi-
rect multi-bi aid). The finding on YESS is highly robust to the definition of ‘last period of
the fiscal year’ as the last weeks, month or quarter in the donor-specific fiscal year. This
Chapter furthermore shows that bulk expenditures at the end of the fiscal year are sub-
3For a recent review see Eslava (2011).
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stantially reduced by bureaucratic quality. The robustness of this finding is assessed using
alternative indicators of governance and by controlling for potential omitted variables. In
contrast, I find no clear evidence in favor of or against the two alternative explanations for
YESS, which posit opposing relationships between YESS and uncertainty. Reducing the
dynamic inefficiences associated with lapsing budgets is the ultimate question of interests.
The data does not allow for a rigorous analysis of the effects of YESS on performance.
I offer descriptive evidence that end-of-year spending is qualitatively different from the
remainder of the fiscal year.
In response to government transparency initiatives and technological progress, access
to sub-annual government data is likely to improve in the coming years. This Chapter
aims to be a starting point for empirical research on the reasons for uneven government
expenditures within the fiscal year. The Chapter makes four contributions to the public fi-
nance literature. First, this Chapter is the first to analyze YESS with cross-country panel
data while the two previous quantitative studies on YESS in public finance, Liebman and
Mahoney (2017) and Baumann (2015), look at variation within individual countries. The
World Bank data allows to study both cross-country and within-country variation. Sec-
ond, I am the first to apply econometric analysis rather than calibration to study YESS.4
The two previous studies on YESS calibrate their respective principal-agent models to the
data. Third, I suggest and test an additional explanation for year-end expenditure surges:
poor planning capacities of government bureaucracies. Fourth, the study contributes to
the public finance literature by systematically testing proposed explanations for the ex-
istence of year-end spikes. As my data cover a discretionary spending item within the
foreign aid budget, I also contribute to the foreign aid literature by proposing a new and
additional reason for the popularity of trust funds and large multilateral funds with donor
countries (for a discussion see Reinsberg et al. 2015).
The remainder of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the related
literature. In Section 2.3, I provide arguments as to why bureaucratic quality should
be related to the size of YESS. Section 2.4 describes the data and the identification
strategy. Section 2.5 uses panel-econometric methods to establish the size and variation
in year-end spending spikes by analyzing the data at the quarterly, monthly, and daily
level. Specifically, Section 2.5.3 analyzes the relationship between YESS and effective
bureaucracies and Section 2.5.4 tests the implications of the two main alternative theories
for YESS. Section 2.6 discusses the findings and concludes.
4Oyer (1998) uses econometrics to analyze variation in revenue and price within firms’ fiscal years.
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2.2 Related Literature
Anecdotal and suggestive evidence for heightened year-end spending in government de-
partments and company divisions across the world abounds (e.g., Merchant 1985; Comptroller
General of the United States 1980; Douglas and Franklin 2006; McPherson 2007; Bau-
mann 2015; Liebman and Mahoney 2017). The two arguments often proposed to explain
end-of-year spending sprees however lack timing specificity: These two arguments explain
why the entire budget is spent within a fiscal year but cannot account for heightened
expenditures at the end of the fiscal year. 5
In the economic literature, year-end spending spikes have so far been explained either
by the bureaucracy’s uncertainty about spending demands (Liebman and Mahoney 2017)
or by bureaucrats’ procrastination (Baumann 2015).6
Given the scarceness of analyses of sub-annual fiscal behavior, I draw on the political
economy literature in public finance more generally to construct a motivating framework
for the empirical analysis of YESS and potential mechanisms. There is a large literature
on institutional features affecting fiscal performance. Previous research highlights the con-
flicts of interests and preference heterogeneity of the actors in the budgetary process and
proposes and evaluates budget institutions that aim to improve fiscal discipline by con-
straining policymakers (see Eslava 2011). Empirical findings suggest the effectiveness of
institutions is often conditional on political systems and environments (see Eslava 2011).
Budgetary institutions discussed in the literature are either numerical targets or proce-
dural rules (Von Hagen and Harden 1995). The latter may govern the drafting, approval
or implementation stage of the budgetary process. Curbing YESS requires budgetary
institutions at the implementation stage, the period of budget execution.
Eslava (2011) specifies two budgetary institutions at the implementation stage: First,
limits to the parliament’s ability to impose ex-post amendments to the size of the budget
and, second, the possibility of the government to cut (but not to expand) the budget
5The first is that budget authorities in most countries need to return unspent funds to the general
treasury at the end of the fiscal year. As this would affect the agency’s utility negatively, these
lapsing funds are spent. Second, the agency fears to obtain lower appropriations in subsequent years
if the principal interprets the returning of funds as a signal of a lack of need. It is important to
note that (planning for) overspending is no alternative as the consequences of overspending are more
severe, including personal liability of the budget holder (Hyndman et al. 2005). Although there
is no evidence supporting this argument, the fear of lowered appropriations is widespread among
bureaucrats (Douglas and Franklin 2006; Fichtner and Greene 2014).
6See Baumann (2015) for a brief discussion of alternative explanations, that do not withstand close
scrutiny. He does not cover the recent argument by Hurley et al. (2014), who propose a model in which
an agency faces uncertainty about the costs of high-priority projects but must nevertheless choose
additional projects of lower quality to assure exploiting the budget until the end of the fiscal year.
The model’s implication that year-end spending is inefficient is however generated by the assumption,
namely that this over-planning leads to high-priority projects (rather than the low-quality ones) being
abandoned in the end of the year.
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after parliamentary approval. She also highlights the importance of budget transparency
for these institutions to be effective. Dietrichson and Ellegård (2015) investigate two
additional budgetary institutions at the implementation stage: Carry-forward rules and
the threat of dismissal following non-compliance to the budget. Carry-forward or roll-
over rules allow sub-units of the central government to transfer surpluses or force them to
carry deficits to the next fiscal year. They find that fiscal surpluses are higher in Swedish
municipalities with carry-forward rules. Surpluses are also higher when local manageres
face a higher risk of dismissal as a consequence of budget deficits. Dietrichson and Ellegård
(2015) term these institutions “incentive-aligning” as they reduce the conflict between the
principal and the agent, in their case of the size of the fiscal deficit.7
In the two papers on YESS, Liebman and Mahoney (2017) and Baumann (2015), the
conflict between the principal and the agent is about the timing of expenditures within the
fiscal year. Before looking into the details of these models, it is worthwhile considering the
importance of the exact timing of disbursements to politicians. There is ample evidence
at the annual level that the timing of expenditures matters during election times (e.g.,
Klomp and De Haan 2013; Sjahrir et al. 2013; Curto-Grau 2014). In other times however,
politicians may care little about the exact disbursement date. Neither Liebman and
Mahoney (2017) nor Baumann (2015) discuss the empirical importance of the conflict
between the parliament (the principal) and the government agency (the agent).
The first paper in the nascent literature on YESS is Liebman and Mahoney (2017), who
propose a stochastic principal-agent model inspired by models of life-cycle consumption.
The game features two sub-annual periods and two players, a representative government
agency and parliament. To model short-run rigidities in the production function, de-
creasing returns to spending within each period of the budget year are assumed.8 This
basic set-up is also adopted in Baumann (2015).9 Liebman and Mahoney (2017) then
introduce stochastic shocks which complicates the agency’s optimization problem of tim-
ing expenditures. With no option to overspend, the agency insures itself against future
expenditure demands through the build-up of a rainy day fund in the first period of the
year. A year-end spending spike is thus observed whether demands materialize or not.
7In the case of Swedish municipalities, the principal is formed jointly by the council and the executive
committee while the agents are the operating branches.
8For example, departments often have a (quasi-) fixed expert staff that, in periods of abnormally high
spending, has less time to devote to each project or for supervising external consultants. Project
preparation time available to staff has been shown to affect the quality of World Bank projects (Kilby
2015). Although the assumption of decreasing returns to spending is theoretically sound and realistic,
there is little empirical evidence that rushed spending is of lower quality. Baumann (2015) discusses
the robustness of his model’s implications to alternative assumptions about returns.
9Neither of the models exhibits a ratchet effect phenomenon (Freixas et al. 1985), in which the pattern of
spending over the year provides an informative signal to the principal on the social value of spending
at the agency.
71
2 December Fever in Public Finance
In the latter case, the agency needs to rush to spend the precautionary savings at the
year-end. Thus, the model predicts a positive relationship between the size of spikes and
uncertainty. Liebman and Mahoney (2017) also offer the first and so far only quantitative
assessment of the quality of end-of-year spending.10 They show that the average quality of
information technology (IT) projects contracted in the last week of the fiscal year is sub-
stantially lower. This finding confirms common perceptions and anecdotal evidence that
end-of-year spending is “uneconomic, inefficient, ineffective or of inappropriate quality
(usually inappropriately high quality)” (Hyndman et al. 2005: 6). Liebman and Mahoney
(2017) propose to curb YESS by extending the budget period through the introduction
of roll-over rules.
While the precautionary saving mechanism is convincing and generally supported by
accounts of budget holders, Liebman and Mahoney’s (2017) paper has some weaknesses.
First, Baumann (2015) criticizes that the level of uncertainty assumed in the calibration of
Liebman and Mahoney’s (2017) model is unrealistically high, being more than ten times
that of professional forecasters in predicting standard macroeconomic variables such as
unemployment.11 One possible explanation is the difficulty of determining the optimal
size of precautionary savings.12 If savings are above the optimal level, YESS would be
excessively high given the level of uncertainty. Second, the unpredictability of spending
demands is likely to vary across government agencies and hence the size of YESS could
differ.
The second paper in the nascent economics literature on YESS is Baumann (2015). He
observes that neither the introduction nor the reform of roll-over rules in the United King-
dom has reduced year-end surges as it should have according to Liebman and Mahoney’s
(2017) theory.13 Moreover, he finds a positive relationship between certainty and spend-
ing spikes rather than the negative one predicted by the precautionary savings hypothesis
(Baumann 2015: Figure 4). Against the backdrop of these doubts about uncertainty
about future spending demands being the (sole) explanation for YESS, Baumann (2015)
proposes a deterministic principal-agent model in which time-discounting effort-averse
bureaucrats postpone spending to later periods within the fiscal year. He argues that the
10Fitzenberger et al. (2014: 3) use differences between projected and actual spending on training programs
at the end of fiscal years as an instrumental variable “to come closer towards estimating the causal
effect of further training” on employment outcomes in West Germany. The paper lacks a discussion
about the external validity of effects based on additional training programs that are budget-driven
and thus “independent of whether there were suitable participants available and whether the offered
program made sense for the individual unemployed.” Fichtner and Greene (2014) review the qualitative
evidence on the efficiency of year-end spending.
11Liebman and Mahoney (2017) assume a root mean square error of 19.6. By assuming risk-averse agents,
a lower level of uncertainty might suffice to obtain the calibration results.
12I thank Andreas Fuchs for raising this point.
13Fichtner and Greene (2014) review the prevalence of carry-over authority and heightened budget trans-
parency across countries and their effects on year-end spending.
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time-inconsistency between the continuous effort expended by public servants to identify
and disburse to projects of good quality and the discontinuous end-of-year performance
evaluation by the parliament (the principal) leads to procrastination.14 Using monthly
data on spending by Northern Irish departments, he finds the data to be more consistent
with his procrastination theory than with Liebman and Mahoney’s (2017) hypothesis. To
curb YESS, he suggests budgetary ‘taxes’ that increase towards the end of the fiscal year.
As the analyzed expenditures originate from the foreign aid budget, this Chapter also
relates to the literature on foreign aid. Specifically, the analysis contributes to the liter-
ature on donors’ choice of aid channels by suggesting a new argument for the popularity
of World Bank funds with donors’ aid agencies: Trust funds are an attractive instrument
to spend lapsing funds.15 The capacity of these funds to de-annualize part of the aid
budget thus provides an additional justification for the efficiency advantage of trust fund
aid over bilateral aid assumed in the model by Eichenauer and Hug (2016) in Chapter 1 of
this thesis. As the present Chapter studies spending patterns within fiscal years, it only
indirectly relates to arguments about the choice of aid channels made by Milner (2006),
Milner and Tingley (2013), and Schneider and Tobin (2013). In the aid literature, the
two most closely related papers are Reinsberg et al. (2015), who use the same data as
this to examine donors’ choice between different types of trust funds, and Eichenauer and
Knack (2016) in Chapter 3 of this thesis, who study whether trust fund disbursements
to recipient countries complement or compensate the performance-based allocation of the
IDA, the World Bank’s concessional arm. To the best of my knowledge, there is only one
paper in the foreign aid literature that considers sub-annual variation.
Michaelowa (2003) uncovers a spike in the number of interim Poverty Reduction Strat-
egy Papers (PRSP) endorsed in the last month of the calendar year 2000. PRSP are a
requirement for participation in the Enhanced Heavily-Indebted Poor Country (HIPC)
initiative. The likely reason for this spike is mounting public pressure through the “Ju-
bilee 2000 Coalition Initiative,” a large debt-relief campaign by non-governmental and
religious organizations. The example of the HIPC initiative shows that the timing of
decisions matters for public perception. Many donors have self-committed to spending
a certain share of their Gross National Income (GNI) on foreign aid, and, according to
several aid officials, year-end spending such as that made via trust funds is necessary
to achieve spending targets.16 Although this argument does not illuminate the reasons
14The mechanism is similar to the argument about effort and nonlinear performance contracts in Oyer
(1998).
15Information on the sub-annual timing of donor countries’ contributions to multilateral organizations,
non-governmental organizations, and on bilateral aid disbursements is lacking. It is thus impossible
to test the relative attractiveness of these aid channels at different moments within the fiscal year.
16Most donors have self-commitments that are below the 0.7 percent of GNI target propagated by the
United Nations and advocated for by non-governmental organizations.
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behind the uneven disbursement pattern within the fiscal year, it explains the persistence
of YESS in the foreign aid budget even in countries without lapsing budgets.
2.3 Bureaucratic Quality and End-of-Year Spending
The achievement of a satisfactory fiscal performance is a persistent challenge. This has
become all the more evident in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, which put a strain
on the finances of many countries, regions, and municipalities. One common response is
the strengthening of budget institutions.
Recent microeconomic research finds that management and organizational practices ex-
plain a large share of productivity differences between firms (Bloom et al. 2016). Nicholas
et al. (2014) suggest that about one quarter of cross-country and within-country differ-
ences in total factor productivity can be explained by management practice. It is textbook
knowledge that the productivity of public services is difficult to assess because public in-
stitutions are often monopolists and produce outputs that are difficult to measure. At the
macroeconomic level, the administrative capacity of government bureaucracies for fiscal
and other outcomes is well established (e.g., Knack and Keefer 1995; Keefer and Knack
2007; Knack and Rahman 2007; Van de Walle 2006). The analysis of sub-annual spending
patterns contributes to this research agenda.
How could bureaucratic quality affect the size of YESS? There are seven channels
that could plausibly affect the size of YESS in substantial ways. These channels can
be associated with three aspects of institutional and administrative capacity: policy and
structures, systems, and human resources (World Bank 2006). YESS may result from
inadequacies in one or several of these clusters.
Two channels are related to the policies and structure in the public administration.
First, the re-allocation of funds by bureaucrats might be constrained by rules, which often
earmark funds to closely defined spending categories (Douglas and Franklin 2006). Second,
reshuﬄing resources between issue areas or transferring funds to the next fiscal year is
often associated with additional administrative burden. This may prevent bureaucrats
from making use of such possibilities instead of spending resources within the budget
area. What is more, these rules might create new costs.17 More generally, a reasonable
degree of discretion and flexibility allows bureaucrats to adjust expenditures swiftly and
on a case-by-case basis.
The two most relevant systemic factors are adequate technological infrastructure, al-
lowing for optimal resource and process management. First, modern accounting software
gives decision makers access to up-to-date information about the remaining budget and
17Douglas and Franklin (2006) report for Oklahoma that the carry-over law increased paperwork.
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improves the precision of cost estimates for planned projects. This allows the forecasting
expenditure demands based on previous years’ experiences and helps in determining the
optimal size of precautionary savings. Second, inadequate forecasts or planning of ex-
penditures as well as excessive precautionary savings can result in a YESS that is due to
accidental ‘left-over’ funds.18 Third, constant re-optimization of expenditures is required
to achieve the intended budget balance of zero at the year-end (Douglas and Franklin
2006).
Human resources are the first dimension of bureaucratic quality. A first factor is the
availability of qualified staff while a second is the efficient management of these people.
Suitable career, pay and other incentive schemes may increase worker productivity as
may adequate monitoring.19 In particular, managerial accountability for budget balances
seems to be effective in improving fiscal performance (Dietrichson and Ellegård 2015). A
weak human resource management may increase procrastination by bureaucrats, which
blends my argument with Baumann’s (2015).20
In sum, the interaction between bureaucratic quality and YESS may occur via multi-
ple channels. These channels interact in non-linear ways, making their disentanglement
difficult.21 As a first stepping stone, this Chapter aims to make a strong case that bu-
reaucratic quality matters. It is beyond this analysis to identify the set of institutions
influencing YESS within bureaucracies.
Also note that this Chapter cannot establish an indisputable causal relationship between
bureaucratic quality and YESS. Assessments of the effectiveness of budget institutions
are plagued by the endogeneity of budget institutions to previous fiscal outcomes (e.g.,
De Haan et al. 1999). Another source of endogeneity are findings that some budget insti-
tutions are feasible or effective only under certain political environments (e.g., Hallerberg
et al. 2009). Finally, a third force might simultaneously influence fiscal outcomes and bud-
getary institutions. Eslava (2011) mentions culture, voters’ preferences and the political
environment as common third factors. To mitigate such endogeneity concerns, a handful
of studies (e.g., De Haan and Sturm 1994) analyzes the effect of (budget) institutions
18In contrast, Hurley et al. (2014) argue that agencies overprogram and then disrupt some projects at
the end of the fiscal year because of insufficient funds.
19In case of effort-averse and time-discounting bureaucrats as assumed in Baumann (2015), monitoring
should be continuous rather than occurring at the end of the fiscal year only
20Note that the bureaucratic quality argument is different because I (in contrast to Baumann (2015))
make no prediction about the relationship with uncertainty.
21Arguably, disbursements to public projects take place only at the end of the fiscal year because of
lengthy planning and disbursement phases. This might be due to the project planning phase occupying
at least the first half of the fiscal year while getting the approval necessary for disbursements takes
several more weeks or even months, e.g., because it involves multiple decision makers. As this problem
repeats itself each year, bureaucracies with higher administrative capacities are likely to have adapted
their planning (e.g., to using multi-annual plans and medium-term budgeting) and optimized approval
processes to minimize year-end bottlenecks.
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conditional on potential third forces. In line with these previous efforts, I examine below
whether the effect of bureaucratic quality persists once I account for fundamental third
factors such as per capita income or transparency in the political process. In other words,
I attempt to rule out these alternative explanations and stories as much as possible.
2.4 Data and Identification
Due to falling technology costs and (government) transparency movements, more and
more detailed data are available to researchers on the web (Fung et al. 2007; The Economist
2010). Nevertheless, there are not yet publicly accessible data on sub-annual government
activities that are comparable across countries. I therefore use financial accounting data
on a specific aid type available from the World Bank.22 Over the last two decades, donor
countries have started to provide earmarked aid to multilateral organizations (Eichenauer
and Reinsberg 2017). Traditional multilateral funding is allocated by the organization’s
governance body. In the case of earmarked aid, individual donors target the aid to their
preferred recipient countries, institutions, or topics. In contrast to bilateral aid, the
implementation of this earmarked aid is delegated to multilateral organizations. One
multilateral organization receiving earmarked aid from donors is the World Bank, which
made available disaggregated data on this new aid type.
2.4.1 Institutional Background and Data
The World Bank Group manages the earmarked aid in designated trust funds until suit-
able projects are identified and ready to receive disbursements. These funds might thus
accumulate and hold cash over several years before disbursing the aid to beneficiaries. A
trust fund is typically set up at the request of one or several donor countries by an indi-
vidually negotiated contract between the funder(s) and the Bank. Among other things,
this contract details the beneficiary country or issue, the decision-making powers of fun-
ders, the services provided by the Bank and the Bank’s management fee. Donor support
for trust funds mostly comes from foreign aid budgets but also from foreign affairs and
finance departments (OECD 2012; Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2017).23
22The data are publicly available at: https://finances.worldbank.org/trust-funds (accessed on September
15, 2016) but do not provide some of the details required for this analysis (e.g., the contribution date).
23One type of trust fund (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)/ IDA trust
funds) is funded almost entirely by donors’ foreign aid units. Sensitivity analyses using IBRD/ IDA
trust funds only are shown in Tables A.11 –A.12 in the Appendix. The coefficient size increases
substantially while signs and significance levels are unchanged or increase. The fiscal year at the
World Bank runs from July 1 to June 30. All amounts are in constant 2013 US$.
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Figure 2.1: Contributions to World Bank funds and disbursements by the International
Development Association
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Figure 2.1 shows that earmarked funds have gained in attractiveness over the sample
period, receiving more than US$ 12.1 billion in the World Bank’s fiscal year 2012 and
almost US$ 98.1 billion over the Bank’s 2002-2013 fiscal years, of which 30 and 29 percent
were made in donor-specific last fiscal quarters, respectively.24 Balanced spending over
all fiscal quarters would imply that in average 25 percent of funds are spent in every
quarter. Figure 2.1 puts these numbers into perspective: gross disbursements by the
IDA, amounted to US$ 10.9 billion in the 2012 fiscal year. Over the sample period, the
World Bank has managed 1669 funds over the sample period whereof more than 900 were
active in June 2013 (World Bank 2013). The data include information on the day of
the contribution, the donor government and the receiving fund.25 In the sample period,
13,209 individual contributions were made by DAC donors to any type of fund, and 7,919
were made to IBRD/ IDA trust funds. To create monthly and quarterly indicators, I use
the variable PostingDate, which corresponds to the date of the financial transaction.26
Table 2.1 shows descriptive statistics.
24The fiscal year at the World Bank runs from July 1 to June 30. All amounts are in constant 2013 US$.
25I use the same data as Reinsberg et al. (2015), obtained from the World Bank’s Trust Funds and
Partnership Department.
26I consider the variable as trustworthy because whenever a transfer was reimbursed to a donor govern-
ment, probably because funds were wired by mistake, in almost all cases funds were returned on the
same day in all but eleven cases. I drop observations when the reimbursement was not completed on
the same date. Any remaining negative flows at the aggregate level are set to one before logarithms
are taken. Results are robust to these decisions.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Quarterly contributions* 1294 60.541 124.998 0.000 1479.981
First fund contributions 1296 1.288 2.620 0.000 36.000
Mean contributions in last quarter* 323 86.513 150.151 0.000 1163.747
Bureaucratic quality, ICRG 1215 3.657 0.503 2.500 4.000
Yearly bureaucratic quality, ICRG 1248 3.660 0.501 2.500 4.000
Corruption, ICRG 1215 4.166 1.121 2.000 6.000
Transparency, IMF 1134 53.126 23.224 0.000 100.00
Control of corruption, WGI 1242 1.497 0.751 -0.255 2.553
Government effectiveness, WGI 1242 1.502 0.499 0.214 2.357
Regulatory quality, WGI 1242 1.393 0.351 0.484 1.971
Average governance, WGI 1242 1.338 0.423 0.232 1.985
Total disaster-affected people, million 1296 224 141 97 659
Asylum seekers 1296 14294 17052 35 109580
Battle-related deaths 1296 25293 12143 12207 71981
Total aid disbursements* 1296 4313 5837 14 32398
Election quarter 1296 0.069 0.253 0.000 1.000
Election year 1296 0.346 0.476 0.000 1.000
Government change 1296 0.017 0.130 0.000 1.000
Year of government change 1296 0.118 0.323 0.000 1.000
Aid minister change 1296 0.018 0.132 0.00 1.000
Year of aid minister change 1296 0.067 0.250 0.000 1.000
Late budget 1296 0.486 1.730 0.000 14.00
Accounting type 924 0.418 0.493 0.000 1.000
Primary balance (% of GDP) 1234 -1.266 3.198 -13.197 5.999
GDP per capita, constant 2005 US$ 1044 36434 11208 17847 90889
Economic crisis 1150 0.063 0.242 0.000 1.000
Note: *in constant 2013 US$ million.
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Figure 2.2: Different types of funds
0
2
4
6
8
C
on
st
an
t U
S
D
 2
01
3 
bi
lli
on
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
World Bank fiscal year
IFC trust funds FIFs
IDA/IBRD trust funds
Figure 2.2 shows the importance of the different types of funds over the sample period.27
Because contributions to one or the other type are likely to be substitutes when donor
agencies spend ‘left-over’ funds at the end of the FY, all fund types are included in the
analysis.28 The analysis is limited to the 27 donor countries organized in the OECD’s
DAC during the sample period for a number of reasons: First, all OECD countries are
democracies, making their budgetary processes relatively comparable. Second, some of
the covariates are available only for this group of countries. Third, the vast majority of
the aid allocation literature analyzes aid by this donor group. While non-DAC countries,
private companies, multilateral organizations, and NGOs also contribute to these funds,
figure 3 shows that donor countries organized in the DAC are by far the most important
donor type in terms of volume (Figure 2.3, see also Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2017).29
Figure 2.4 – Figure 2.7 provide a first impression of the data. As can be seen from
27The World Bank categorizes funds according to their topic and the services it provides to these funds.
These funds may support the projects of or be implemented by the IBRD and the IDA, or by the
International Finance Corporation (IFC). Alternatively, contributions are made to Financial Interme-
diary Funds (FIFs), which may also use organizations other than the World Bank for implementation.
FIFs are pass-through multilaterals as described in the introduction of this thesis. They are in-
stitutionally less dependent from the World Bank than trust funds, relying mainly on its financial
management service.
28Clearly, there are other spending categories within the foreign aid budgets that are substitutes for trust
fund contributions. However, no sub-annual data on these spending categories are available.
29OECD/DAC countries in our sample (in alphabetic order) are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South
Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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Figure 2.3: Different types of donors
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Table 2.2, donors rely on different fiscal years for budgeting. I define donor-specific fiscal
quarter (FQ) by assigning donors’ contributions in a calendar quarter to the FQ according
to the fiscal year used by the donor. Figure 2.4 shows the ratio of actual average quarterly
contributions as a share of average quarterly contributions if these were disbursed evenly
over the donor-specific fiscal year. Again, the horizontal line at one marks balanced
spending over the fiscal year. Contributions in the last quarter are significantly above
the line of balanced spending while contributions in the second and third quarter are
significantly below it. Figure A.1 in the Appendix shows the same ratio at the monthly
level. Contributions in the first and last month are significantly above the line of balanced
spending. Figure 2.5 shows the evenness of weekly expenditures in the eight weeks before
and after the end of the fiscal year. While the confidence interval is large and includes
the line of balanced spending, the end of the fiscal year clearly marks a break. Figure 2.6
shows contributions to funds by donor-specific FQ. The grey-shaded area mark the last
fiscal quarters of donor-specific fiscal years. Visual inspection suggests that spending is
higher in the last FQ.
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Table 2.2: Budget years of DAC donors
Fiscal year 1.4. - 31.3. 1.7. - 31.6. 1.10. -30.9. 1.1. - 31.12.
Calendar quar-
ter corresponding
to the last fiscal
quarter
1 2 3 4
Donor countries
Canada,
Japan,
United
Kingdom
Australia,
New
Zealand
United
States
Austria, Belgium, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, South
Korea, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovak
Republic, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland
Number of coun-
tries 3 2 1 21
Figure 2.4: Fund contributions by donor-specific fiscal quarter
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Notes: The y-scale shows the evenness of spending within the fiscal year and is defined as the actual
quarter trust fund contributions divided by the average quarterly contributions (i.e., annual trust fund
contributions divided by 4). The vertical line at one represents even spending in the last fiscal quarter
(i.e., one quarter of annual spending).
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Figure 2.5: Weekly contributions to funds around the end of the donor-specific fiscal
year
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Notes: The y-scale shows the evenness of spending which is defined as the actual weekly fund contributions
divided by the average weekly contributions (i.e., annual fund contributions divided by 52). The x-scale
depicts the number of weeks before and after the end of the donor-specific fiscal year. The vertical line
at one represents even spending in the last fiscal quarter (i.e., one quarter of annual spending). The lines
without dots represent the 95% confidence bands.
Figure 2.6: Aggregate quarterly fund contributions by donor-specific fiscal quarter
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Notes: The grey-shared area highlight changes in contributions between the third and the last fiscal
quarter of donor-specific fiscal quarters.
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2.4.2 Identification Strategy
In contrast to existing research on year-end spending in the public sector, I use panel-
econometric analysis with various fixed effects rather than calibration to test my and the
alternative explanations for spending spikes. I exploit variation in donors’ fiscal years to
control for seasonal effects (Table 2.2). My main dependent variable is (logged) quarterly
amounts contributed to trust funds by donor-specific FQ. I analyze the data at different
levels of temporal aggregation to test the robustness of the main results. For the main
analysis, I prefer quarterly data over temporally more disaggregated data for two reasons.
First, trust fund contributions are not observed every day and are of substantial size.
Temporal aggregation helps to reduce the effect of outliers. Second, quarterly data are
more adequate for testing the explanations for YESS. In particular, the variables I use
to approximate the uncertainty present in the planning and budgeting phase typically do
not occur at a precise date while they can reasonably be assumed to occur within a given
quarter.
I start with testing the raw YESS effect. (Logged) quarterly amounts in constant US$
are regressed on a dummy for the last FQ and on various fixed effects. My preferred
regression equation takes the following form:
Log (Quarterly amount)iqifi = α + β Last fiscal quarteriqi + δifi + iqifi (2.1)
The index i refers to the donor country, qi to the donor-specific fiscal quarter, and fi
to the donor-specific fiscal year. Table 2.2 shows that a majority of countries uses the
calendar year as their budget year but that six major donors start their fiscal years in
April, July, or October. The dummy Last fiscal quarteriqi is one in the fourth donor-
specific fiscal quarter. The baseline categories are thus the contributions made in the
first, second, and third fiscal quarters (i.e., the remainder of the fiscal year). A positive
coefficient β would provide evidence for a YESS.
My preferred specification relies on donor-fiscal year fixed effects (δifi) that account for
time-invariant donor characteristics and donor-specific time-variant shocks. As many of
the co-variates of interest described below do not vary within the donors’ fiscal year, I
will have to rely on donor- and fiscal-year fixed effects instead of their interaction in the
regressions. Errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the donor country
level. Potential reverse causality is discussed in Section 2.5.3.
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2.5 Empirical Analysis
The phenomenon of heightened year-end spending is widely recognized and has attracted
many nicknames. In particular, YESS is often referred to by the season associated with
the end of a country’s financial year. Nicknames such as ‘March Madness’, ‘Spring Sale’,
‘Christmas Season,’ ‘December Fever,’ or as ‘Grand Piano Syndrome’ suggest that end-
of-year spending tends to be of the ‘unhealthy’ and wasteful type.30 In stark contrast to
public awareness about end-of-year spending spikes, the academic literature on its causes
and consequences is scarce. In particular, there is no systematic empirical evidence for
sub-annual fiscal budget cycles across countries. The next section establishes that sub-
annual budget cycles in fund contributions across donor countries exist. Subsequent
sections will assess the explanatory power of the different explanations for (the size of)
heightened year-end contributions to trust funds.
2.5.1 Cross-country Evidence for End-of-Year Spending Spikes
This section establishes the existence of heightened year-end contributions to trust funds
at the quarterly, monthly and weekly level. Table 2.3 shows that contributions to trust
funds are significantly higher in the last FQ. The coefficient β is statistically and eco-
nomically significant across columns and robust to the introduction of increasingly strin-
gent fixed effects. Column 1 shows the relationship between the logged contributions by
donor-quarter and the dummy for the last FQ without any fixed effects. Contributions
are estimated to almost double in the last quarter relative to the other quarters of the
fiscal year.31 Due to donors’ heterogeneous use of trust funds, the estimated adjusted
R-squared is small. The smallest trust fund donor in the sample, Slovak Republic, con-
tributed less than (2013 constant) US$ 60,000 over the sample period whereas the largest
donor, the United States, provided US$ 15.7 billion. Column 2 accounts for fiscal-year-
specific shocks, absorbing factors such as the general popularity of trust funds in a given
fiscal year. The adjusted R-squared slightly decreases relative to column 1. The intro-
duction of donor-fixed effects alone barely affects the estimated coefficient because the
last FQ dummy is essentially uncorrelated with unobserved donor characteristics as it
mechanically occurs every fourth quarter.
30The British Council coined the term ’Grand Piano Syndrome’ to suggest that British Council offices
around the world purchased grand pianos, an extravagant and largely unnecessary expense, in March,
the final month of the British fiscal year. While it is possible that bureaucrats strategically spend
less during the year to make such luxury shopping possible, this is rather unlikely because such
misappropriation might lead to dismissal. Due to the re-election constraint, politicians would not
approve of such spending unless it benefits them directly.
31Percentage: 100 ∗ (e1.039 − 1) = 183.
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Table 2.3: Last fiscal quarter effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Last fiscal quarter 1.039∗∗∗ 0.998∗∗∗ 1.040∗∗∗ 1.238∗∗∗ 1.214∗∗∗ 1.679∗∗
(0.306) (0.301) (0.350) (0.402) (0.418) (0.649)
Fiscal year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Donor-fiscal year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Donor-calendar year FE No No No No Yes Yes
Calendar quarter FE No No No No No Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.00428 0.00406 0.711 0.710 0.697 0.702
N° of observations 1296 1296 1296 1296 1296 1296
N° of donors 27 27 27 27 27 27
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Column 3 thus directly adds donor-fiscal year fixed effects to control for the level of
trust fund contributions by a given donor in a given fiscal year. Identification thus comes
from the within-country-within-fiscal year variation in contributions. This is my preferred
specification because it accounts for the most important sources of omitted variables. The
estimated coefficient is of similar size as in column 1, suggesting a doubling of contributions
in the last FQ. To rule out that omitted variables drive the result, columns 4-6 include
increasingly stringent fixed effects. Column 4 adds calendar-year fixed effects to control
for time-variant changes that affect all donors equally and are not captured by the fiscal
year effects. For example, they would account for the introduction of a new regulation
on trust fund contributions by the World Bank, or a joint trust fund initiative by several
donors. As the adjusted R-squared is lower in column 4, any bias from potential omitted
variables must be minor relative to the high number of additional dummies.
Seasonal effects such as lower staff productivity in the Christmas season are further
potentially important sources of unobserved heterogeneity. I exploit the fact that some
countries’ fiscal years deviate from the calendar year, which allows for the inclusion of
calendar-quarter fixed effects (column 6). The identification mainly originates from the
five donor countries with fiscal years departing from the calendar year. It is thus less
precisely estimated while its increase suggests that YESS in these five donor countries
is more pronounced than in donor countries with a calendar-based fiscal year. Although
the deviation from the calendar year is unlikely to be the main explanation for higher
year-end contributions in these countries, it should be noted that in all sample countries
government staff tend to work a lower number of days in the last month of the calendar
year due to holiday days taken for Christmas and New Year festivities. This implies
that there are fewer working days in December to spend funds. Because the fiscal year
coincides with the calendar year in the majority of the sample countries, the coefficient
of interest, β, would be downward biased.
To examine whether the length of the month has any effect, Table 2.4 analyzes the
data at the monthly level. The results show that, irrespective of fixed effects, contribution
amounts in the last month of the fiscal year are statistically and economically significantly
higher: On average about eighteen times as high as in the other eleven months of the
year.32 Moving from column 1 to 6, the same set of increasingly stringent fixed effects
used previously are introduced. Column 7 adds month-fixed effects to account for fine-
grained seasonality effects and for differences in the number of days per month. The
coefficient is remarkably stable across columns.
32Percentage: 100 ∗ (e2.985 − 1) = 1, 878.
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Table 2.4: Last fiscal month effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Last fiscal month 2.985∗∗∗ 2.994∗∗∗ 3.042∗∗∗ 3.041∗∗∗ 2.974∗∗∗ 2.736∗∗∗ 3.212∗∗∗
(0.534) (0.539) (0.555) (0.554) (0.549) (0.561) (0.731)
Fiscal year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Donor-fiscal year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Donor-calendar year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Calendar quarter FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Month FE No No No No No No Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.0120 0.0186 0.525 0.524 0.523 0.524 0.544
N° of observations 3879 3879 3879 3879 3879 3879 3879
N° of donors 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged) monthly contributions to funds and covers the World Bank’s fiscal
years 2002-2013. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
87
2 December Fever in Public Finance
To explore in more detail what drives the effect at the quarterly and monthly levels,
Table 2.5 analyzes the contribution data at the daily level. As mentioned above, the lack
of aggregation increases the noise in the data so that more imprecise estimates must be
expected. Coefficients are consistently positive in the eight weeks prior to the end of the
fiscal year and increase as the fiscal year draws to a close. The coefficients turn significant
at the latest five weeks before the end of the fiscal year irrespective of the included fixed
effects. In some weeks in the new fiscal year, the weekly dummies are still positive and
statistically significant although with substantially smaller coefficients. There are several
reasons that may explain this pattern: Transfers made by donor countries at the end of the
fiscal year need several working days to be wired to the World Bank account; World Bank
staff post the date of receipt with delay due to the holiday season, in particular around the
end of the calendar year, when the fiscal year of a majority of donors ends, and Christmas
and New Year festivities take place; or donors made transfers later than intended due to
delays in their bureaucracies. Finally, it is common practice that disbursements ordered
prior to the fiscal year but undertaken up to sixty days (i.e., up to 7 weeks) after its end
may be counted as disbursements of the elapsed fiscal year (OECD 2003: 109). Indeed,
the estimated coefficients and significance levels decrease as the elapsed fiscal year moves
further away. Note that heightened spending in the first weeks of the new fiscal year is
not a threat to the identification as it would bias the estimated coefficient downward.
The variable of interest is not a ‘true panel variable’ because it does not vary over fiscal
years within a donor country but only across countries within the fiscal year. In these
cases, Angrist and Pischke (2009) suggest checking whether results hold in the cross-
sectional setting. Table 2.6 shows that they do. The coefficient shrinks substantially,
suggesting that last quarter expenditures are about three-quarters higher than in the
other FQs rather than doubling as in the panel analysis shown in Table 2.3. Typically,
cross-sectional estimates are larger than coefficients in fixed effect estimations because
panel results are more sensitive to bias from measurement error and to selection effects
(Angrist and Pischke 2009: 167). These concerns do not seem to apply to the analyis in
this Chapter.
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Table 2.5: Daily contributions to trust funds at the end of the fiscal year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Before: week 8 0.0976∗ 0.0706 0.0828 0.101∗∗ 0.101∗∗
(0.0561) (0.0597) (0.0556) (0.0485) (0.0485)
Before: week 7 0.0455 0.0186 0.0308 0.0485 0.0485
(0.0498) (0.0642) (0.0551) (0.0534) (0.0534)
Before: week 6 0.159∗ 0.133 0.145∗ 0.162 0.162
(0.0839) (0.0836) (0.0846) (0.0986) (0.0986)
Before: week 5 0.135∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.0416) (0.0362) (0.0362) (0.0581) (0.0581)
Before: week 4 0.186∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗
(0.0600) (0.0634) (0.0603) (0.0952) (0.0952)
Before: week 3 0.353∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.105) (0.108) (0.154) (0.154)
Before: week 2 0.369∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.0997) (0.101) (0.137) (0.137)
Before: week 1 0.458∗∗ 0.431∗∗ 0.443∗∗ 0.545∗∗ 0.545∗∗
(0.177) (0.163) (0.170) (0.207) (0.207)
After: week 1 0.0964 0.112 0.0998 0.223 0.223
(0.0951) (0.103) (0.0981) (0.137) (0.137)
After: week 2 0.185∗∗ 0.201∗∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.312∗∗ 0.312∗∗
(0.0853) (0.0870) (0.0879) (0.129) (0.129)
After: week 3 0.128∗ 0.143∗ 0.131∗ 0.254∗ 0.254∗
(0.0701) (0.0797) (0.0748) (0.131) (0.131)
After: week 4 0.117∗∗ 0.133∗∗ 0.120∗∗ 0.243∗∗ 0.243∗∗
(0.0537) (0.0618) (0.0569) (0.108) (0.108)
After: week 5 0.0935∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.0969∗ 0.198∗∗ 0.198∗∗
(0.0508) (0.0518) (0.0523) (0.0856) (0.0856)
After: week 6 0.112∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.116∗∗ 0.199∗∗ 0.199∗∗
(0.0452) (0.0486) (0.0471) (0.0731) (0.0731)
Table 2.5: (continues on next page)
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Table 2.5: (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After: week 7 0.0921 0.108 0.0955 0.179∗ 0.179∗
(0.0645) (0.0735) (0.0674) (0.104) (0.104)
After: week 8 0.112∗ 0.127∗ 0.115∗ 0.198∗∗ 0.198∗∗
(0.0591) (0.0669) (0.0606) (0.0816) (0.0816)
Aggregation level Daily Daily Daily Daily Daily
Calendar year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fiscal year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Donor-fiscal year FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Calendar quarter FE No No No No Yes
Calendar month FE No No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.00214 0.00313 0.0299 0.0303 0.0303
N° of observations 118341 118341 118341 118341 118341
N° of donors 27 27 27 27 27
Notes: The dependent variables are (logged) daily contributions to all funds and
cover the World Bank’s fiscal years 2002-2013. Robust standard errors in parentheses
clustered at the donor country level. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.6: Cross-section analysis
(1) (2)
Last fiscal quarter 0.551∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗
(0.220) (0.126)
Collapse dimension FY-FQ FY-FQ
Calendar year FE No Yes
Donor FE No No
R-squared 0.0866 0.848
Adjusted R-squared 0.0683 0.795
N° of observations 52 52
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged)
quarterly contributions to all funds. Robust
standard errors in parentheses clustered at the
donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 2.7: Evenness of spending within the fiscal year by donor country
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Notes: The y-axis shows the evenness of spending within the fiscal year and is defined as the actual
quarterly trust fund contributions divided by the average quarterly contributions (i.e., annual trust fund
contributions divided by 4). The vertical line at one represents even spending in the last fiscal quarter
(i.e., one quarter of annual spending).
Next, I explore the heterogeneity across donors and years. Figure 2.7 shows that yearly
spending moments vary substantially across years for some donors but not for others.
The horizontal line represents balanced spending within the fiscal year. Dots above the
horizontal line indicate a YESS. I also explore donor heterogeneity statistically.33 I obtain
the donor-specific coefficients for the YESS effect from interactions of each donor dummy
with the last quarter dummy. The regressions include fiscal year- and donor- fixed effects.
The Slovak Republic is the smallest provider of trust fund aid in the sample and I thus
use the last quarter effect in the Slovak Republic as the baseline category. As these
coefficients are based on variation in twelve observations, it is not surprising that they
lack precision. Almost all point estimates are positive and in the four cases where they
are not, the coefficients are close to zero (except for Luxembourg, a small donor) and
33Results are available from the author upon request.
91
2 December Fever in Public Finance
even their 90% confidence intervals include zero. One of the two top trust fund donors,
the United Kingdom, does not experience any YESS on average. This might be due to
the possibility of (partial) roll-overs to the next financial year. In contrast, large donors
like Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden have significant year-end
budget spikes. Not only the estimated size of the coefficient but also the width of the
confidence intervals vary widely across donor countries. Small confidence intervals are
observed for some large trust fund donors. This implies that they make regular use
of trust funds to spend lapsing budgets (Switzerland, Denmark, Japan, Norway, New
Zealand and Sweden). This can also be seen from Figure 2.7. In sum, there is substantial
heterogeneity in donors’ use of trust funds to spend lapsing budgets in both regularity
and extent. In sum, there is substantial evidence for the existence of YESS in trust fund
contributions at three different levels of temporal aggregation. The use of trust funds to
spend lapsing budgets is also acknowledged by staff at bilateral aid agencies. As a French
aid official put it: “[The fiscal year] is of course only one element of explanation for trust
funds. But a powerful one.”34
2.5.2 Cross-country Evidence for End-of-Year Creation of Trust
Funds
Trust funds allow donors to store funds programmed for a specific bilateral project but
where circumstances do not allow full disbursement within their fiscal year. For example,
signatures on the project contract may be missing or preconditions required for disburse-
ments may not be met. Under such circumstances, donor countries might resort to setting
up a trust fund with a narrow mandate. According to World Bank staff, the creation of
a single-donor trust fund can be done within a few months under some circumstances.35
While I hypothesize that trust fund creation timed to the end of the donor’s fiscal year
is higher, the data do not provide information about the creation of trust funds. I thus
test for a last quarter effect in trust fund creation by constructing the variable quarterly
number of first contributions. In the disaggregated data, I define first contribution as the
first transfer ever received by a given trust fund. Aggregating to the donor-specific FQ in
a given year, I obtain a cardinal variable ranging from zero to thirty-six and interpret this
variable as the number of new trust funds created in a given quarter. Figure 2.8 shows
that most trust funds are created in the early years of the sample and that within fiscal
years, most trust funds receive their first contribution in the last quarter of the fiscal year
34Statement in an e-mail exchange in October 2014, translated by the author.
35The creation of a trust fund is easier if the donor knows his goal, if the issue is not sensitive, if there is
interest within the Bank and staff on both sides are prompt in carrying out the administrative tasks.
The process of setting up a fund takes longer if multiple or ‘complicated’ donors are involved.
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as highlighted by the grey-shaded areas. The process of trust fund creation is described
below.
Figure 2.8: Number of first contributions by donor-specific fiscal quarter
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Notes: The grey-shaded area highlights the change in the number of funds receiving first-time contribu-
tions between the third and the last fiscal quarter.
Donors create significantly more trust funds in the last quarter. According to column
1 in table ??, more than 0.8 additional first-time contributions are made in the last quar-
ter. Given the standard deviation of 2.6 for the dependent variable, this corresponds
to about 30 percent of a standard deviation change. Because the dependent variable is
zero in most donor-quarters, column 2 re-estimates the main effect using a zero-inflated
negative binomial regression, which is most adequate for over-dispersed cardinal depen-
dent variables.36 I model the logit part of the model with donors’ quarterly participation
in G8 summits and the count part with the dummy variable of interest and fiscal-year
fixed effects.37 The coefficient of interest in column 2 is slightly smaller but similar to
the point estimate obtained using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). This suggests that the
use of OLS is relatively unproblematic and column 3 thus adds donor-fiscal year fixed
36The Vuong test indicates that the zero-inflated model is preferable to an ordinary negative binomial
regression model and according to the likelihood test the zero-inflated negative binomial model is
more adequate than the zero-inflated Poisson model.
37The G8 variable is inspired by an observation of the World Bank’s evaluation unit (IEG 2011a: vii):
“For large multi-donor funds, the decision [about trust fund contributions] generally comes at the
initiative of senior government officials or international groups of officials such as the G-7.” Russia
joined the G7 in 1997 and was expelled from the G8 following its annexation of Crimea in March
2014. We thus only observe G8 meetings in our sample period.
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effects to the model of column 1. The coefficient is similar to previous columns. In in-
formal conversations, World Bank staff suggested that institutional restrictions in their
organization might affect the creation of trust funds. In particular, the World Bank has
discontinued solicitations of trust funds during recent replenishment negotiations for the
next three-year funding period of IDA.38 The IDA replenishment period might thus be
an omitted variable. Column 4 includes the variable End of IDA cycle, which is one in
the last quarter of an IDA replenishment period. The last quarter effect is robust to the
inclusion of the variable. For the IDA variable, I find a negative coefficient, implying that
the intended purpose of the restriction was achieved.
Table 2.7: First contributions to funds and bureaucratic quality
(1) (2) (3)
Last fiscal quarter -2.314 -2.406 -1.954
(1.890) (1.931) (1.943)
Last fiscal quarter 0.908 0.882 0.758
∗ bureaucratic quality (0.592) (0.602) (0.620)
Bureaucratic quality 1.103∗∗∗ 1.043∗∗∗
(0.339) (0.330)
Model OLS OLS OLS
Fiscal year FE No Yes Yes
Donor-fiscal year FE No No Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.0976 0.174 0.598
N° of observations 1296 1296 1296
N° of donors 27 27 27
Notes: The dependent variable is the quarterly number of
first contributions and covers the World Bank’s fiscal years
2002-2013. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered
at the donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
38As the Bank’s fiscal year runs from July 1 to June 30 and the IDA budget is replenished for a three-year
period, the end period of IDA12-IDA16 fall in our sample period, which, respectively, ended on June
30 of the years 2002, 2005, 2008, and 2011.
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2.5.3 Empirical Evidence for the Bureaucracy Hypothesis
As suggested above, the simplest explanation for spending surges at the end of the budget
year is probably a failure to plan. This section tests this argument formally by using
bureaucratic quality as a measure of planning capacity and interact it with the dummy
for the last FQ. I expect better bureaucracies to reduce YESS and therefore a negative
interaction term.
Several measures of governance and, more specifically, government capacity exist. As
the quality of governance in general and of subcomponents of governance in particular
are notoriously hard to measure (Langbein and Knack 2010), I provide extensive sensi-
tivity analysis. For the main regressions, I use the variable Bureaucratic Quality from
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) (Howell 2011), a commercial service pro-
viding information on political risks to investors and lenders. ICRG provides the only
governance measures available at monthly frequency. Moreover, the variable corresponds
most closely to the theoretical mechanisms underlying the argument. Values range from
zero to four with higher scores indicating the presence of regular, meritocratic recruit-
ment and advancement processes, insulation from political pressure, and the ability to
continue service provision during government changes (Howell 2011). Because no more
details about the definition are given and the scores are based on expert ratings, further
research was conducted to validate the measure against alternative ones, although only
for developing countries.39 Given that the bureaucratic quality score is based on expert
surveys, there is also small risk of reverse causality with YESS. Surveyed experts might
observe inefficient projects that are due to YESS and attribute lower scores to the bureau-
cracy as a consequence. In robustness checks, I lag the bureaucratic quality variable by
one year to mitigate these concerns. A further concern is the ordinal nature of the ICRG
and most governance variables. Nevertheless, the literature uses the ICRG variables as
interval data (e.g., Knack and Rahman 2007). I dichotomize bureaucratic quality at the
sample mean and replicate the results with the binary measure as robustness check. As
there is relatively little variation in bureaucratic quality over the time-frame and across
the sample countries, I test the robustness of the results by using alternative measures
of governance and government effectiveness. These proxy variables aim to measure con-
cepts similar but distinct from bureaucratic quality. For adequate comparison with these
yearly variables, I also run regressions with the annual average of the ICRG bureaucratic
quality variable and do not include fiscal year-donor dummies in regressions with annual
39Knack and Rahman (2007) find bureaucratic quality to be highly correlated with Evans and Rauch’s
(1999) more detailed “Weberian scale” of bureaucratic development. Hendrix (2010) assesses the
construct validity of operationalization of state capacity in the civil conflict literature and concludes
by suggesting that survey-based variables of bureaucratic quality are among the two most theoretically
and empirically justified measures.
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variables. Table 2.1 shows descriptive statistics for the different governance measures and
Table 2.9 their correlation matrix.
Table 2.8 shows that the interaction effect of bureaucratic quality and last FQ has
the hypothersized negative effect and is economically and statistically significant. This
result is independent of the included fixed effects (columns 1-4). In terms of magnitude,
a one-point (one standard deviation) increase in bureaucratic quality increases reduces
YESS by 81 (40) percent.40 For the average donor, this would translate into a reduction
of last quarter funding by, respectively, 70 and 35 million US$.41 Put differently, the
results predicts that YESS is 160 percent lower for a donor with the maximum level of
bureaucracy in the sample (e.g., New Zealand in 2010) compared to a country with the
lowest level in the sample (e.g., Italy in 2010).42 Figure 2.9 shows the marginal effect of
the last quarter for the different levels of bureaucratic quality observed in the analyzed
sample of OECD countries. Although there is a year-end effect for all levels of bureaucratic
quality, YESS is smaller for better bureaucracies.
Given the strong increase in contributions over time, I want to test the robustness of
the main result to changes in the time period. Column 5 includes contributions during
the second half of the World Bank’s fiscal years 2008-2013 while column 6 focuses on the
start of the sample period (2002-2007). The results are robust to these modifications. I
also analyze the sensitivity of the results to the exclusion of individual donor countries
controlling for donor-fiscal year effects. The main result is not sensitive to excluding any
of the donors. In particular, the result is robust to the exclusion of the United States, a
special case because its budgets are often delayed and USAID, the US aid agency, is more
micro-managed by the legislature than aid agencies in other donor countries (Tables A.2–
A.4). Column 7 excludes the five smallest donors.43 Column 8 excludes the two donors,
which share the budget year of the World Bank (i.e., Australia and New Zealand). The
result is robust to their exclusion.
Results are also robust to using the one-year lag (Table A.5), the yearly average of
bureaucratic quality (Table A.7) and for the monthly analysis. In sum, there is robust
evidence that smaller end-of-year spending spikes are observed in countries with better
bureaucracies. In the following, the robustness of this finding to alternative measures of
bureaucratic quality is tested.
40Percentage: 100 ∗ (e−1.674 − 1) = −81.25; 100 ∗ (e−1.674 − 1) ∗ 0.50 = −41.63.
41Average contributions in the last quarter are US$ 86.51 million. Thus, −0.8125 ∗ 86.51 = −70.29 and
−0.82 ∗ 86.51 ∗ 0.503 = −35.35.
42 4
2.5 = 1.6.43The Slovak Republic, Poland, Iceland, the Czech Republic and Greece each provide less than US$ 40
million to funds over the sample period. The next largest donor, Portugal, provides almost three
times as much as Greece, the largest donor among the excluded donors.
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Table 2.8: The effect of bureaucratic quality on contributions in the last quarter
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Last fiscal quarter 7.154∗∗∗ 7.197∗∗∗ 7.238∗∗∗ 6.707∗∗ 6.303∗∗ 7.871∗∗ 5.072∗ 7.061∗∗∗
(2.433) (2.460) (2.490) (2.856) (2.991) (3.626) (2.559) (1.631)
Last fiscal quarter -1.674∗∗ -1.683∗∗ -1.688∗∗ -1.549∗∗ -1.530∗ -1.733∗ -1.126∗ -1.636∗∗∗
∗ bureaucratic quality (0.617) (0.623) (0.631) (0.723) (0.762) (0.920) (0.641) (0.445)
Bureaucratic quality 6.254∗∗ 6.284∗∗ -0.337 1.864∗∗∗ -0.479 2.325∗∗∗ -0.382 -0.500
(2.404) (2.412) (0.390) (0.238) (0.352) (0.233) (0.335) (1.202)
Fiscal year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Donor FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Donor-fiscal year FE No No No Yes No No No No
Adjusted R-squared 0.222 0.225 0.710 0.714 0.712 0.722 0.391 0.722
N° of observations 1296 1296 1296 1296 712 584 1056 1200
N° of donors 27 27 27 27 27 27 22 25
Notes ≤ 2007 > 2007 5 minor WB year
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged) quarterly contributions to funds and covers the World Bank’s fiscal years 2002-
2013. Column 5 excludes observations after the World Bank’s fiscal year 2007 while column 6 excludes contributions prior
to the year 2007. Column 7 drops the five smallest trust funds donors (The Slovak Republic, Poland, Iceland, the Czech
Republic and Greece) and column 8 the two donors that have the same fiscal year as the World Bank (Australia and New
Zealand). Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 2.9: Marginal effects for regressions with different sets of fixed effects
(a) Without fixed effects
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(b) With fiscal year-fixed effects
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(c) With donor- and fiscal year- fixed effects
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(d) With donor-fiscal year-fixed effects
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Notes: Marginal effect of bureaucratic quality on (logged) fund contributions in the last fiscal quarter.
Figures a, b, c and d correspond to columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Table 2.8 respectively.
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It is possible that it is good governance more generally that drives the result for the
bureaucratic quality variable. I use six governance variables that claim to measure con-
cepts similar but distinct from bureaucratic quality (see column 1 of Table 2.9 for their
correlation with ICRG bureaucratic quality). First, I use three different governance mea-
sures from the World Governance Indicators (WGI) are used (Kaufmann et al. 2011).
The WGI consist of six annual indicators that aim to capture different dimensions of gov-
ernance.44 Langbein and Knack (2010) examine the dimensionality of the WGI indexes
and conclude that the individual WGI indicators do not generally capture distinct aspects
of governance. Their result supports averaging the six indices in a broader index (e.g.,
Bjørnskov 2006). I use the average WGI value as one sensitivity check but as the goal is
not to test a specific hypothesis about one or the other dimension, I also use the relevant
indicators individually.
First, the WGI government effectiveness indicator aims to capture “the capacity of
the governments to effectively formulate and implement sound policies” (Kaufmann et al.
2011). It includes the ICRG bureaucratic quality variable as one source of information.
Government effectiveness is defined more broadly than bureaucratic quality while clearly
encompassing it. This is less clear for the WGI regulatory quality variable that measures
“perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound poli-
cies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development” (Kaufmann
et al. 2011). Third, I use the WGI control of corruption indicator that should capture
“perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and
private interests” (Kaufmann et al. 2011). One channel for the negative relationship be-
tween bureaucratic quality and YESS is the absence of political interference that disturbs
the implementation of the disbursement plan. One relatively indirect measure for such
political interference is the level of government corruption. As alternative measure of cor-
ruption, I use the monthly available ICRG corruption score, which is mostly “concerned
with actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job
reservations, ‘favor-for favors’, secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between
politics and business.” The lower the value, the more widespread corruption is.
The transparency of government finances reduces the opportunities for corrupt activi-
ties, indicates statistical capacity, and increases the accountability of the government to
taxpayers for the efficient use of taxes. Alt and Lassen (2006) find that political business
cycles in 19 OECD countries in the 1990s are reduced by fiscal transparency. Ficht-
44The indicators are constructed using an Unobserved Components Model which weights the information
contained in more than thirty existing data sources. Each governance measure is distributed between
-2.5 and 2.5 with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Higher values correspond to better
governance.
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ner and Greene (2014) note that YESS may also be curbed through heightened budget
transparency such as via a midyear budget execution review as introduced in Taiwan in
2002. However, as information about sub-annual government spending is generally not
available, there are no public discussions about YESS and the channels through which
transparency decreases political business cycles are not (readily) applicable to sub-annual
spending cycles. Nevertheless, one could expect that the more transparent donors are,
the more likely it is that they will be held accountable for rushed end-of-year spending,
especially if it is of the wasteful kind. Due to a lack of alternative measures, I use a new
measure of fiscal transparency that is based on the comprehensiveness of governments’
reporting to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Wang et al. 2015).45
Table 2.9 shows the correlation of the six governance measures with ICRG bureaucratic
quality and oneanother. The interaction of the alternative governance measures with the
last quarter is negative and significant for different sets of fixed effects (Table A.9 and
Table A.10). The interaction with the IMF fiscal transparency measure is negative but
far from being statistically or economically significant.
Omitted variable bias arises due to failure to account for a factor that affects both
bureaucratic quality and the size of YESS. To reduce such concerns, I conduct two types
of sensitivity analysis. First, I examine the potentially most important common determi-
nant of bureaucratic quality and YESS: the level of development as measured by income
per capita. As noted in previous research (e.g., Knack and Rahman 2007; Acemoglu
et al. 2001), the correlation of income per capita and bureaucratic quality is also high
in my sample (r = 0.64) Column 1 of Table 2.10 shows that the finding about bureau-
cratic quality is robust to the inclusion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita
(OECD 2016a). The interaction of GDP per capita with the last quarter dummy is also
statistically significant.
A second source of omitted variable bias are specific institutions or procedures that vary
across countries and over time. In this Chapter, I will consider whether these institutions
or procedures have additional explanatory power for YESS.
45Using the Aid Transparency Index which assesses the state of aid transparency among major donor
organizations, would be most appropriate here but it is only available since 2011. Measuring budget
transparency more generally, the Open Budget Index (OBI), a biannual survey measure of budget
transparency, participation, and oversight, is available from 2006 for some donor countries. However,
fourteen donors are not included in any year. Independent of using the raw or interpolated values of
the OBI, the interaction with the last FQ dummy is insignificant. Further alternative indicators of
fiscal transparency are not available for the sample period (e.g., the indicator of Alt and Lassen 2006)
or limited to EU countries (Hallerberg et al. 2009).
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Table 2.9: Correlation matrix for governance measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) Bureaucratic quality, ICRG 1.000
(2) Yearly bureaucratic quality, ICRG 0.998 1.000
(3) Binary bureaucratic quality, ICRG 0.984 0.982 1.000
(4) Government effectiveness, WGI 0.851 0.852 0.834 1.000
(5) Regulatory quality, WGI 0.785 0.786 0.790 0.831 1.000
(6) Average governance, WGI 0.866 0.867 0.862 0.948 0.897 1.000
(7) Corruption, ICRG 0.760 0.762 0.758 0.857 0.765 0.903 1.000
(8) Control of corruption, WGI 0.854 0.855 0.852 0.928 0.860 0.974 0.929 1.000
(9) IMF transparency index 0.200 0.200 0.196 0.162 0.192 0.213 0.221 0.224 1.000
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First, the accounting system might affect the size and existence of spending spikes.
During the sample period, many OECD governments transitioned from cash to accrual
accounting. Cash accounting records a transaction when the monetary transfer occurs
while accrual accounting registers the activity when the product or service is consumed
or produced. Experts suggested that rushing expenditures at the end of the budget year
might be more difficult under accrual accounting. However, time-series information on
countries’ transition between accounting systems. Table 2.10 shows the effect of accrual
accounting on YESS. The binary indicator is one in country-years accrual accounting is
used (Table A.1). Column 2 shows that the interaction with accounting type is statistically
insignificant while the bureaucratic quality effect remains. Second, roll-over rules might
affect the size of YESS despite the lack of evidence from the mentioned reforms in the
UK. However, there is currently not enough internationally comparable information to
code the introduction, presence and type of roll-over rules,
Third, bureaucratic quality and YESS are both related to fiscal discipline (e.g., Vlaicu
et al. 2014), making it a potential omitted variable. Expenditures may be more generous
when the budgetary situation of the country is relatively good and tight in periods of fiscal
austerity. Moreover, expenditures might be more closely monitored by the parliament
in the latter case, making YESS less likely. I proxy the fiscal space available to the
government with the primary balance (as a share of GDP) (IMF 2015). According to
column 3 of Table 2.10, the interaction with bureaucratic quality stays negative and
significant while the interaction with the primary balance is insignificant.
While the theoretical effect of bureaucratic quality on YESS is unambigious, theory
suggests two opposing effects on the creation of new trust funds. These may or may not
be of the same size and may compensate each other partly in a reduced form estimation.
First consider that it takes several months to negotiate a trust fund’s founding contract
and to complete the administrative paper-work. This implies that staff in bilateral aid
agencies need to plan ahead if they want to have a trust fund ready at the end of the fiscal
year. Consequently, first-time contributions at the end of the fiscal year should be higher
in higher quality bureaucracies. However, these donors are less likely to have ‘left-over’
funds in the first place due to higher planning capacity. These two effects may (partly)
counter oneanother. Table 2.11 shows that, controlling for the level of bureaucratic quality,
there no longer is a last quarter effect.
In sum, there is robust evidence that a lack of planning capacity as measured by the
general quality of bureaucracy, and, more generally, the quality of governance reduces
YESS substantially. However, bureaucratic quality reduces YESS only by around 86
percent in average. The following sections explore whether other explanations for YESS,
namely the uncertainty about spending demands, add explanatory power.
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Table 2.10: Income per capita, accounting type, and fiscal space
(1) (2) (3)
Last fiscal quarter 26.56∗∗ 7.507∗∗∗ 5.889∗∗
(11.23) (2.588) (2.292)
Last fiscal quarter -0.910∗ -1.831∗∗ -1.374∗∗
∗ bureaucratic quality (0.472) (0.706) (0.585)
Bureaucratic quality -0.812∗ -0.336 -0.146
(0.426) (0.463) (0.352)
Last fiscal quarter -2.104∗
∗ GDP p.c. (ln) (1.086)
GDP p.c. (ln) 6.920∗
(3.786)
Last fiscal quarter* 0.504
accounting system (0.615)
Accounting system 0.112
(0.606)
Last fiscal quarter -0.0337
∗ primary balance (0.0679)
Primary balance -0.147∗∗
(% of GDP) (0.0556)
Fiscal year FE Yes Yes Yes
Donor FE Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.710 0.706 0.746
N° of observations 1268 1264 1234
N° of donors 27 27 26
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged) quarterly contri-
butions to all funds and covers the World Bank’s fiscal years
2002-2013. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at
the donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.11: First contributions to funds and bureaucratic quality
(1) (2) (3)
Last fiscal quarter -2.314 -2.406 -1.954
(1.890) (1.931) (1.943)
Last fiscal quarter 0.908 0.882 0.758
∗ bureaucratic quality (0.592) (0.602) (0.620)
Bureaucratic quality 1.103∗∗∗ 1.043∗∗∗
(0.339) (0.330)
Model OLS OLS OLS
Fiscal year FE No Yes Yes
Donor-fiscal year FE No No Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.0976 0.174 0.598
N° of observations 1296 1296 1296
N° of donors 27 27 27
Notes: The dependent variable is the quarterly number of
first contributions and covers the World Bank’s fiscal years
2002-2013. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered
at the donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.5.4 Empirical Evidence for the Precautionary Savings and the
Procrastination Hypotheses
This Section seeks to assess the explanatory power of the other alternative theories for
end-of-year spending spikes, which accord a large role to uncertainty. The first step is
to establish that importance of uncertain but, within a confidence inverval, forecastable
events on YESS. In a second step, I condier the direction of the relationship between
YESS and uncertainty. Both theories predict that positive spending shocks lower year-end
spending, which implies a negative relationship between unexpected spending demands
and YESS.
Unexpected demand shocks arise from the beneficiaries of the public service in question.
They are exogenous to the bureaucracy and to the time of the fiscal year. I consider three
demands shocks to which OECD governments are likely to respond via their aid agency.
The first and arguably most exogenous international demand shock is the occurence of
natural disasters in developing countries after which OECD governments rush to disburse
disaster aid (Fuchs and Klann 2013). I find that the (logged) total number of people
affected by natural disasters decreases YESS (Column 1 in Table 2.12).
The two other international demand shocks considered, violent conflicts and refugees,
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are less exogenous to the donor country, more slow-onset and thus more predictable.46
Column 2 and 3 of Table 2.12 find that these events are not statistically related to YESS.
In sum, demand shocks reduce YESS as predicted by both theories.
The two theories make opposing prediction regarding the relationship between the
degree of uncertainty and the size of YESS. Liebman and Mahoney’s (2017) model predicts
a positive association between the size of spending spikes and uncertainty. Heightened
year-end spending is driven by uncertainty about demands in the later months of the fiscal
year, leading to the build-up of reserves to meet unexpected demands and expenditures.
If no shock occurs, these reserves are nevertheless spent before the end of the budget year
as the funds would otherwise lapse.
In contrast, Baumann’s (2015) model suggests a negative relationship between YESS
and uncertainty. Bureaucrats procrastinate over strenuous tasks until their appraisal at
the end of the year but will take advantage of beneficial shocks during the fiscal year to
disburse the budget earlier.
As Baumann (2015) notes, it is variation in unpredictability of future demands that ex-
plains precautionary savings in Liebman and Mahoney (2017). This interpretation makes
it possible to empirically test their hypothesis against real world measures of uncertainty.
Neither Liebman and Mahoney (2017) nor Baumann (2015) propose variables to measure
uncertainty. Uncertainty does not have a universally accepted definition. In the emerging
literature on YESS, this Chapter provides the first attempt to identify and measure major
sources of uncertainty affecting the size of YESS. Controlling for bureaucratic quality, the
following sections propose and tst plausible indicators of uncertainty related to budget
policy, domestic politics, and the macroeconomic situation. These variables are interacted
with the last FQ dummy to test their effect on YESS.
Uncertainty and Budget Policy
The ability of a government agency to deal with uncertainty may depend on the agency’s
budget and in particular on the discretionary part of the budget. Agencies with large
46While the persistence of conflicts in developing countries is slightly more predictable than the occurrence
of natural disasters, their onset and intensity represent a source of uncertainty in the programming
process.
Conflicts, natural disasters, and economic crises in developing countries have been associated with
increased migration to OECD countries (e.g., Neumayer 2005).
Not least because of a lack of legal migration possibilities, such migrants often seek asylum status
in Western countries. The OECD / DAC’s definition of ODA allows donor countries to count some of
the expenses associated with asylum seekers in donor countries as foreign aid (see the OECD Method-
ological Note on refugees:
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/RefugeeCostsMethodologicalNote.pdf (accessed on September 15,
2016)). Unexpected surges in the (logged) annual number of asylum seekers could lead to lower
YESS.
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Table 2.12: International demand shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Last fiscal quarter 39.235∗∗∗ -3.270 7.259∗∗ 34.678∗
(11.338) (7.728) (2.614) (17.257)
Last fiscal quarter -1.673∗∗ -1.710∗∗ -1.688∗∗ -1.686∗∗
∗ bureaucratic quality (0.631) (0.629) (0.644) (0.640)
Bureaucratic quality -0.353 -0.352 -0.383 -0.403
(0.387) (0.390) (0.396) (0.394)
Last fiscal quarter* -1.678∗∗∗ -1.612∗∗
disaster affected (ln) (0.542) (0.605)
Last fiscal quarter* 1.056 0.326
battle deaths (ln) (0.680) (0.762)
Last fiscal quarter* -0.002 0.009
asylum seekers (ln) (0.149) (0.153)
Asylum seekers (ln) 0.238 0.239
(0.222) (0.221)
Fiscal year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Donor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.713 0.710 0.710 0.712
N° of observations 1296 1296 1296 1296
N° of donors 27 27 27 27
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged) quarterly contributions to all
funds and covers the World Bank’s fiscal years 2002-2013. Robust standard
errors in parentheses clustered at the donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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budgets may absorb spending shocks better by dispersing the unexpected demand shock
across their programmed expenditures, leading to minor cuts (increases) for all projects.
Large agencies would thus require lower levels of precautionary savings and be able to
avoid large YESS. This absorption advantage of large agencies should be especially pro-
nounced for shocks that are not proportional to the size of the agency.
Table 2.13 considers whether agencies with large (logged) ODA disbursements (column
1) (OECD 2016a) or higher (logged) annual fund contributions (column 2), a lower bound
the discretionary part of the budget available, experience lower YESS. Both variables are
lagged by one fiscal year. While the interaction is insignificant in column 1, column 2
suggests that YESS increase in the size of total contributions. The interaction between
bureaucratic quality and the last quarter dummy remains significantly negative in both
columns.
Another major source of uncertainty for a government department is the lack of infor-
mation about the size of the budget. The main reason for an unknown budget size is late
budget approval by parliament. Liebman and Mahoney (2017) find for the U.S., where
budgets are agreed on notoriously late, delayed appropriations heighten spending at the
end of the fiscal year. In the majority of OECD countries, appropriations were never
delayed in the analyzed time period.
Column 3 of Table 2.13 tests whether the number of months by which the budget is
delayed affects last quarter contributions (own coding, see Table A.1). The interaction
with late budget is insignificant, suggesting that delayed approval of the budget does not
systematically increase YESS across countries.47 As it is possible that all three variables
affect YESS conditionally on one another, column 4 includes them in tandem. While
significance levels sometimes change, the overall picture does not. The effect of interest
regarding bureaucratic quality is preserved. Given the high correlation between total
aid and yearly contributions (r = 0.76), these variables will not jointly be included in
subsequent regressions due to multicollinearity concerns. In sum, there is no evidence
that the fiscal variables affect YESS.
47Austria is a special case. Although biannual budgeting has been constitutionally allowed in exceptional
cases only since 2009, budgets have been appropriated for two-year-periods since the beginning of the
2000s (Austrian Parliament 2016). Setting the late approval dummy for Austria to zero halves the
interaction coefficient to -0.097. Although statistically significant at almost the five percent level, the
effect is economically insignificant.
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Table 2.13: The Last Quarter Effect and Budget Policy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Last fiscal quarter 7.773∗ 6.847∗∗ 7.411∗∗∗ 17.36∗∗
(3.932) (2.909) (2.505) (6.563)
Last fiscal quarter -1.712∗∗ -2.296∗∗ -1.711∗∗ -2.456∗∗
∗ bureaucratic quality (0.662) (0.950) (0.632) (0.943)
Bureaucratic quality -0.491 -0.125 -0.613 -0.486
(0.368) (0.371) (0.384) (0.381)
Last fiscal quarter* -0.0220 -0.596∗
aid (ln) (0.166) (0.315)
Total aid (ln) 2.153∗∗ 1.777∗
(1.004) (0.877)
Last fiscal quarter* 0.155∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗
yearly contributions (ln) (0.0591) (0.0952)
Yearly contributions 0.211∗∗ 0.129
(ln) (0.101) (0.0968)
Last fiscal quarter* -0.194 -0.191
late budget (0.122) (0.123)
Late budget 0.000604 -0.000913
(0.0363) (0.0252)
Fiscal year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Donor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.716 0.720 0.710 0.726
N° of observations 1296 1296 1296 1296
N° of donors 27 27 27 27
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged) quarterly contributions to all funds
and covers the World Bank’s fiscal years 2002-2013. Robust standard errors in
parentheses clustered at the donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Uncertainty and Domestic Politics
Beyond late approval of budgets, politics are a major source of uncertainty in government
administrations. A large literature on political business cycles shows that politics affect
fiscal variables particularly in election years. Elections instill uncertainty in government
agencies because of the possibility of imminent changes to department policy and direc-
tion. This may affect the size of the total and the agency’s budget, lead to changes in
senior staff and in spending priorities.48
An election effect on the size of YESS could be interpreted as evidence that those
governments that expect to loose power spend all remaining discretionary parts of the
budget according to their priorities right before the election. Finally, political business
cycles are also a candidate explanation for uneven spending within the fiscal year. In the
case of fund contributions, it is unlikely that election-related disbursement manipulations
affect foreign aid in general and trust fund aid in particular: These financial flows target
neither the marginal voters nor strengthen support from major voting blocs.49
The election effect is tested in Table 2.14: It shows the interaction of the last fiscal
quarter dummy with an election quarter dummy (column 1) and an election year dummy
(column 2) (own data extension of Beck et al. 2001). The interaction is insignificant in
both cases.
48The uncertainty surrounding elections increases if the exact date of the vote is unclear or the outcome
seems close ex ante. In the sample period, several EU countries held more than one election per year
because no coalition governments could be formed. This led to the announcement of new elections on
short notice. Unfortunately, there are no cross-country measures for the ex-ante degree of closeness
of election results to test this argument.
49Despite these theoretical doubts, I econometrically tested for heightened spending in the two quarters
before the election. The coefficient is insignificant independent of the inclusion or not of an interaction
with the last quarter dummy, which also is insignificant.
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Table 2.14: Uncertainty and domestic politics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Last fiscal quarter 7.117∗∗∗ 7.346∗∗∗ 7.198∗∗∗ 7.212∗∗∗ 7.236∗∗∗ 7.140∗∗∗ 7.122∗∗∗ 7.216∗∗∗ 5.042∗∗
(2.415) (2.411) (2.446) (2.463) (2.479) (2.444) (2.413) (2.358) (1.937)
Last fiscal quarter -1.675∗∗ -1.694∗∗ -1.679∗∗ -1.683∗∗ -1.692∗∗ -1.673∗∗ -1.678∗∗ -1.669∗∗ -0.961∗∗
∗ bureaucratic quality (0.616) (0.629) (0.621) (0.625) (0.630) (0.625) (0.617) (0.618) (0.455)
Bureaucratic quality -0.293 -0.319 -0.315 -0.309 -0.333 -0.346 -0.274 -0.319 -0.591
(0.397) (0.389) (0.385) (0.389) (0.390) (0.395) (0.399) (0.392) (0.369)
Last fiscal quarter 1.157 0.961
∗ election quarter (1.444) (1.215)
Election quarter -0.430 -0.450
(0.545) (0.561)
Last fiscal quarter -0.286 -0.408
∗ election year (0.535) (0.578)
Election year 0.191 0.183
(0.198) (0.251)
Last fiscal quarter -0.170 -0.366
∗ quarter of government change (1.388) (1.207)
Quarter of government change 1.160 1.210
(0.776) (0.803)
Table 2.14: (continues on next page)
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Table 2.14: (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Last fiscal quarter 0.0453 0.230
∗ year of government change (1.000) (1.162)
Year of government change 0.274 0.197
(0.294) (0.431)
Last fiscal quarter 2.412∗∗∗ 2.438∗∗∗
∗ quarter of aid minister change (0.777) (0.776)
Aid minister change -0.611 -0.643
(0.822) (0.824)
Last fiscal quarter 0.620 0.691
∗ year of aid minister change (0.966) (0.993)
Year of aid minister change -0.346 -0.425
(0.726) (0.753)
Last fiscal quarter -1.072∗∗∗
∗ independent aid agency (0.358)
Fiscal year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Donor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.710 0.709 0.710 0.709 0.709 0.709 0.710 0.709 0.527
N° of observations 1296 1296 1296 1296 1296 1296 1296 1296 1104
N° of donors 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 23
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged) quarterly contributions to all funds and covers the World Bank’s fiscal years
2002-2013. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the donor country level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01111
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If the government changes, a high level of uncertainty persists for some months because
of potential policy changes affecting the budget size, allocation, and staff. Government
changes may also affect spending within the fiscal year for a reason other than uncertainty.
Outgoing governments may use the months they remain in office after the lost election and
before the inauguration of the new government to allocate any remaining (discretionary)
funds according to their priorities. The average number of months between a lost election
and the subsequent inauguration of the new government is 1.4 months. Thus, such spend-
ing must be made expeditiously. For the same reasons as for year-end spending, trust
funds are particularly attractive under this scenario because they separate the spend-
ing and the implementation stages and thus allow for rapid spending. In other words,
trust funds allow for the intended earmarking of funds according to the outgoing govern-
ment’s priorities, most likely even without compromising on quality.50 Column 3 tests the
‘in-between-government’ effect at the quarterly level while column 4 includes a dummy
equaling one in those election years with a government transition.51 Both interactions are
insignificant.
With a new government typically comes a new minister but rotations in ministerial
positions also occur in non-election years. A change in ministerial leadership affects the
agency directly by instilling uncertainty about the continuation in the strategic goals and
the expenditure plans. Columns 5 and 6 consider this possibility by respectively including
interactions between the last fiscal quarter dummy and the quarter or year of a change
in the aid minister (Fuchs and Richert 2015).Thee interaction with the quarter of the aid
minister change is highly significant in column 5. This effect is absent using the annual
variable in column 6
Because omission of alternative sources of uncertainty would lead to omitted variable
bias, column 7 includes all variables related to domestic uncertainty at the same time.
Column 7 uses the quartely measures of election, minister change, and government change
while column 8 uses the annual ones. The results confirm the findings of previous columns.
One reason for the general lack of an effect of politics on aid agencies’ YESS relatively
little, is variation in the institutional protection from political interference across coun-
tries. In countries with ‘protected’ aid agencies, the interaction between the last quarter
dummy and a measure of institutional independence would be negative. Column 9 in-
cludes a time-invariant dummy for an independent aid agency as defined in Bertoli et al.
(2008). Data for four countries are missing.52 The interaction with last quarter dummy
50See Section 2.5.5 for a discussion of the quality of trust fund aid in general and relative to alternative
aid channels.
51A government change is defined as a change in government ideology (Beck et al. 2001, own extension
to 2013).
52The coding by Bertoli et al. (2008) is based on OECD (2009) and no information for the Czech Republic,
Island, Poland, and the Slovak Republic are available.
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has the expected significantly negative coefficient while the main result for bureaucratic
quality is preserved.
In sum, year-end trust fund contributions do not appear to be systematically and
robustly related to uncertainty in domestic politics on average. There is some evidence
that this lack of a result for the average donor country might be associated with different
degrees of institutional independence.
Uncertainty and Macroeconomic Factors
In the wake of financial and economic crises and, more generally, in periods of economic
uncertainty, tax revenues and the costs of lending at financial markets are less predictable.
This uncertainty on the revenue side of the budget might instill uncertainty on the ex-
penditure side.
Column 1 of Table 2.15 includes an indicator marking the start of a sovereign, banking
or currency crisis (Valencia and Laeven 2012) and its interaction with the last fiscal
quarter dummy. As expected, the interaction is significantly negative.
During crisis times, budgeting is further complicated by particularly imprecise projec-
tions about macroeconomic factors such as inflation that affect the cost of input goods and
services bought by the government.53 This relationship is tested by including the devia-
tion from projected government spending, measured as the difference between projected
and realized values (OECD 2016b), and its interaction with the last quarter dummy. A
positive interaction would imply that YESS increases with the projection error. Column
2 shows the results for the deviation between the realized value and the last projected
value available at least two months before a donor’s budget year starts.54 The interaction
is insignificant.
The last column includes all variables related to economic uncertainty simultaneously.
The results of previous columns are confirmed.
53I thank Jan-Egbert Sturm for suggesting this channel.
54The OECD Economic Outlook reports projections biannually in June and November. For donors with
fiscal years starting on July 1, I thus use the December projection of the previous calendar year (see
variable definition in Table A.1 in the Appendix to this Chapter). Results are robust to calculating
the deviation from the most recent projection available prior to the start of the budget year (i.e., the
June one in the exemplifying case) or any of the two-year forward projections.
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Table 2.15: Uncertainty and Macroeconomics
(1) (2) (3)
Last fiscal quarter 7.355∗∗∗ 6.753∗∗ 6.931∗∗∗
(2.446) (2.446) (2.410)
Last fiscal quarter -1.695∗∗ -1.547∗∗ -1.566∗∗
∗ bureaucratic quality (0.617) (0.618) (0.605)
Bureaucratic quality -0.339 0.0269 0.0326
(0.395) (0.397) (0.405)
Last fiscal quarter -1.627∗ -1.808∗
∗ economic crisis (0.933) (0.994)
Economic crisis 0.261 0.417
(0.718) (0.696)
Last fiscal quarter 0.0635 0.0646
∗ Deviation from projected (0.0805) (0.0804)
government net lending
Deviation from projected -0.118∗ -0.119∗
government net lending (0.0649) (0.0646)
Fiscal year FE Yes Yes Yes
Donor FE Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.710 0.690 0.690
N° of observations 1296 1198 1198
N° of donors 27 27 27
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged) quarterly contributions to
all funds and covers the World Bank’s fiscal years 2002-2013. Robust
standard errors in parentheses clustered at the donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Uncertainty and Fiscal, Political, and Macroeconomic Factors
To minimize potential omitted variable bias, Table 2.16 includes the potentially relevant
fiscal, political, and macroeconomic factors of uncertainty simultaneously. This is analo-
gous to Altonji et al.’s (2005) approach of assessing the importance of potentially omitted
variables. The idea is to approximate how large a bias there would need to be in order to
make the interaction of interest indistinguishable from zero. Specifically, one assesses the
importance of the impact that unobserved variables would need to have on the interaction
relative to the impact of observable variables.
The first two columns of Table 2.16 include almost all previously identified covariates.
Specifically, they include all indicators of uncertainty, the demand shocks, and the po-
tential omitted variables that interacted significantly with the last quarter dummy in
Table 2.10, i.e., GDP per capita.55 The quarterly and annual indicators for politics are
included in columns 1 and 2 respectively. Because of the high collinearity between the
size of annual trust fund contributions and a donor’s aid budget, I include (logged and
lagged) ODA, which is slightly less endogenous to the dependent variable.
Column 3 is more parsimonious and my preferred specification. I apply Altonji et al.’s
(2005) approach by including all variables that interacted significantly with the last quar-
ter dummy in the respective baseline specification. Thus, (logged and lagged) annual
trust fund contributions rather than ODA is included. Arguably, column 3 might thus be
closest to the ‘true’ model.
The interaction between the last quarter dummy and the ICRG bureaucratic quality
variable remains significantly negative in all three columns of Table 2.16. Regarding the
measures of uncertainty, their level and their interaction with the last quarter dummy
are mostly insignificant as in the previous regressions. There is persistent evience that
unexpected demand shocks negatively affect YESS: the interaction with the number of
disaster-affected people is highly significant in all columns. The previous result that higher
capita income is associated with lower YESS reemerges in column 3 while the result of
the quarterly change in the aid minister is not confirmed.
Overall, the evidence for YESS and the mitigating effect of bureaucratic quality is con-
firmed. Following Altonji et al.’s (2005) approach, I did not find evidence for substantial
omitted variable bias.
55I do not include the independent aid agency dummy tested in Table 2.14 because it is available only
for a limited number of countries.
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Table 2.16: Robustness of bureaucratic quality to the inclusion of all covariates
(1) (2) (3)
Last fiscal quarter 45.60 46.91∗ 66.07∗∗∗
(26.87) (27.20) (19.76)
Last fiscal quarter -1.029∗ -1.134∗ -0.877∗
∗ bureaucratic quality (0.551) (0.579) (0.491)
Bureaucratic quality -0.686 -0.784∗ -0.760∗
(0.457) (0.402) (0.388)
Last fiscal quarter -1.324 -1.474 -1.186
∗ economic crisis (1.013) (1.012) (0.960)
Economic crisis 0.409 0.458 0.338
(0.620) (0.586) (0.643)
Last fiscal quarter 0.0832 0.0853
∗ Deviation from projected government net lending (0.0838) (0.0888)
Deviation from -0.0907 -0.0870
projected government net lending (0.0615) (0.0604)
Last fiscal quarter -2.878 -1.724
∗ quarter of aid minister change (2.365) (1.050)
Aid minister change 1.485 0.926
(1.026) (0.973)
Last fiscal quarter -0.994
∗ government change (1.921)
Government change 1.056
(1.013)
Last fiscal quarter 2.500
∗ election quarter (1.537)
Election quarter -0.678
(0.653)
Last fiscal quarter* -0.243 -0.194
late budget (0.153) (0.146)
Late budget -0.00713 -0.00517
(0.0508) (0.0459)
Last fiscal quarter* -0.0399 -0.0505
aid (ln) (0.347) (0.350)
Table 2.16: (continues on next page)
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Table 2.16: (continued)
(1) (2) (3)
Total aid (ln) 1.724∗∗ 1.606∗
(0.798) (0.808)
Last fiscal quarter* 0.685 0.654
battle deaths (ln) (0.831) (0.848)
Last fiscal quarter* 0.116 0.0924
asylum seekers (ln) (0.322) (0.334)
Asylum seekers (ln) 0.274 0.320
(0.216) (0.213)
Last fiscal quarter* -1.409∗∗ -1.401∗∗ -1.848∗∗∗
disaster affected (ln) (0.668) (0.649) (0.575)
Last fiscal quarter -1.967 -1.983 -2.587∗∗
∗ GDP p.c. (ln) (1.210) (1.232) (1.127)
GDP p.c. (ln) 4.323 5.278 6.635∗
(3.623) (3.707) (3.414)
Last fiscal quarter -1.970
∗ year of aid minister change (1.571)
Year of aid minister 1.174∗∗
change (0.521)
Last fiscal quarter -0.387
∗ year of government change (0.588)
Year of government 0.634∗
change (0.354)
Last fiscal quarter 0.187
∗ election year (0.641)
Election year -0.265
(0.240)
Table 2.16: (continues on next page)
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Table 2.16: (continued)
(1) (2) (3)
Yearly contributions 0.0603
(ln) (0.0929)
Last fiscal quarter* 0.0552
yearly contributions (ln) (0.0432)
Donor FE Yes Yes Yes
Fiscal year FE Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.695 0.694 0.714
N° of observations 1170 1170 1268
N° of donors 27 27 27
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged) quarterly contributions to all funds and covers the World
Bank’s fiscal years 2002-2013. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the donor country
level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.5.5 Interpretation of the Evidence and Limits of the Analysis
The following subsections discuss the interpretation of the econometric findings on uncer-
tainty , provide qualitative evidence on the three explanations for YESS , hint at further
explanations for YESS that cannot be tested with the available data, and discuss con-
cerns about the dataset used and the external validity of findings.The last subsection
provides descriptive evidence that year-end spending is qualitatively different although
not necessarily less efficient.
Discussion of the Evidence for the Relationship Between Uncer-
tainty and YESS
Using measures of fiscal, political and macroeconomic uncertainty, I aimed to test the two
main theories in the literature about year-end spending surges. There are a number of
potential reasons why I do not find systematic support for either hypothesis.
First, two types of bureaucrats might work in a government agency: procrastinating
and saving bureaucrats. The analyzed data are the aggregated result of the individual
bureaucrat’s behavior. Their behaviors could counteract each another, leading to a null
effect on average.
Second, the level of precautionary savings may not be optimal for the empirically ob-
served levels of uncertainty. In particular, the level of savings might be too high in some
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years but too low in other years and this may vary across countries. Non-optimality of
precautionary savings would make it impossible to detect a relationship with uncertainty.
Third, the proposed measures for uncertainty and for demand shocks may be inadequate
or too few, although the Altonji et al. (2005)-inspired test suggests that no important
covariates are missing.56
Finally, the data cover a specific discretionary budget item within the aid budget and
might therefore be too narrow to investigate the competing hypotheses about the rela-
tionship between uncertainty and YESS.57
Qualitative Evidence About the Reasons for YESS
During the spring and summer of 2016, I talked to more than a dozen people with bud-
get responsibility in private companies, government administration, international orga-
nizations, and universities about their experiences and explanations for YESS. Budget
holders at various type of organizations generally find the bureaucracy explanation and
precautionary savings argument convincing. They note that they often face uncertainty
about spending demands, the timing of expenditures, and even the budget size. In the
context of bilateral aid budgeting, a major issue is delays in high-level officials in donor
countries signing contracts with recipient governments. Staff at aid agencies suggested to
me that in such cases trust funds are created at the end of the budget year.
In contrast, budget holders find the procrastination hypothesis less convincing although
procrastinating co-workers exist of course. Interviewees repeatedly remarked that man-
agers observe the performance of their staff throughout the year and that the quality, and
not only the amount of expenditures, matters. It was also proposed that workers might
procrastinate on some particularly painstaking or boring tasks until the year-end.58 This
may explain YESS if these tasks are systematically associated with financially significant
amounts.
56Uncertainty prior to events might differ from ex-post measures. Moreover, the proposed variables might
not be specific enough as in the case of close elections, where no ex-ante measures of closeness are
available.
57As trust fund aid is only one among probably multiple discretionary items in the aid budget, demand
shocks would thus not necessarily affect the trust fund budget. As demand shocks are unlikely to
affect trust fund spending, the trust fund budget represents an ideal store for “emergency” funds.
YESS in trust fund contributions would thus only be observed in years without demand shocks
(i.e., precautionary savings were not used or procrastinating bureaucrats were not presented with
opportunities to easily spend funds earlier).
58I thank Stephen Knack for suggesting this interpretation of procrastination.
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Alternative Explanations for YESS
Alternative explanations exist. The two following arguments are not fully developed and
seem difficult to test empirically. Moreover, they seem to be relevant explanations for
YESS in some situations only.
A first alternative explanation is that in some organizational units learning about the
size of the remaining budget is costly in terms of time, effort and money, mostly due
to opportunity costs. In these situations, it is optimal to collect information about the
lapsing funds only as the fiscal year draws to a close. If the agents learns that sizeable funds
are still available, this results in heightened spending at the end of the year.59 An example
for such a situation is an invididual professor’s budget for himself and his PhD students
at a German university. This is different in larger organizations: Information about the
remaining budget is regularly provided to project managers. For example, the German
implementing aid agency reports at least monthly to the project team whether their
spending targets are reached. Testing this alternative explanation for YESS would require
information about the (different types of) costs associated with up-to-date information
about remaining funds.
A second alternative explanation for YESS is revenue maximization. The treasury or
budget holders may seek to maximize income from interest by disbursing funds as late as
possible.60 As the relevant interest rate is unclear, this explanation is not tested in this
Chapter.
Finally, a trust fund-specific explanations has been suggested to me: If the majority
of trust fund contributions are determined in a meeting in the donor’s aid agency in the
end of the donor-specific FY, this would also result in a YESS. It seems however that
contribution decisions are taken in a decentralized manner according to the OECD (2012)
report and anecdotal evidence on the decision-making processes in donor agencies.
Discussion of the External Validity of the Findings
In this subsection, I will discuss three important aspects regarding the external validity
of the findings in this Chapter.
First, readers might be concerned about both the importance of the fund aid relative
to donors’ aid budgets and about the representativeness of the data. Regarding the first
concern, it is important to note that although trust fund aid might be a small fraction of a
donor’s aid budget, it is a much larger fraction of the discretionary part of the aid budget
59I thank Christoph Vanberg for suggesting this alternative explanation for YESS.
60I thank Jan-Egbert Sturm for suggesting this additional explanation.
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for which bulk spending is likely.61 YESS are generally observed for capital or investment
expenditures rather than operative or current expenditures. YESS are less likely to occur
in demand-driven or pre-committed or regular expenditure categories such as wages paid
to staff (Liebman and Mahoney 2017; Baumann 2015). A large chunk of multilateral
core aid consists of mandatory membership contributions and of additional voluntary
(unearmarked) funding committed in previous years. Similarly, much of bilateral aid is
already programmed for multi-annual development projects. Finally, an important share
of the agency’s budget covers current expenditures such as wages.
Second, the use of a specific budget item within the foreign aid budget raises the issue
of external validity. I am duly cautious about generalizing from my finding and, as for
empirical results in general, cross-validation of the findings in this paper in other contexts
is highly important. However, I do not think that there are systematic differences in
bureaucrats’ behaviors, bureaucratic effectiveness, or in pay, career, and other incentives
between the foreign aid agency and other governments departments.
Finally, the anaylzed data are different than the common-sense understanding of ‘spend-
ing’. While contributions to World Bank funds are spent in the accounting sense, there are
not expenditures as commonly understood in the literature. Indeed, donor countries may
view trust funds as ‘saving accounts’ although imperfect ones. This would raise problems
if I was to analyze the efficiency of year-end spending. However, it matters much less for
the analysis of YESS. Indeed, this type of spending might allow for a cleaner identification
of YESS as there are no absorption constraints on the recipient side (i.e., the World Bank
funds). For other types of spending, absorption constraints of implementing agencies risk
leading to an underestimation of YESS.
Evidence for Differential Use of Trust Funds at the End of the
Fiscal Year
Liebman and Mahoney (2017) are the first to show that year-end spending is less efficient
than funds spent in the remainder of the fiscal year.62
As discussed in the previous subsection, contributions to World Bank funds differ from
the common understanding of ‘spending’. Trust fund aid might be just as efficient than
spending in the rest of the fiscal year. While I provide evidence that year-end contributions
to trust funds are qualitatively different, I do not claim that this affects the quality of
subsequent disbursements by these funds. It is not possible to rigorously evaluate the
61Trust fund aid as share of donors’ total disbursements ranges from 0.07 percent for the United States
in 2013 to 12 percent for the United Kingdom in 2007. The average share in 2012 was 2.23 percent.
62Fichtner and Greene (2014) review the little evidence available elsewhere.
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effectiveness of trust fund aid provided at different times during a fiscal year because no
systematic information about the quality of this aid type is available.
Despite potentially substantial YESS, I do not expect (but cannot thoroughly test) that
these contributions are substantially less efficient than contributions made at other times
of the year. Financial resources kept in trust funds do not lapse so that disbursements
can be undertaken whenever high-quality projects are on offer.63 Year-end contributions
to trust funds should thus be no less effective than contributions made at other times of
donors’ fiscal years. Furthermore, consider the alternatives. In the unlikely case of the
lapsing funds being returned to the general treasury, the efficiency of trust fund aid and
other aid would need to be compared to that of public resources used in other sectors in the
next fiscal year. Year-end disbursements to NGOs or for studies written by consultants are
probably those of lower priority and therefore likely to be less efficient than if requested at
other times of the year. Regarding the effectiveness of trust fund aid relative to bilateral
and multilateral aid, the literature has not yet provided hard evidence.64 Given that a
large chunk of trust fund aid provided to funds is ultimately implemented by the World
Bank, it is reasonable not to expect significant differences in the effectiveness of ‘pure’
multilateral and trust fund aid.65 Thus, any conclusion on efficiency needs to be a cautious
and relative one.
Thus, there is no reason to expect year-end contributions to be less efficient than con-
tributions made at other times during the fiscal year. One possibility is to benchmark the
year-end spending to the spending pattern in the first three quarters of the fiscal year.
Deviations from this spending pattern could be interpreted as inefficient or, less norma-
tively, as different – leaving open the question of what explains the different spending
pattern.66
First, I consider trust funds that are used once or twice in the sample period by any
donor. Such contributions might be less efficient because these types of funds tend to be
small with largely fixed set-up costs.67 Table 2.17 shows that of the 445 trust funds that
63Some large FIFs have multi-annual budgets. In Tables A.11 and A.12, I thus focus only on contributions
to IBRD/ IDA trust funds, where the timing of disbursements is not constrained.
64Eichenauer and Knack (2016) (Chapter 2 of this thesis) show that trust fund aid is less politically
motivated than traditional bilateral aid than traditional bilateral aid. If politically motivated aid is
less effective (e.g., Dreher et al. 2016), then trust fund aid might be more effective than bilateral aid
on average. For evidence on multi-donor trust funds see Barakat (2009) and Barakat et al. (2012).
65This is true in particular for IBRD/ IDA and IFC trust funds and less so for FIFs.
66The transaction costs and the efficiency of trust funds are a discussion of their own (e.g., IEG 2011a;
Reinsberg et al. 2015; Reinsberg 2016a).
67Smaller trust funds are likely to be less efficient because transaction costs are high in relative terms as
reflected by management fees. Recent World Bank reforms have increased the minimum size of trust
funds and have sought to dissolve small trust funds (no threshold until World Bank fiscal year (WBFY)
2007; US$ 1 million threshold effective fromWBFY 2008 to 2013; US$ 2 million threshold since WBFY
2013).
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received only one contribution in the sample period, more than 40 percent were used in
donors’ last FQ (row 1). Row 2 shows that contributions to trust funds that were used
twice in the sample period by any donor were most frequent in the last quarter, although
the percentage share is lower than in row 1. This data pattern might be driven by trust
funds set up recently that have not had much time to receive additional contribution.
Rows 3 and 4 test for this possibility by focusing on observations prior to the calendar
year 2010. The percentage shares in rows 3 and 4 are similar to rows 1 and 2, respectively.
Row 5 shows that donors made unique contributions to any given trust fund in every
quarter but that single usage peaks in the last FQ.
Second, I analyze whether donors use different types of funds at the end of the year.
Donors might prefer to contribute to single-donor trust funds that allow them to maintain
control of the future allocation of funds chapter 3. If the purpose of a trust fund is to
de-annualize a part of the donor budget, single-donor trust funds are the better “savings
accounts” than multi-donor trust funds. Column 1 in Table 2.18 finds contributions to
single-donor trust funds to more than double in the last FQ.68
Finally, I test whether whether donors use lapsing funds for debt-related issues, a
hypothesis inspired by Michaelowa’s (2003) finding.69 Column 2 compares the last quarter
usage of debt-related trust funds with contributions to all other funds. The interaction
is significantly negative. This can be interpreted as evidence that donors consider debt
relief an important issue and address it early in the fiscal year rather than with left-over
funds at the year-end.
In sum, there is some evidence that the use of funds in the last quarter is different than
in the other three fiscal quarters. The data does not allow to determine whether year-end
contributions are less efficient than fund aid provided in other quarters, than other types
of foreign aid, or than public funds spent through other government agencies in the donor
country .
68In percentage: 100 ∗ (e0.998 − 1) = 171.29.
69Although general information about the sectors targeted by each trust fund is not available, in the case
of debt it is relatively easy to identify the relevant trust funds through a keyword search of the trust
fund names.
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Table 2.17: Spending pattern within the fiscal year
1st quarter 2nd quarter 3rd quarter 4th quarter Total
(1) N° of funds used only
once
126 28% 65 15% 66 15% 188 42% 445
(2) N° of funds used only
twice
149 27% 85 15% 102 18% 216 37% 552
(3) N° of funds used onlyonce (< 2010) 100 30% 54 16% 44 13% 140 43% 338
(4) N° of funds used onlytwice (< 2010) 120 30% 66 16% 72 18% 147 37% 405
(5) N° of funds used onlyonce by a given donor 293 30% 140 14% 135 14% 407 43% 975
Notes: Rows 1–4 shows the number (percentage) of funds used, as indicated in the row name, once or
twice by any donor within the sample period (rows 1 & 2: 2002-2013; rows 3 & 4: 2002-2011).) Row shows
the number (percentage) of funds used only once by a given donor within the sample period (2002-2013).
Table 2.18: Nested model for IDA/IBRD trust funds
(1) (2)
Last fiscal quarter 0.998∗∗∗ 1.108∗∗∗
(0.327) (0.324)
Last fiscal quarter 0.894∗
∗ single-donor TFs (0.493)
SDTF -6.076∗∗∗
(0.743)
Last fiscal quarter -0.964∗∗
∗ debt trust funds (0.358)
Debt trust funds -13.27∗∗∗
(1.096)
Constant 19.66∗∗∗ 15.76∗∗∗
(0.372) (0.548)
Trust fund type ALL vs. SDTF ALL vs. DEBT
Donor-fiscal year FE Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.649 0.765
N° of observations 2592 2592
N° of donors 27 27
Notes: The dependent variables are (logged) contributions to the
respective types of IDA/IBRD trust funds and cover the World
Bank’s fiscal years 2002-2013. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses clustered at the donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.6 Concluding Remarks
Above-average spending at the end of a budget period is common in private and public
organizations. Academic research on the existence and the causes for YESS, the con-
sequences for the quality of spending, and the institutional remedies for this dynamic
inefficiency is still scarce. This Chapter contributes to the literature on subannual public
spending in several ways.
This Chapter is the first to analyze YESS across countries. To assure comparabil-
ity aross budgetary systems, I used accounting data on daily contributions from 27
OECD countries to World Bank funds during 2002-2013. Causal identification of YESS is
achieved by exploiting variation in countries’ fiscal years and the use of high-dimensional
fixed effects. The results are robust to using different temporal definitions of the end of
the fiscal year. As a new explanation for the size of spending spikes, I proposed bureau-
cratic quality. As a second contribution to the literature, this Chapter provided the first
econometric analysis of the bureaucratic quality explanation and the two other theories
for YESS proposed in the literature. I provided robust support for the mitigating role
of bureaucratic quality on the size of year-end spending spikes. There is no conclusive
evidence for the two alternative theories.
Quantitatively, I found spending to double in the last fiscal quarter. I show that bu-
reaucratic capacity lowers YESS using a monthly indicator for bureaucratic quality. The
finding is robust to using alternative measures of governance quality and to the inclusion
of per capita income and other potential omitted variables. I also assessed whether the
effect of bureaucratic quality conceals special budgetary institutions or policies. I did
not find that changes in the accounting type or late budgets to affect year-end spending.
Future research will need to examine different budgetary institutions and policies to open
up the black box ‘bureaucratic quality’.
While a higher level of bureaucratic quality reduces YESS, it does not fully explain
above-average spending at the end of the fiscal year. The remaining YESS might be
explained by one of the two explanations for YESS proposed in the literature: Precau-
tionary savings (Liebman and Mahoney 2017) or procrastinating bureaucrats (Baumann
2015). Both accord an important role to uncertainty. In a first step, I established that
unexpected exogenous demand shocks reduce YESS, which is predicted by both theories.
Uncertainty seems to play a role in explaining the unexplained remainder of YESS: The
demand shock mostly likely to be exogenous to the foreign aid budget, natural disasters
in developing countries, reduces YESS substantially.
Regarding the relationship between the level of uncertainty and the size of YESS, the
two theories make opposing predictions. In a second step, I thus analyzed the relationship
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between YESS and uncertainty. I propose various political and macroeconomic indica-
tors of uncertainty. Controlling for bureaucratic quality, I find no robust and conclusive
evidence against the null hypothesis of no relationship between YESS and uncertainty. I
discussed theoretical and empirical reasons why it does not follow that the two theories
have no explanatory power.
Understanding the mechanism(s) for YESS is important to inform the choice of the
policy to curb YESS and reduce dynamic inefficiencies in the (public) budget process. The
results in this paper suggest that the extent of YESS and thus the associated inefficiency
can be reduced by increasing bureaucratic capacity. As with all empirical findings, the
question of external validity is important and the findings of this Chapter need to be
validated in other contexts. Moreover, more (comparative) research about YESS and
the effects of budgetary institutions is required to foster our understanding about the
specific channels through which bureaucratic quality lowers YESS. Improved measures of
uncertainty will allow to shed more light on the two alternative explanations for YESS.
The limited understanding of the mechanisms behind YESS imply that the rules and
procedures proposed to lower YESS must be critically assessed. They risk to create new
costs and inefficencies.70
On a more aggregate level, future research might study the macroeconomic effects of
YESS. Within a country, the fiscal year ends simultaneously for all public sector agencies
(and often also for private firms). Because the public sector accounts for almost half of
GDP in many OECD countries, YESS may contribute to the macroeconomic seasonality.
70Douglas and Franklin (2006) report the carry-over law increased paperwork in Oklahoma.
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2.A Appendix: Figures and Tables for “December Fever
in Public Finance”
Figure A.1: Fund contributions by donor-specific fiscal month
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Notes: The y-scale shows shows the evenness of spending within the fiscal year and is defined as the actual
monthly contributions divided by the average monthly contributions (i.e., annual fund contributions
divided by 12). The vertical line at one represents even spending in the last fiscal quarter (i.e., one
quarter of annual spending).
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Figure A.2: Individual donors’ contributions by donor-specific fiscal quarter
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Figure A.3: Extent of spending spike for the three largest donors
0
1
2
3
E
ve
nn
es
s 
of
 q
ua
rte
rly
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
s
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Fiscal year
USA
Japan
UK
129
2 December Fever in Public Finance
Table A.1: Sources and definitions
Variable Definition Original
Source
Dependent Variables
Quarterly fund
contributions
(ln)*
Quarterly transfers from a donor coun-
try to (a certain type of) World Bank
funds (identified by PostingDate), log-
arithm.
World Bank
(2013).
Monthly TF con-
tributions (ln)*
Monthly transfers from a donor coun-
try to (a certain type of) World Bank
funds, logarithm.
World Bank
(2013).
Number of first
contributions (ln)
Number of first transfers to a specific
fund (identified by TrusteeFundName)
by any donor in a fiscal quarter.
World Bank
(2013).
Independent variables
Monthly variables
Last fiscal month Binary variable indicating the last
month in the fiscal year of the donor.
See Table 2.2:
own coding.
Bureaucratic
quality
Monthly score of Bureaucratic Quality. International
Country Risk
Indicators by
Howell (2011).
Quarterly variables
Last fiscal quarter Binary variable indicating the last
quarter in the fiscal year of the donor.
Table 2.2: own
coding.
Table A.1: (continues on next page)
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Table A.1: (continued)
Variable Definition Original
Source
End of IDA cycle Binary variable equal to 1 for all donor
countries in the final quarter of a re-
plenishment cycle of the IDA. As the
Bank’s fiscal year runs from July 1 to
June 30 and the IDA budget is replen-
ished for a three-year period, the end
period of IDA12-IDA16 fall in our sam-
ple period. They respectively ended on
June 30 in the years 2002, 2005, 2008,
and 2011.
Own coding
based on World
Bank (2016a);
Tenney and
Salda (2013);
World Bank
(2003).
Bureaucratic
quality
Quarterly mean of the monthly scores
of bureaucratic quality.
International
Country Risk
Indicators by
Howell (2011).
G8 participant Binary variable that takes the value of
one for G8 members in quarters a G8
meeting is held.
G7/8 Informa-
tion Centre.
Late budget Number of months the annual budget
is appropriated late. Early and on-
schedule budget approvals are coded as
zero.
Own coding
based on in-
ternet research
(sources avail-
able upon
request).
Election quarter Binary variable equal to 1 in the elec-
tion quarter. Legislative elections are
used for parliamentary and presiden-
tial systems because budget author-
ity is always held by parliaments. In
the United States of America (US)
case, biannual legislative elections to
the House of Representatives take place
biannually.
Beck et al.
(2001), own
update for 2013.
Table A.1: (continues on next page)
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Table A.1: (continued)
Variable Definition Original
Source
Government
change
Binary variable equal to 1 in the quar-
ter between a lost election and the in-
auguration of the new government.An
election is lost if the party of the Chief
Executive changes as consequence of
the election. Elections are all legisla-
tive elections.
Beck et al.
(2001), own
update for 2013.
Own coding of
inauguration
date based on
internet re-
search (sources
available on
request).
Aid minister
change
Binary variable equal to 1 in the quar-
ter the minister responsible for the aid
budget changes.
Fuchs and
Richert (2015).
Annual variables
Government
effectiveness
Governance indicator measuring “the
capacity of the governments to effec-
tively formulate and implement sound
policies.”
World Gover-
nance Indicators
(Kaufmann
et al. 2011).
Regulatory qual-
ity
Governance indicator measuring “per-
ceptions of the ability of the gov-
ernment to formulate and implement
sound policies and regulations that per-
mit and promote private sector devel-
opment.”
World Gover-
nance Indicators
(Kaufmann
et al. 2011).
Avg. WGI score Average of the six World Gover-
nance Indicators (Control of Corrup-
tion; Government Effectiveness; Law
and Order; Political Stability; Regu-
latory quality; Voice and Accountabil-
ity).
World Gover-
nance Indicators
(Kaufmann
et al. 2011).
Table A.1: (continues on next page)
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Table A.1: (continued)
Variable Definition Original
Source
Control of corrup-
tion, WGI
Governance indicator capturing “per-
ceptions of the extent to which public
power is exercised for private gain, in-
cluding both petty and grand forms of
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the
state by elites and private interests.”
World Gover-
nance Indicators
(Kaufmann
et al. 2011).
GDP p.c.* Gross Domestic Product per head in
constant US$, fixed PPPs, season-
ally adjusted, expenditure approach
[HVPVOBARSA]*
OECD (2016a)
Primary balance
(% of GDP)
Cyclically adjusted primary balance as
share of GDP
IMF (2015).
Total aid (ln)* Official Development Assistance dis-
bursements by donor country, lagged
by one fiscal year, logarithm
OECD (2015)
via OECD
Wizard.
Yearly contribu-
tions (ln)*
Sum of total fund contributions by
a donor within a donor’s fiscal year,
lagged by one fiscal year, logarithm
World Bank
(2013).
IMF trans-
parency
Score for the comprehensiveness of gov-
ernment finance statistics, available
since 2003
Wang et al.
(2015).
Economic crisis Binary variable equal to 1 in years
countries are affected by a banking,
sovereign or currency crisis
Valencia and
Laeven (2012).
Deviation from
projected gov-
ernment net
lending
Difference between the projected gov-
ernment net lending as a percentage of
GDP [NLGQ] as available at least two
full months before the beginning of the
donor’s fiscal year and realized values
as reported in November 2014.
OECD (2016b).
Table A.1: (continues on next page)
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Table A.1: (continued)
Variable Definition Original
Source
Accounting sys-
tem
Binary indicator equal to 1 if the fed-
eral government uses accrual account-
ing systems and 0 for cash accounting
systems and years of transition. Coun-
tries using accrual accounting in all
sample years: Australia, Canada, Den-
mark, Spain, Finland, Iceland, New
Zealand, Sweden, United States.Âă
Countries using cash accounting in
all sample years: Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway. First year of full
accrual accounting for switching coun-
tries: Austria (2013), Czech Republic
(2010), France (2006), Poland (2010),
Republic of Korea (2006), Switzerland
(2007), United Kingdom (2004), Slovak
Republic (2010). No country switched
from cash to accrual accounting dur-
ing the sample period. I was unable
to determine the accounting system for
the following country-years: Finland
(2001), Japan (2006-2013).
Own cod-
ing based on
OECD (2003;
2004; 2005;
2013); confirmed
through corre-
spondence with
accounting ex-
perts in different
countries.
Total affected (ln) Total number of people affected by nat-
ural disasters, logarithm
EM-DAT: The
OFDA/CRED
International
Disaster
Database by
Guha-Sapir
et al. (2015).
Table A.1: (continues on next page)
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Table A.1: (continued)
Variable Definition Original
Source
Aylum seekers
(ln)
Number of asylum seekers per donor
country, logarithm
OECD Interna-
tional Migration
Statistics.
Battle deaths (ln) Number of battle deaths
[VC.BTL.DETH]
World Bank
(2016c).
Independent aid
agency
Binary variable based on the classifica-
tion of the four organizational models
of bilateral aid provision, one-year lag.
Independent aid agency as defined in
Fuchs et al. (2014) and combines the
management models 3 and 4. Model
1: Development co-operation is an in-
tegral part of the ministry of foreign af-
fairs, which is responsible for policy and
implementation. Model 2: A Develop-
ment Co-operation Directorate has the
lead role within the ministry of foreign
affairs and is responsible for policy and
implementation. Model 3: A ministry
has overall responsibility for policy and
a separate executing agency is respon-
sible for implementation. Model 4: A
ministry or agency, which is not the
ministry of foreign affairs, is responsi-
ble for both policy and implementation.
Definition from
Fuchs et al.
(2014); Clas-
sification from
OECD (2009).
Table A.1: (continues on next page)
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Table A.1: (continued)
Variable Definition Original
Source
IDA replenish-
ment year
Binary variable equal to 1 for all donor
countries in the World Bank’s fiscal
year of replenishment of the IDA. As
the Bank’s fiscal year runs from July
1 to June 30 and the IDA budget
is replenished for a three-year period,
the end period of IDA12-IDA16 fall in
our sample period. They respectively
ended on June 30 in the calendar years
2002, 2005, 2008, and 2011.
Own coding
based on World
Bank (2016a);
Tenney and
Salda (2013);
World Bank
(2003).
Election year Binary variable equal to 1 in the elec-
tion year. Legislative elections are used
for parliamentary and presidential sys-
tems because budget authority is al-
ways held by parliaments. In the US
case, biannual legislative elections to
the House of Representatives take place
biannually.
Beck et al.
(2001), own
update for 2013.
Year of govern-
ment change
Binary variable equal to 1 in the year
between a lost election and the inaugu-
ration of the new government. An elec-
tion is lost if the party of the Chief Ex-
ecutive changes as consequence of the
election. Elections are all legislative
elections.
Beck et al.
(2001), own
update for 2013.
Own coding of
inauguration
date based on
internet re-
search (sources
available upon
request).
Year of aid minis-
ter change
Binary variable equal to 1 in the year
the minister responsible for the aid
budget changes.
Fuchs and
Richert (2015)
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Table A.2: Excluding one donor at the time I, quarterly level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Last fiscal quarter 6.566∗∗ 6.605∗∗ 6.872∗∗ 6.674∗∗ 6.713∗∗ 6.141∗ 6.609∗∗ 6.836∗∗ 7.150∗∗ 6.750∗∗
(2.853) (2.855) (2.861) (2.861) (2.862) (3.049) (2.856) (2.863) (3.059) (2.863)
Last fiscal quarter -1.501∗∗ -1.514∗∗ -1.605∗∗ -1.538∗∗ -1.551∗∗ -1.409∗ -1.515∗∗ -1.593∗∗ -1.655∗∗ -1.564∗∗
∗ bureaucratic quality (0.722) (0.724) (0.724) (0.725) (0.726) (0.769) (0.724) (0.725) (0.774) (0.726)
Bureaucratic quality 1.865∗∗∗ 1.865∗∗∗ 1.862∗∗∗ 1.864∗∗∗ 1.864∗∗∗ 1.815∗∗∗ 1.865∗∗∗ 1.863∗∗∗ 2.207∗∗∗ 1.864∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.238) (0.239) (0.238) (0.238) (0.256) (0.238) (0.239) (9.09e-11) (0.238)
Donor AUS AUT BEL CAN CHE CZE DEU DNK ESP FIN
Donor-fiscal year FE No No No No No No No No No No
Adjusted R-squared 0.715 0.720 0.723 0.710 0.712 0.706 0.710 0.712 0.717 0.713
N° of observations 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248
N° of donors 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged) quarterly contributions to all funds and covers the World Bank’s fiscal years 2002-2013. Each column
excludes the donor country mentioned below the table. ed effects. The acronyms refer to Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada
(CAN), Czech Republic (CZE), Germany (DEU), Denmark (DNK), Spain (ESP), and Finland (FIN). Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered
at the donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.3: Excluding one donor at the time II, quarterly level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Last fiscal quarter 6.750∗∗ 7.400∗∗ 6.634∗∗ 7.081∗∗ 6.790∗∗ 6.540∗∗ 7.637∗∗ 6.833∗∗ 5.388∗
(2.863) (3.079) (2.858) (3.145) (2.864) (2.848) (3.568) (2.863) (2.623)
Last fiscal quarter -1.564∗∗ -1.720∗∗ -1.524∗∗ -1.641∗∗ -1.577∗∗ -1.492∗∗ -1.789∗ -1.592∗∗ -1.223∗
∗ bureaucratic quality (0.726) (0.779) (0.725) (0.794) (0.726) (0.721) (0.904) (0.725) (0.665)
Bureaucratic quality 1.864∗∗∗ 1.924∗∗∗ 1.865∗∗∗ 1.896∗∗∗ 1.863∗∗∗ 1.866∗∗∗ 1.934∗∗∗ 1.863∗∗∗ 1.751∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.256) (0.238) (0.263) (0.239) (0.238) (0.293) (0.239) (0.219)
Donor FIN FRA GBR GRC IRL ISL ITA JPN KOR
Donor-fiscal year FE No No No No No No No No No
Adjusted R-squared 0.713 0.711 0.707 0.721 0.724 0.727 0.723 0.709 0.739
N° of observations 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248
N° of donors 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged) quarterly contributions to all funds and covers the World Bank’s fiscal years 2002-2013.
Each column excludes the donor country mentioned below the table. ed effects. The acronyms refer to Finland (FIN), France (FRA),
Great Britain (GBR), Greece (GRC), Ireland (IRL), Island (ISL), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), and Korea (KOR). Robust standard
errors in parentheses clustered at the donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.4: Excluding one donor at the time III, quarterly level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Last fiscal quarter 6.391∗∗ 6.833∗∗ 6.826∗∗ 6.695∗∗ 5.123∗∗ 7.274∗∗ 7.346∗∗ 6.829∗∗ 6.688∗∗
(2.823) (2.863) (2.863) (2.863) (2.369) (3.111) (3.094) (2.863) (2.861)
Last fiscal quarter -1.441∗ -1.592∗∗ -1.590∗∗ -1.545∗∗ -1.157∗ -1.689∗∗ -1.707∗∗ -1.591∗∗ -1.543∗∗
∗ bureaucratic quality (0.710) (0.725) (0.725) (0.726) (0.603) (0.786) (0.782) (0.725) (0.725)
Bureaucratic quality 1.867∗∗∗ 1.863∗∗∗ 1.863∗∗∗ 1.864∗∗∗ 1.728∗∗∗ 1.913∗∗∗ 1.919∗∗∗ 1.863∗∗∗ 1.864∗∗∗
(0.237) (0.239) (0.239) (0.238) (0.197) (0.260) (0.258) (0.239) (0.238)
Donor LUX NLD NOR NZL POL PRT SVK SWE USA
Donor-fiscal year FE No No No No No No No No No
Adjusted R-squared 0.717 0.709 0.710 0.725 0.703 0.721 0.656 0.711 0.707
N° of observations 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248
N° of donors 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged) quarterly contributions to all funds and covers the World Bank’s fiscal years 2002-2013. Each
column excludes the donor country mentioned below the table. ed effects. The acronyms refer to Luxembourg (LUX), Netherlands
(NLD), Norway (NOR), New Zealand (NZL), Poland (POL), Portugal (PRT), the Slovak Republik (SVK), Sweden (SWE), and the
United States of America (USA). Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.5: The effect of lagged bureaucratic quality on year-end contributions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Last fiscal quarter 7.235∗∗∗ 7.293∗∗∗ 7.388∗∗∗ 6.847∗∗ 7.871∗∗ 6.490∗∗
(2.476) (2.513) (2.533) (2.899) (3.626) (3.112)
Last fiscal quarter -1.694∗∗ -1.703∗∗ -1.726∗∗ -1.584∗∗ -1.733∗ -1.576∗
∗ bureaucratic quality (lagged) (0.628) (0.637) (0.642) (0.734) (0.920) (0.793)
Bureaucratic quality 6.430∗∗ 6.490∗∗ 0.147 1.121∗ 2.325∗∗∗ 0.0320
(lagged) (2.404) (2.405) (0.506) (0.603) (0.233) (0.465)
Fiscal year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Donor FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Donor-fiscal year FE No No No Yes No No
Adjusted R-squared 0.231 0.236 0.710 0.714 0.722 0.712
N° of observations 1296 1296 1296 1296 584 712
N° of donors 27 27 27 27 27 27
Notes > 2007 ≤ 2007
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged) quarterly contributions to all funds to funds the World Bank’s
fiscal years 2002-2013. The quarterly mean of the ICRG bureaucratic quality is lagged by one year. Robust
standard errors in parentheses clustered at the donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.6: The effect of the binary ICRG bureaucratic quality indicator on year-end contributions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Last fiscal quarter 2.294∗∗∗ 2.315∗∗∗ 2.339∗∗∗ 2.211∗∗∗ 1.910∗∗ 2.798∗∗
(0.659) (0.668) (0.674) (0.781) (0.774) (1.036)
Last fiscal quarter -1.868∗∗ -1.878∗∗ -1.887∗∗ -1.729∗∗ -1.778∗∗ -1.871∗
∗ bureaucratic quality dummy (0.685) (0.693) (0.699) (0.810) (0.815) (1.075)
Binary bureaucratic 7.347∗∗∗ 7.384∗∗∗ -0.287 1.914∗∗∗ -0.412 2.357∗∗∗
quality (2.276) (2.274) (0.392) (0.260) (0.351) (0.270)
Fiscal year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Donor FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Donor-fiscal year FE No No No Yes No No
Adjusted R-squared 0.266 0.270 0.710 0.714 0.713 0.722
N° of observations 1296 1296 1296 1296 712 584
N° of donors 27 27 27 27 27 27
Notes ≤ 2007 > 2007
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged) quarterly contributions to all funds to funds the World Bank’s
fiscal years 2002-2013. The bureaucratic quality dummy is one for country-year observations above the
sample mean of the ICRG bureaucratic quality variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at
the donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.7: The effect of the yearly average of the bureaucratic quality variable on year-end contributions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Last fiscal quarter 6.959∗∗∗ 6.990∗∗∗ 7.292∗∗∗ 6.749∗∗ 7.871∗∗ 6.380∗∗
(2.465) (2.498) (2.507) (2.874) (3.626) (3.042)
Last fiscal quarter -1.623∗∗ -1.628∗∗ -1.702∗∗ -1.560∗∗ -1.733∗ -1.549∗
∗ yearly bureaucatic quality (0.625) (0.633) (0.635) (0.728) (0.920) (0.775)
Yearly bureaucratic 6.284∗∗ 6.318∗∗ -0.516 32.39∗∗∗ 2.325∗∗∗ -0.765∗
quality (2.406) (2.413) (0.424) (0.632) (0.233) (0.403)
Fiscal year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Donor FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Donor-fiscal year FE No No No Yes No No
Adjusted R-squared 0.223 0.227 0.710 0.714 0.722 0.712
N° of observations 1296 1296 1296 1296 584 712
N° of donors 27 27 27 27 27 27
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged) quarterly contributions to all funds to funds and covers the
World Bank’s fiscal years 2002-2013. The yearly bureaucratic quality variable is the average of the
monthly ICRG bureaucratic quality within a donors’ fiscal year. Robust standard errors in parentheses
clustered at the donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
142
2.A
A
ppendix:
Figures
and
Tables
Table A.8: The effect of bureaucratic quality on contributions in the last fiscal month
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Last fiscal month 9.113∗∗∗ 9.215∗∗∗ 9.218∗∗∗ 8.856∗∗∗ 8.930∗∗∗
(2.923) (2.929) (2.937) (3.090) (3.087)
Last fiscal month -1.676∗ -1.691∗ -1.687∗ -1.588∗ -1.614∗
∗ bureaucratic quality (0.847) (0.848) (0.849) (0.890) (0.888)
Bureaucratic quality 6.267∗∗∗ 6.320∗∗∗ -2.195∗∗∗ 5.479∗∗∗ 5.479∗∗∗
(2.049) (2.050) (0.368) (0.0693) (0.0694)
Fiscal year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Donor FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Donor-fiscal year FE No No No Yes Yes
Calendar year FE No No No No Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.183 0.193 0.514 0.526 0.525
N° of observations 3879 3879 3879 3879 3879
N° of donors 27 27 27 27 27
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged) monthly contributions to all funds and covers
the World Bank’s fiscal years 2002-2013. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered
at the donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.9: Alternative governance measures at the quarterly level I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Last fiscal quarter 3.336∗∗∗ 3.232∗∗∗ 3.119∗∗ 3.928∗∗∗ 3.869∗∗ 3.825∗∗ 3.512∗∗∗ 3.468∗∗∗ 3.364∗∗
(1.073) (1.074) (1.261) (1.366) (1.393) (1.701) (1.150) (1.172) (1.403)
Last fiscal quarter -1.549∗∗ -1.476∗∗ -1.406∗
∗ government effectiveness (0.612) (0.609) (0.716)
Government 7.171∗∗∗ 0.370
effectiveness (2.058) (1.066)
Last fiscal quarter -2.113∗∗ -2.055∗∗ -2.018∗
∗ regulatory quality (0.863) (0.883) (1.082)
Regulatory quality 9.358∗∗∗ 3.871∗∗∗
(2.338) (1.372)
Last fiscal quarter -1.880∗∗ -1.835∗∗ -1.761∗
∗ Avg. WGI score (0.739) (0.755) (0.906)
Avg. WGI score 7.994∗∗∗ 5.284∗∗
(2.247) (2.240)
Fiscal year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Donor FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Donor-fiscal year FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.287 0.711 0.717 0.245 0.715 0.717 0.259 0.715 0.717
N° of observations 1242 1242 1242 1242 1242 1242 1242 1242 1242
N° of donors 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged) quarterly contributions to all funds and covers the World Bank’s fiscal years 2002-2013.
Government effectiveness and regulatory quality are annual variables from the World Governance Indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann et al.
2011). Avg. WGI score is the annual averageof all six WGI indicators. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the donor
country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.10: Alternative governance measures at the quarterly level II
(1) (2) (3)
Last fiscal quarter 3.839∗∗ 2.490∗∗ 1.881∗
(1.554) (0.993) (1.045)
Last fiscal quarter -0.672∗
∗ corruption, ICRG (0.329)
Last fiscal quarter -0.990∗
∗ control of corruption, WGI (0.528)
Last fiscal quarter -0.0131
∗ IMF transparency (0.0148)
Fiscal year FE Yes Yes Yes
Donor FE Yes Yes Yes
Donor-fiscal year FE Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.714 0.717 0.719
N° of observations 1296 1242 1134
N° of donors 27 27 27
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged) quarterly contributions to
all funds and covers the World Bank’s fiscal years 2002-2013. Column
1 includes the quarterly average of the monthly ICRG corruption
variables, column 2 the WGI control of corruption measure, column
3 the IMF fiscal transparency index (Valencia and Laeven 2012) and
column 4 and 5 the open budget index, with interpolated values in
column 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the
donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.11: Last fiscal quarter effect for IBRD/IDA trust funds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Last fiscal quarter 1.663∗∗∗ 1.653∗∗∗ 1.717∗∗∗ 1.679∗∗∗ 1.618∗∗∗ 3.152∗∗
(0.372) (0.391) (0.438) (0.423) (0.443) (1.356)
Fiscal year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Donor-fiscal year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Donor-calendar year FE No No No No Yes Yes
Calendar year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Calendar quarter FE No No No No No Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.00909 0.0154 0.636 0.634 0.629 0.635
N° of observations 1296 1296 1296 1296 1296 1296
N° of donors 27 27 27 27 27 27
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged) quarterly contributions to IBRD/IDA trust funds and
covers the World Bank’s fiscal years 2002-2013.Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at
the donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.12: Last fiscal month effect for IBRD/IDA trust funds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Last fiscal month 3.133∗∗∗ 3.166∗∗∗ 3.205∗∗∗ 3.179∗∗∗ 3.137∗∗∗ 2.955∗∗∗ 3.389∗∗∗
(0.598) (0.618) (0.625) (0.613) (0.619) (0.717) (1.208)
Fiscal year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Donor-fiscal year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Donor-calendar year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Calendar quarter FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Month FE No No No No No No Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.0130 0.0188 0.516 0.515 0.515 0.517 0.519
N° of observations 3874 3874 3874 3874 3874 3874 3874
N° of donors 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged) monthly contributions to IBRD/IDA trust funds and covers the World
Bank’s fiscal years 2002-2013. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.13: The effect of bureaucratic quality on contributions in the last quarter for IBRD/IDA trust funds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Last fiscal quarter 4.806∗ 4.840∗ 4.809∗ 4.154 2.367 7.355 5.740 5.299∗∗
(2.635) (2.643) (2.674) (3.146) (3.056) (4.870) (3.372) (2.109)
Last fiscal quarter -0.861 -0.858 -0.847 -0.667 -0.279 -1.412 -1.039 -1.019∗
∗ bureaucratic quality (0.710) (0.711) (0.718) (0.840) (0.854) (1.240) (0.872) (0.575)
Bureaucratic quality 6.854∗∗∗ 6.913∗∗∗ -8.826∗∗∗ -1.071∗∗∗ -8.358∗∗∗ 4.468∗∗∗ -8.793∗∗∗ -8.824∗∗∗
(2.340) (2.348) (0.454) (0.245) (0.478) (0.334) (0.507) (1.554)
Fiscal year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Donor FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Donor-fiscal year FE No No No Yes No No No No
Adjusted R-squared 0.221 0.233 0.625 0.636 0.623 0.647 0.435 0.635
N° of observations 1296 1296 1296 1296 712 584 1056 1200
N° of donors 27 27 27 27 27 27 22
Notes ≤ 2007 > 2007 5 minor WB year
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged) quarterly contributions to IBRD/IDA trust funds the World Bank’s fiscal years
2002-2013. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.14: The effect of bureaucratic quality on contributions in the last fiscal month
for IBRD/IDA trust funds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Last fiscal month 4.766 4.908 4.845 4.472 4.590
(4.307) (4.300) (4.310) (4.465) (4.445)
Last fiscal month -0.446 -0.467 -0.450 -0.346 -0.386
∗ bureaucratic quality (1.189) (1.189) (1.190) (1.231) (1.222)
Bureaucratic quality 5.831∗∗∗ 5.888∗∗∗ -5.491∗∗∗ 2.167∗∗∗ 2.166∗∗∗
(1.776) (1.774) (0.341) (0.106) (0.106)
Fiscal year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Donor FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Donor-fiscal year FE No No No Yes Yes
Calendar year FE No No No No Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.162 0.170 0.496 0.516 0.514
N° of observations 3874 3874 3874 3874 3874
N° of donors 27 27 27 27 27
Notes: The dependent variable is (logged) monthly contributions to all funds and
covers the World Bank’s fiscal years 2002-2013. Robust standard errors in parentheses
clustered at the donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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CHAPTER3
Poverty and Policy Selectivity of World Bank
Trust Funds
Joint with Stephen Knack
Multilateral trust funds at the World Bank and at other international organizations
are increasingly popular with donors of foreign aid. These new funding modalities allow
donor governments to cooperate with like-minded donors only, and to earmark their aid
for specific countries, sectors or objectives as with “traditional” bilateral aid. In contrast
to traditional bilateral ai, these new funds use the financial and implementation infras-
tructure of the multilateral organization hosting them.1 The increasing importance of this
multi-bi aid channel raises questions about its distinctiveness in relation to unearmarked
multilateral aid and other bilateral aid, particularly with respect to country allocation
patterns. Trust funds could potentially undermine the policy- and poverty-selectivity of
the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) aid. Undermining would
occur if donors’ earmarked contributions come partly at the expense of their core contri-
butions to the IDA, and if trust fund allocations are not sensitive to recipients’ quality of
governance or income levels.
In this Chapter, we exploit a novel and rich data set on World Bank trust fund dis-
bursements from 2002 to 2012 to analyze the determinants of trust fund allocations across
countries. WE also offer allocation analyses differentiating trust funds by type and sec-
tor.2 We specifically compare the policy- and poverty-selectivity of multi-bi aid to that
of other bilateral aid and of the World Bank’s IDA disbursements. We find that trust
funds are similar to the IDA, and different from other bilateral aid, in being highly sen-
1Because trust fund contributions are earmarked, they are officially classified by the OECD/DAC as
bilateral aid, although multilaterals are the implementing agencies.
2Our datasets only contains disbursements by trust funds and none by pass-through multilaterals, which
are available in different formats from the respective institution’s website. We thus analyze only the
allocation of direct multi-bi aid at the World Bank.
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sitive to recipient’s income and quality of governance. Multi-bi funds administered by
the World Bank thus do not appear to undermine the IDA’s allocation criteria, even if
donors’ contributions to them partially crowd out their IDA contributions. We leave for
future research the question of whether the increase in trust funds has had an impact
on core contributions to the IDA, their potential effects on other aspects of World Bank
operational policies, and the effectiveness of trust funds relative to traditional bilateral
and multilateral core aid.3
The remainder of the Chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides background
information on World Bank trust funds and reviews related literature. Section 3.3 presents
theoretical considerations regarding donor motives on allocation of trust funds. Section 3.4
describes the data and Section 3.5 discusses the methods and presents the main results
for aggregate and sector-specific disbursements. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Background and Related Literature
Over the last decade, trust funds at the World Bank have proliferated. The total number
of trust funds considered in this Chapter exceeds 1,200, excluding the largely independent
Financial Intermediary Funds (FIFs) and trust funds at the International Finance Cor-
poration (IFC). These funds disbursed more than US$ 22.5 billion over the fiscal years
2002-2012, our sample period.4 To put this number into perspective, gross disburse-
ments by the IDA, the fund accounting for most concessional lending by the World Bank,
amounted to US$ 10.9 billion in the 2012 fiscal year.5 Figure 3.2 shows the significant
increase in trust fund disbursements over the last decade and how its volume compares
to IDA funds. Most disbursements were made to specific countries, while smaller shares
are allocated to a region or for global goods. Donors are very heterogeneous in their use
of trust funds to deliver their foreign aid. In the 2002-2012 sample period, the largest
sovereign contributors to World Bank funds, excluding FIFs, were the United Kingdom,
the European Commission, the United States, and the Netherlands.6
3Chapter 1 presents a model with a multilateral agent governed by multiple principals with heteroge-
neous preferences to better understand the trade-offs donors face when choosing bilateral, multilateral
or trust fund aid. Assuming a fixed aid budget, Eichenauer and Hug’s (2016) findings (Chapter 1 of
this thesis) suggest that the possibility of trust fund contributions decreases bilateral and multilateral
‘core’ aid in most cases. During recent IDA replenishment negotiations, the World Bank has placed a
moratorium on solicitations of trust funds from donors by its staff members, indicating that it believes
trust funds can (partially) displace core contributions. Reinsberg (2016a) discusses implications for
the World Bank.
4Programs funded from FIFs are typically monitored by these separate agencies, such as GAVI, the
Vaccine Alliance, or the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), and not by
World Bank staff. The Bank mainly provides financial administration for FIFs.
5The fiscal year at the World Bank runs from July 1 to June 30.
6This information is based on contributions data with donor-specific information.
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Three sets of actors are involved in the recent trust fund trend: donor countries, interna-
tional organizations such as the World Bank, and recipient countries. Donor governments
may use trust funds to target their foreign aid to priority countries and development is-
sues, while, and in contrast to bilateral aid, delegating responsibility for its management
and implementation to the multilateral organization. Evidence collected by the Bank’s
evaluation unit through structured interviews with 55 officials of eight donor countries
finds that six out of eight donor countries use trust funds to target priority issues or
countries (IEG 2011b). From the perspective of the multilateral organization, trust funds
allow expanding its global role and operations, and increasing its staff and assets under
management.
From a recipient country perspective, trust funds may have several positive implica-
tions. For middle-income countries seeking technical assistance but are reluctant to bor-
row for this purpose, trust funds make technical assistance available at grant terms (IEG
2011b: 7). Trust funds have also supported post-conflict and post-disaster countries and
territories that are ineligible to borrow from the IDA or the IBRD (e.g., Timor-Leste,
Aceh in Indonesia, West Bank and Gaza). Moreover, trust funds have encouraged the
provision of global public goods (IEG 2011b: viii). While multi-donor trust funds could,
theoretically, improve donor coordination prior to implementation, reducing excessive and
harmful donor fragmentation in the field (Huq 2010; IEG 2011b), its effects on donor har-
monization seem ambiguous (IEG 2011b: 43; Barakat et al. 2012: 34f) as trust funds
usually do not replace existing bilateral and multilateral projects (Barakat 2009: 112).
An evaluation of World Bank trust funds (IEG 2011b: 7) highlights their importance for
countries in arrears or entities, where the IDA is legally forbidden to engage and bilateral
donors prefer not to engage alone. Looking at aggregate official aid flows, however, it
is still unclear whether, and in what sectors or countries, trust fund aid substitutes for
(i.e., “crowds out”) or complements multilateral or bilateral aid, or if, alternatively, it
is additional to traditional aid. Using data on donors organized in the OECD’s DAC,
Reinsberg et al. (2015) find some evidence that earmarked or multi-bi aid is additional
to multilateral core aid. As they note, some of their estimations may however suffer from
potential reverse causality and simultaneity. Based on data for the World Bank through
2009, Huq (2010) finds that the sectoral allocation of trust funds executed by recipients
is “aligned” (or positively correlated) with IDA but not with IBRD disbursements.
Donor countries might prefer using trust funds rather than bilateral or multilateral
aid for a number of reasons. Donors might seek to supplement IDA funding for particu-
lar countries, sectors and/or projects, and trust funds are often used to co-finance IDA
projects. In other cases, bilateral donors may use trust funds to complement their bilat-
eral programming when their aid agencies do not have sufficient presence or expertise in
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countries to implement programs effectively (OECD 2010: 40, 2011: 29). Donor officials
state that the proliferation of trust fund aid is associated with a need for a new type of
aid that is complementary to the existing multilateral and bilateral aid. They claim that
multilateral core contributions to the World Bank and other MDBs cannot achieve some
aims because contributions cannot be earmarked (IEG 2011b). The evaluation by the
World Bank’s International Evaluation Group (IEG) (2011b: 6) thus concludes: “trust
funds are a way to circumvent the allocation system of the MDBs’ country-based business
model.”7
Eligibility for IDA funds is based on being under a per capita GNI threshold and on a
lack of access to non-concessionary lending. Replenishments of the IDA, and IDA policies
regarding allocations and other issues, are negotiated every third year by donor countries.
Throughout our sample period, IDA resources were allocated according to an explicit
rule taking into account recipient need (as measured by low per capita income) and the
quality of economic policies and governance, where the latter is assumed to increase aid
effectiveness (e.g., Burnside and Dollar 2000, 2004). The World Bank’s Country Policy
and Institutional Assessments (CPIA) measure the quality of policies and institutions,
and are the most important element in the formula determining allocations for most
IDA countries.8 The IDA donors, largely working in concert with Bank management
and staff, determine the content of the CPIA and its weight in the allocation formula.
Morrison (2013) finds that during the Cold War IDA-eligible countries received more IDA
commitments when they held seats on the World Bank Executive Board. However, he
reports that this effect is absent after 1989, when IDA’s performance-based allocation
system became more formal and transparent, reducing any discretion in the process. He
found no support for the hypothesis that the CPIA ratings at the core of this allocation
system are influenced by the Bank’s shareholders.
Not all donors, however, are equally supportive of current IDA allocation policies. For
example, some donor countries have called for increasing the weight accorded to need in
the allocation formula, so that countries emerging from conflict may benefit from increased
funding (see Manning 2014).9 Such donors might reduce their contributions to IDA and
7The IEG (2011b) also found that six out of eight donors direct aid resources through trust funds “to
issues or countries of national policy or public interest” and that five out of eight donors use trust
funds to influence the World Bank. A UK official stated that his government supports large global
funds in climate change, health and education because of “impatience with the existing multilateral
system” (IEG 2011b: 6).
8The CPIA measures numerous aspects of policies and institutions, grouped into four “clusters” or
broad policy areas: (macro)economic management, structural policies, equity and social inclusion, and
public sector management and institutions. A detailed description can be found on the World Bank’s
website, e.g., for the WBFY 2012: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-
1244163232994/6180403- 1372096800800/CPIAcriteria2012.pdf (accessed on September 15, 2016).
9Donor countries can and, surprisingly, do unilaterally increase their IDA contributions beyond what is
seen as their fair share (Manning 2014). These additional contributions do not increase the formal
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divert them to supporting trust funds that complement IDA funding. While donors could
also shift these funds to their respective bilateral aid budgets, they might want some
share of it implemented by the Bank. The IEG (2011b: 6f) evaluation suggests that
donors appreciate the World Bank as a trustee because of its capacity, expertise and
strong working relations with recipient country governments. If trust fund aid is used
in this way to complement the (cross-country) allocation of the IDA funds, then trust
fund aid should be more weakly related to the quality of policies in IDA-eligible recipient
countries than IDA funds – and the relationship could even be negative.
Trust funds are often used to respond to natural disasters and other humanitarian crises,
and to fund environmental and other projects with significant spillovers across national
borders that do not always conform well to IDA’s country-based approach. To the extent
humanitarian and cross-border problems are not correlated with per capita income and
policy quality, allocations of trust funds responding to these problems are likely to be less
poverty- and policy-selective than IDA allocations. For several reasons, therefore, trust
funds can potentially undermine IDA’s “performance-based allocation” system intended,
first, to direct more aid to countries where its development impact is likely to be greater,
and, second, to create incentives for policy improvements in recipient countries.
Our data on disbursements by World Bank trust funds for the 2002-2012 period allow
us to study whether and how trust fund aid is allocated differently from bilateral and
multilateral aid, particularly with respect to policy- and poverty-selectivity. We analyze
trust fund disbursements using linear regression models that account for time-invariant
recipient characteristics and common year-specific shocks. Because motives are likely to
vary with the type of trust funds (Reinsberg et al. 2017), we consider single-donor and
recipient-executed trust funds separately, as types where an individual donor has the
greatest control over where and how the funds are used. We also run separate tests for
three sectors in which trust funds are relatively popular with donors – health, education,
and environment – and where the CPIA includes measures of the quality of sectoral
policies.
Several studies (e.g., Annen and Knack 2015; Dollar and Levin 2006) have shown that
IDA disbursements are highly responsive to per capita income and to the quality of
policies, as intended by the IDA’s performance-based allocation system. Specifically, they
show that disbursements increase with the quality of policy controlling for per capita
income (and population), and that they decrease with per capita income, controlling for
the quality of policy (and population). Aid from some bilateral donors is also very poverty-
voting power of the donor, although higher voluntary contributions might function as an informal
leverage effect for their preferences. It could be that these additional contributions are popular
domestically (Milner 2006). For example, the United Kingdom committed more than the United
States to IDA15 and IDA17 replenishments (Manning 2014).
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and/or policy-selective, but bilateral aid overall is much less selective than multilateral
aid, and IDA is more selective than aid from most other multilaterals (Knack et al. 2011;
Dollar and Levin 2006). Although multilaterals’ allocations are sometimes influenced
by influential donor countries’ political or economic interests (e.g., Barro and Lee 2005;
Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Dreher et al. 2009a,b), those interests matter much more for
bilateral aid allocations (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000). Both multilateral and bilateral
donors’ aid allocations have become more selective with respect to the quality of the
institutional environment in recipient countries since the end of the Cold War (Dollar and
Levin 2006; Claessens et al. 2009).
Very few analyses have been done of the selectivity of World Bank trust funds. World
Bank (2007a) reported that “the distribution of IDA disbursements” among IDA-eligible
countries does not follow a discernible performance-based or needs-based pattern. In
fact, the report found a negative correlation with CPIA ratings but it did not explain its
method: e.g., it is not clear whether it controlled for per capita income in testing the rela-
tionship of trust fund disbursements with CPIA ratings. A few years later, another World
Bank study (Huq 2010) reported a positive but not very strong unconditional correlation
between commitments per capita from recipient-executed trust funds (RETF)s and the
CPIA ratings, which assess recipients’ policy performance and institutional capacity.
An evaluation of the World Bank’s implementation of its 2007 Governance and Anti-
Corruption Strategy reports a positive coefficient on the CPIA rating in RETF allocation
regressions, using aggregate GNI rather than GNI per capita. However, this positive coef-
ficient is insignificant for RETF disbursements and only marginally significant for RETF
commitments (IEG 2011c: 154). When the sample is limited to IDA-eligible countries,
CPIA is not significant even for RETF commitments. The analysis is limited to the years
2004-2010, and it uses only one of the four “clusters” (on public sector management and
institutions) of policy areas in the CPIA. Wagner (2016: 19) finds that RETF commit-
ments for IDA-eligible countries during the 2009-2013 period are significantly correlated
with GNI per capita, population, and CPIA ratings. He stresses, however, that the col-
lective explanatory power of these three variables is much lower for RETF allocations
than for IDA allocations, suggesting that “trust funds are mainly allocated according to
a different set of criteria.”
3.3 Theoretical Considerations
The World Bank allocates IDA funds among eligible recipients mainly based on its CPIA
index that measures recipients’ policy performance and institutional capacity, and on per
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capita income.10 This reliance on the CPIA index reflects donors’ view that resources
are more likely to be used productively in countries with favorable policies and strong
public management systems (e.g., Burnside and Dollar 2000, 2004). However, donors’
motives when creating World Bank-managed trust funds may be very different, and the
relationship between CPIA ratings and allocations of trust funds could be positive or
negative. Donors might want to direct more trust funds to higher performing countries
for the same reasons as with IDA funds. Alternatively, trust funds might be a way for
some donors to compensate partially for IDA’s performance-based country allocations, if
they perceive some lower-performing countries as under-aided.
Any impact of CPIA ratings – whether positive or negative – should apply more to
IDA-eligible recipients than to other countries, because the CPIA ratings are used by
the Bank only for IDA allocations. For this reason we run separate regressions for all
developing countries and for IDA-eligible countries only.11 Because the CPIA does not
affect Bank funding to non-IDA countries, donors have no reason to compensate for any
under-provision of aid to low-rated recipients.
When we focus on all recipient countries, we include a dummy for effective IDA eligi-
bility. The dummy for effective IDA eligibility might influence the probability and size of
trust fund resources with a sign that could go in either direction. On the one hand, IDA
recipients might be less likely than IBRD countries or non-member states and territories
to receive trust fund aid because they already benefit from IDA resources. On the other
hand, bilateral donors might view IDA countries as those countries in particular need of
additional resources (Knack et al. 2014) and where the Bank has an advantage in exper-
tise, and thus channel more of their “bilateral” aid to those countries through the Bank
in the form of trust funds. In many cases, trust funds are even used to “co-finance” IDA
projects. If such cases are very common, trust fund aid should be positively correlated
with the IDA dummy, or with net IDA flows, which we control for in some regressions.
We also control for other donor motives in establishing World Bank-managed trust
funds. Bilateral donors state that they use trust funds to complement their bilateral pro-
gramming when their aid agencies do not have sufficient presence or expertise in countries
to implement programs effectively (OECD 2010: 40, 2011: 29), and appreciate the World
10Lack of access to capital markets at market rates of interest is another criterion for IDA eligibility.
However, the World Bank’s assessments of creditworthiness are not disclosed, so we cannot control
directly for this variable. We can control for per capita income and country size (population), which
are likely to be important determinants of creditworthiness.
11This dummy equals one for country-year observations where there are positive IDA flows or the country
is on the list of eligible IDA recipients. We apply these two criteria which are not perfectly congruent.
Some countries might not want to borrow from the IDA while some countries still borrow because
they are just above the eligibility cutoff (blend countries). Note that according to Huq (2010: foonote
9), financial support from IDA is not available to Sudan because of outstanding arrears. Therefore,
we set the IDA eligibility dummy for Sudan to zero.
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Bank as a trustee because of its capacity, expertise and strong working relations with gov-
ernments (IEG 2011b: 6f). Specifically, donors might provide funding through the Bank
rather than directly in circumstances where they do not want to be present in recipient
countries themselves. For example, donors might want to delegate the implementation of
projects to the Bank in fragile countries because it allows diffusing accountability about
aid effectiveness, because sending bilateral staff is politically sensitive, or because donors
want to act in concert through the Bank to avoid harmful fragmentation in aid activi-
ties. We test the relationship between trust fund and bilateral aid by directly including
bilateral development assistance in some regressions.
Rhetoric by donors and the World Bank also suggests that trust funds are a useful
instrument in fragile contexts. We expect fragile countries to be more likely to receive
aid from trust funds rather than from IDA. On the one hand, the World Bank might be
restricted by its legal mandate when governments in fragile contexts change repeatedly,
making it virtually impossible to negotiate programs. Fragile states also have low CPIA
scores by definition, limiting the IDA resources available for this country mechanically
due to the allocation rule.12 On the other hand, some bilateral donors may view the IDA
performance-based allocation system as under-aiding fragile countries confronted with
challenging situations. Moreover, some donors might be more concerned than other donors
with security, refugee and other problems associated with specific fragile and conflict-
affected states. Such donors might be geographically proximate to the fragile situation,
or have high reputation or economic stakes in the fragile country, such as former colonial
powers. World Bank (2007a) reports that RETF disbursements to fragile states increased
from US$ 130 to 679 million between fiscal years 2002 and 2006.
Donors also use trust funds to fill “gaps in the multilateral system,” in particular to
provide a rapid response to “emergencies such as natural disasters, disease outbreaks, and
the end of armed conflict, where donors want to coordinate their bilateral aid and where
the MDBs do not grant resources to engage on a sufficient scale” (IEG 2011b: 5). We
test these motives by including dummy variables for disaster-affected, post-conflict, and
fragile states. Given the multitude of motives for using trust funds, we use multivariate
statistical analysis that allows assessing the relative importance of these simultaneous
motives while keeping time-invariant characteristics and year-specific shocks constant.
12A small number of post-conflict countries receive supplemental IDA funding for a limited number of
years.
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Our dependent variable is (logged) disbursements of trust funds to recipient countries
based on the financial accounting tables of the World Bank.13 In the disbursements data,
recipient countries are almost always indicated but donors are unknown, so that we cannot
discriminate between the sources of funds.14 The unit of analysis thus is the recipient
country-year, rather than donor-recipient-year. For purposes of comparing the overall aid
selectivity of World Bank trust funds to the IDA and to other bilateral aid, this is the
appropriate unit of analysis, because it implicitly weights larger trust fund donors more
heavily in the analysis. With donor-recipient-year observations, each donor-recipient pair
would receive an equal weight. If selectivity of trust fund aid differed systematically for
large and small donors, selectivity coefficients could be a misleading indicator of overall
selectivity.15
The structure of the disbursements data is depicted in Figure 3.1. The figure indicates
that trust funds may differ along three dimensions: by the number of contributors (Figure
3.2 (b)), the country-specific, regional or global mandate, and by their execution type
(Figure 3.2 (c)). We analyze a subset of the universe of World Bank funds, IBRD/IDA
trust funds, which are most numerous. The Bank makes a technical distinction among
three types of trust funds. The Bank only provides financial services to FIFs.16 The
number of trust funds of the IFC is relatively minor and has different objectives than
IBRD/IDA trust funds. IBRD/IDA trust funds, the focus of this analysis, are classified
further by RETFs, which are implemented by a third party but supervised by the Bank,
and Bank-executed trust funds (BETF)s, which support the Bank’s work directly. While
RETFs are similar to the IDA or IBRD in terms of being disbursed to recipient countries,
BETFs are more similar to Bank administrative expenses, and often but not always
finance Bank activities that are not country-specific and thus not relevant for our research
question (Figure 3.2 (c)).
13We use the data from Reinsberg et al. (2017) as obtained from the Bank’s Trust Funds and Partnerships
Department.
14The by far most important contributors to trust funds are DAC countries, accounting for 80 percent
of contributions over the period of study. Non-DAC donor countries, private companies, NGOs and
multilateral organizations are relatively minor contributors (see also Eichenauer and Reinsberg 2017).
15In Wagner (2016), CPIA ratings are significant in regressions based on recipient-year observations, but
not in regressions based on donor-recipient-year observations.
16Our data set does not contain the information on country allocation by FIFs, which have their own
governance and disbursement systems (see Reinsberg et al. 2015).
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of disbursement data
Notes: The choice of recipient countries and trust funds as well as the allocation choices of trust funds are fictive. The “Donor Funded Staffing Program” and
“Gender Mainstreaming” trust funds do not allocate aid to specific countries but support Bank programs. ∗ mark recipient-executed trust funds (RETF).
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In testing for poverty- and policy-selectivity of trust funds and other aid, we control for
the natural logarithm of population. The IDA allocation formula provides more aid to
larger countries, but with an elasticity of less than one. Studies typically show a “small
country bias” for IDA disbursements – i.e., aid increases less than proportionately with
population – but this bias is smaller than for aid from most other donors (e.g., Annen
and Knack 2015). Due to missing and low-quality data on actual poverty rates (e.g., the
percentage share of the population living on less than US$ 2 per day), income per capita
is used as a proxy for poverty in the IDA formula. In the tests we report below we follow
the IDA allocation formula specifically by using GNI per capita, smoothed for exchange
rate changes using the Atlas method, rather than GDP per capita, which is used more
commonly in the aid allocation literature. The World Bank also uses GNI per capita
in its lending classifications (including eligibility for IDA) and its income classifications.
Unsurprisingly, poverty-selectivity of World Bank-administered aid (IDA or trust funds)
tends to be somewhat weaker if we use GDP per capita in our regressions instead of the
measure the World Bank uses in its own allocation policies, GNI per capita. The choice
of GNI or GDP makes little difference, however, for most other results, including the
policy-selectivity of aid.17 Data for both income measures and for population come from
the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2016b).
Aggregated and partially-disaggregated CPIA scores for IDA-eligible countries are pub-
licly available from the World Bank (2016c) since 2005, and range from a minimum score
of 1 (lowest quality policies) to a maximum of 6 (highest quality). For non-IDA countries
and prior years, scores are not publicly available, but were obtained with the necessary
permissions by one of the authors from internal World Bank databases. In contrast to
Wagner (2016), we are therefore able to include observations dating to 2002, and for non-
IDA as well as IDA countries. In a few cases, CPIA scores are not assigned after countries
fall into arrears with the World Bank and are no longer classified as active borrowers. This
typically is the case when the quality of policies and governance are very low, as indicated
by their CPIA scores for years when they were active borrowers. In these cases, we replace
the missing score with the lowest score received by any other country in this year, but
results are not sensitive to dropping these observations instead.
Our main tests do not include other control variables, because our interest is mostly
in comparing selectivity across aid sources. We control in some tests for a fragile state
dummy, because some donors in recent years have given them favored status in allocating
aid. A very small share of IDA funds are set aside for a handful of “post-conflict” countries
that overlap considerably with fragile state status. We create a dummy variable for fragile
17Full results using GDP per capita are available from the authors upon request. In reporting results
below we note two instances in which significant results for one variable become insignificant when
GDP is used instead of GNI.
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country status from the official World Bank list of fragile and conflict situations, first
produced in 2006 and updated annually. When we include the fragile dummy, we limit
the sample to the fiscal years 2006-2012, where the dummy equals one in those country-
years in which a country was on the official lists of fragile situations.18 We create a
separate dummy for countries eligible for special “post-conflict” funding (World Bank
2014a). In some specifications, we also control for (logged) bilateral aid and development
aid received from official donors through channels other than trust funds and IDA using
OECD/DAC data (2015) and World Bank data for (logged) IDA flows. If other aid flows
are to some extent policy- and poverty-selective, these aid flows are collinear with our
measures of policy quality and poverty for which the coefficients are then imprecisely
estimated.
In robustness tests, we control for several donor-interest variables, following the liter-
ature on allocation of bilateral aid (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000). First, we measure
geopolitical interests by the alignment of votes between recipient countries and impor-
tant donor countries in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) using data from
Voeten (2013). Annual measures of voting alignment range from 0 to 1 with higher values
implying higher similarity and are calculated as in Kilby (2013) using all UN votes. We
calculate the mean alignment of the largest three sovereign trust fund donors (United
Kingdom, United States, Netherlands), which we label as “the G3.”19 We exclude the Eu-
ropean Commission, the second largest donor, because its preference aggregation process
is more complex (e.g., Michaelowa et al. 2017). Second, we add a dummy for a colonial
relationship between a G3 donor and the recipient country. Third, commercial interests
are measured by total G3 exports, using data from the IMF (2015). A thorough test of
the importance of these donor-interest variables in aid allocation decisions would require
a different data set, with donor-recipient-year observations. In our analysis, we merely
use these as control variables.
Table 3.1 displays the descriptive statistics for the dependent and control variables in
our sample. The average recipient country receives US$ 1.8 trust fund aid per capita, a
relatively minor inflow compared to average per capita aid of US$ 6.7 from IDA and US$
67 from other sources.20 However, trust fund volumes have increased over the sample
period and represent significant inflows for some recipient countries as indicated by the
maximum value of more than US$ 82 trust fund aid per capita. Average GNI per capita
18The absence of a list prior to 2006 likely reflects the lack of any influential view among donors that
“fragility” was an important concept or that fragile states should be treated differently.
19In the fiscal years 2002-2012, these donors contributed constant US$ 4.08, 2.47, and 2.04 billion re-
spectively. The European Commission contributed US$ 2.47 billion while Canada as the fifth largest
donor contributed US$ 1.12 billion.
20Table 3.1 is based on the sample of all developing countries. Among IDA eligible countries, the figure
is US$ 10.3 per capita. These high per capita figures are driven by island states.
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is US$ 2,744, which the Bank classified as a lower middle income country in the fiscal year
2012. The mean of the aggregate CPIA rating is just below the median value of 3.5, and
the maximum value is almost 5. Recipient countries’ education, health and environmental
policy ratings range between 1 and 6 with an average value similar to the aggregate CPIA
score. With regard to the political and economic variables, the data show that average
voting affinity with the largest donors is slightly higher than the median value of 0.5.
Total exports per capita from the G3 trust fund donors (UK, US, and Netherlands) vary
substantially around the mean value of 202 US$ per capita. The table further shows
that one third of recipient countries in our sample are former G3 colonies, while fragile
countries make up 17 percent, and IDA-eligible countries 65 percent of observations.
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Aid flows per capita
Trust fund aid per capita 1.68 6.15 0.00 79.07
IDA aid per capita 6.73 11.50 0.00 138.62
Other aid per capita 66.85 180.83 0.00 2’469.26
Performance variables
GNI per capita, constant US$ 2’744 2’743 131 14’532
Population in millions 42 156 0.00 1’344
Agg. CPIA score 3.43 0.57 1.40 4.91
CPIA, Education 3.54 0.68 1.00 6.00
CPIA, Health 3.50 0.67 1.00 6.00
CPIA, Environment 3.31 0.65 1.00 6.00
Political economy variables
Voting affinity in UNGA (G3) 0.56 0.15 0.21 0.92
Total exports per capita, US$ (G3) 203 432 1.00 4’818
Former colonies (G3) 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00
Other control variables
Total disaster affected (3-year total)∗ 2’048 14’209 0.00 185’932
Fragile countries 0.02 0.16 0.00 1.00
Post conflict situation 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
IDA eligible countries 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00
Note: ∗In thousands
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Figure 3.2: Different types of trust funds
(a) Trust fund contributions and IDA disbursements
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(b) Disbursements by single- and multi-donor trust funds
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(c) Trust fund disbursements by execution type
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(d) Trust fund disbursements by sectors
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Notes: World Bank trust fund data, 2002-2012. Disbursements by FIFs and IFC trust funds are not
included.
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3.5 Estimation Method and Results
This section compares the selectivity of trust fund aid to IDA and bilateral aid. We
use panel models with year- and recipient-fixed effects without a selection stage, because
almost all recipient countries receive positive trust fund disbursements at least once during
our sample period. Our sample includes all countries that the OECD’s DAC considered
developing countries in a given year.
As is common in the aid allocation literature, our baseline regression model looks as
follows:
Log (disbursements)i,t = α + β CPIAi,t−1 + γ ln (population)i,t−1
+ δ ln( GNIp.c. )i,t−1 + λ′ Xi,t−1 + θi + σt + i,t
(3.1)
where i refers to the recipient country and t to the Bank’s fiscal year. Errors are robust
to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the recipient country level. We include year-fixed
effects σt and, in most regressions, recipient-fixed effects θi.
The inclusion of recipient fixed effects controls for any time-invariant recipient charac-
teristics that may influence aid allocations: estimates of poverty- and policy-selectivity
are then informed only by changes over time within countries in aid, GNI per capita,
and quality of policy.21 However, we also report results from pooled OLS (with standard
errors clustered by recipient), in which estimates are informed primarily by cross-country
rather than over-time variation in the data. The CPIA ratings are designed to compare
the quality of policies across countries at a point in time using all relevant information at
that time. Changes in ratings from one year to the next sometimes reflect newly-available
information rather than actual changes in the quality of policies and institutions, and rat-
ings from prior years are not “corrected.” Over-time variations in the data therefore are
likely to incorporate substantially more measurement error than the cross-sectional vari-
ation. Reassuringly, the fixed effects estimates (which minimize omitted variable bias)
reported below are largely consistent with the pooled OLS estimates (which are likely
based on less noisy data).
Table 3.2 shows results with recipient- and year-fixed effects for all IDA countries
(columns 1-3) and all developing countries (columns 4-6). Trust funds and IDA pro-
vide significantly higher aid to poorer and better-governed (i.e., higher CPIA) countries
(columns 3 and 1 respectively). Trust fund allocations are thus much more similar to IDA
than to other ODA in terms of poverty- and policy-selectivity.22 Coefficients on (log of)
21Hausman tests show that fixed effects are preferred over random effects.
22There is no statistical difference between the coefficients on the selectivity variables for IDA and TF aid,
while coefficients are significantly different between trust fund aid and other aid flows (p-value=0.002
for GNI p.c. and p-value=0.023 for the CPIA score). We test the equality of coefficients using Stata’s
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Table 3.2: Comparison of poverty-and policy-selectivity across TF aid, IDA aid, and
other aid, fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GNI p.c. (ln) -1.899∗∗ 0.764 -2.518∗∗∗ -1.028∗∗ 1.396 -3.430∗∗∗
(0.828) (0.813) (0.815) (0.508) (0.962) (0.783)
CPIA score 3.031∗∗∗ -0.33 2.088∗∗∗ 1.953∗∗∗ -0.827 2.596∗∗∗
(1.013) (0.891) (0.761) (0.717) (0.856) (0.794)
Population (ln) 3.082 0.018 2.864 3.034 -5.64 2.23
(2.523) (3.302) (3.206) (1.975) (6.261) (2.737)
IDA eligible 15.538∗∗∗ -2.52 0.656
(1.506) (2.556) (1.031)
Dependent variable IDA Other TF IDA Other TF
Sample IDA IDA IDA All All All
Estimation FE FE FE FE FE FE
Adjusted R-squared 0.075 0.002 0.189 0.316 0.015 0.166
N° of observations 900 900 900 1375 1375 1375
N° of countries 89 89 89 133 133 133
Notes: The dependent variables is the natural logarithm of the aid type noted in the bottom
of the respective column and covers the Bank’s fiscal years 2002-2012. All regressions include
dummies for the World Bank’s fiscal year. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the
recipient country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.3: Comparison of poverty- and policy-selectivity across TFs, IDA aid, and other
aid, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GNI p.c. (ln) -1.571∗∗∗ -0.735∗ -0.647 -1.238∗∗∗ -0.817* -0.783∗∗
(0.512) (0.374) (0.403) (0.362) (0.436) (0.356)
CPIA score 5.337∗∗∗ -0.502 1.809∗∗ 2.601∗∗∗ -0.424 0.924
(1.330) (0.445) (0.714) (0.849) (0.475) (0.624)
Population (ln) 0.771∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 1.088∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗ 0.353∗ 1.156∗∗∗
(0.262) (0.150) (0.204) (0.200) (0.182) (0.155)
IDA eligible 15.011∗∗∗ 0.000 1.137
(0.777) (0.840) (0.741)
Dependent variable IDA Other TF IDA Other TF
Sample IDA IDA IDA All All All
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Adjusted R-squared 0.392 0.140 0.361 0.804 0.081 0.379
N° of observations 900 900 900 1375 1375 1375
N° of countries 89 89 89 133 133 133
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the aid type noted in the bottom of the
respective column and covers the Bank’s fiscal years 2002-2012. All regressions include dummies
for the World Bank’s fiscal year. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the recipient
country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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GNI per capita (and on log of population) are interpretable as elasticities, so a 1 percent
increase in per capita GNI reduces IDA flows by 1.9 percent (column 1) and TF aid by
2.5 percent (column 3). A 1-point increase in the CPIA rating (measured on a 1 to 6
scale) is associated with a nearly 20-fold increase in IDA flows (= e3.031 − 1) and 7-fold
increase in TF aid (= e2.088 − 1). Note, however, that a 1-point increase in CPIA is very
large in relative terms, equal to nearly two standard deviations.
Even for a sample that includes non-IDA countries (column 6), trust funds are very
policy-selective (although marginally insignificant at conventional level of significance)
as well as poverty-selective. As shown in Table 3.3, this holds true in OLS regressions
with year-fixed effects that allow for the inclusion of time-invariant variables. The main
difference is that the estimated effects of country size are more consistent and significant.
The coefficients on population for other aid types in Table 3.3 reflects the bias in favor of
small-countries (in per capita terms) frequently noted in the literature (Fleck and Kilby
(2010: e.g.,)), but this bias is nearly absent for trust fund aid, where the coefficient on
population is even slightly above one. When we include a dummy for fragile countries and
limit the sample to the post-2005 years accordingly, we do not find that these countries
receive more trust fund aid (Table 3.4, column 2). Moreover, the inclusion of this dummy
has only trivial effects on coefficients for the selectivity variables (comparing columns 1
and 2).
Potentially, allocating aid partly for commercial and political motives could weaken
the policy- and poverty-selectivity of trust funds. If so, then when we control for those
factors the absolute value of the selectivity coefficients should increase, i.e., “conditional”
selectivity should be stronger than “unconditional” selectivity. We include measures for
commercial and political motives in Table 3.4 (column 3), but find the coefficients on the
selectivity variables to change little compared to Table 3.2 (column 6). The commercial
and political variables – UNGA voting alignment with the G3, and (log of) total G3
exports – are significant, with the expected positive signs.23 In column 4 of Table 3.4 we
drop the country-fixed effects, so we are able to add a second political interest variable, a
dummy for former colonies of G3 donors. The colonial heritage dummy is not significant
and its inclusion increases the size and significance level of the selectivity coefficients
(comparing Table 3.4, column 4 and Table 3.3, column 6). The last column in Table 3.4
controls for (logged) other aid flows and IDA aid to the recipient country, where the
latter coefficient is positive and marginally significant.24 This finding reinforces the idea
that trust fund allocations look a lot more like the IDA’s than like other aid. But, more
suest command.
23In column 3, the coefficient falls from 6.1 to 4.2 and becomes insignificant if we measure income using
GDP instead of GNI per capita.
24For the IDA sample, IDA flows are significant in the fixed and random effects models.
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Table 3.4: Robustness checks for trust fund aid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GNI p.c. (ln) -4.955∗∗∗ -4.961∗∗∗ -3.759∗∗∗ -0.839∗∗ -3.274∗∗∗
(1.386) (1.389) (0.806) (0.373) (0.801)
CPIA score 3.594∗∗ 3.541∗∗ 2.380∗∗∗ 1.058∗∗ 2.324∗∗∗
(1.515) (1.571) (0.804) (0.473) (0.840)
IDA eligible 0.841 0.840 0.781 1.866∗∗∗ -1.459
(1.070) (1.070) (1.163) (0.676) (1.475)
Population (ln) 4.169 4.035 1.234 0.978∗∗∗ 1.751
(4.414) (4.395) (2.735) (0.260) (2.739)
Fragile situation -0.154
(0.507)
G3 UNGA-Alignment 6.149∗ 8.439∗∗∗
(3.581) (2.251)
Total G3 exports (ln) 0.622∗∗ 0.130
(0.304) (0.214)
G3 colonial heritage -0.692
(0.456)
Other aid (ln) -0.013
(0.025)
IDA aid (ln) 0.134∗
(0.080)
Sample > 2005 > 2005 All All All
Estimation FE FE FE OLS FE
Adjusted 0.164 0.164 0.177 0.391 0.173
R-squared 887 887 1332 1332 1375
N° of observations 133 133 128 128 133
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of trust fund aid and covers the
Bank’s fiscal years 2002-2012. All regressions include dummies for the World Bank’s fiscal
year. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the recipient country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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importantly, it is showing that donors’ trust fund allocations are not just guided by IDA
flows, including co-financing of IDA projects: even controlling for IDA flows, their trust
fund allocations are separately influenced by IDA policies, namely poverty- and policy-
selectivity.
Donor countries might prefer RETFs, which are under more direct control of donors,
over trust funds more generally.25 In particular, some BETF allocations by country are
determined by staff. Therefore, RETFs could be guided by political and commercial
objective to a larger extent and therefore less poverty- and policy- selective. Column 2 of
Table 3.5 replicates the method and specification of Table 3.4, column 3, but for RETFs
instead of all TFs. In this fixed effects test, GNI per capita is not significant, and its
coefficient is reduced in absolute value compared to the case of all TFs. The political
and commercial variables are not significant either. In the OLS test, per capita income is
also insignificant while political alignment is associated with significantly larger RETFs
allocations (Table 3.5, column 4). In the OLS tests (comparing column 3 to column
4), the coefficient for CPIA increases and becomes significant by controlling for political
and commercial interests. This provides evidence for “conditional” policy-selectivity but
neither for “conditional” nor “unconditional” poverty-selectivity.
Single-donor trust funds could be used by an individual donor country to support
strategic interests, while multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs) should look more like IDA:
other things equal, as an MDTF includes more donors, it will look more like the full set
of IDA donors. Compared to an SDTF donor, donors in MDTFs should therefore have
a stronger collective interest in selectivity while disagreement about countries to benefit
from favors should limit the role of political and commercial factors in determining aid
allocations. Columns 5–8 of Table 3.5 replicate columns 1–4, but for SDTFs instead of
RETFs. We find some support for the hypothesis that political interests matter more for
SDTFs, as coefficients on voting alignment are somewhat larger in columns 6 and 8 than
in columns 3 and 4, respectively, of Table 3.4.26 These coefficients are not much larger,
however, and selectivity for policy and poverty is still strong. In sum, we find that,
despite being guided by political and commercial motives to a somewhat larger extent
than aggregate trust fund aid, RETFs remain policy-selective while SDTFs remain both
policy- and poverty-selective.
25RETF disbursements exclude disbursements by ‘hybrid’ trust funds that are classified as both RETF
and BETF (Figure 3.2 (d)).
26In column 6 of Table 3.7, the coefficient falls from 7.4 to 6.2 and becomes insignificant if we measure
income using GDP instead of GNI per capita.
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Table 3.5: Recipient-executed and single-donor trust funds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GNI p.c. (ln) -1.559 -1.757 -0.517 -1.039 -3.188∗∗∗ -3.080∗∗∗ -0.901∗∗∗ -0.734∗
(1.159) (1.212) (0.552) (0.669) (0.807) (0.833) (0.327) (0.372)
CPIA score 2.969∗∗∗ 2.806∗∗ 1.139 1.556∗∗ 3.349∗∗∗ 3.449∗∗∗ 1.625∗∗ 1.867∗∗∗
(1.033) (1.075) (1.082) (0.735) (0.902) (0.939) (0.712) (0.550)
IDA eligible -0.402 -0.324 4.864∗∗∗ 5.397∗∗∗ 1.134 1.162 1.210 1.961∗∗∗
(2.340) (2.440) (1.194) (0.939) (0.932) (1.006) (0.766) (0.687)
Population (ln) 11.090∗ 11.003∗ 1.112∗∗∗ 0.973∗∗∗ -0.975 0.163 0.998∗∗∗ 1.027∗∗∗
(5.727) (5.991) (0.184) (0.353) (2.880) (3.036) (0.138) (0.235)
G3 UNGA-Alignment 6.341 23.500∗∗∗ 7.439∗ 10.455∗∗∗
(7.416) (4.684) (4.193) (2.337)
Total G3 exports (ln) 0.651 0.232 0.051 -0.075
(0.492) (0.311) (0.372) (0.216)
G3 colonial heritage -0.301 -1.027∗∗
(0.759) (0.500)
Dependent variable RETF RETF RETF RETF SDTF SDTF SDTF SDTF
Sample All All All All All All All All
Estimation FE FE OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS
Adjusted R-squared 0.055 0.057 0.241 0.312 0.560 0.568 0.498 0.534
N° of observations 1375 1332 1375 1332 1502 1453 1502 1453
N° of countries 133 128 133 128 134 128 134 128
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the TF aid noted in the bottom of the respective column and covers
the Bank’s fiscal years 2002-2012. All regressions include dummies for the World Bank’s fiscal year. Robust standard errors in
parentheses clustered at the recipient country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.6 tests whether donors use trust funds to provide extra funding for post-conflict
and disaster-affected countries in a coordinated manner. We find no systematic evidence
that these motives explain trust fund allocations. Neither a post-conflict dummy variable
nor a measure of the number of people affected by a disaster are significantly related to
TF aid, in either fixed effects or pooled OLS regressions, for either the IDA sample or the
full developing-country sample. The poverty- and policy-selectivity is unchanged when
we control for these specific trust fund purposes.
Table 3.6: Selectivity with respect to disaster- and conflict-affected countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GNI p.c. (ln) -2.448∗∗ -2.983∗∗∗ -0.528 -1.788∗∗∗
(1.002) (0.854) (0.389) (0.322)
CPIA score 2.210∗∗∗ 2.213∗∗∗ 1.255∗∗ 1.755∗∗∗
(0.837) (0.799) (0.555) (0.600)
Population (ln) 3.09 4.262 0.870∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗
(3.663) (3.042) (0.186) (0.170)
Post-conflict country -0.549 -0.238 -2.28 -0.913
(1.046) (0.940) (4.837) (2.265)
Affected (ln) 0.109 -0.011 0.079 0.006
(0.077) (0.067) (0.076) (0.063)
Dependent variable TF TF TF TF
Sample IDA All IDA All
Estimation FE FE OLS OLS
Adjusted R-squared 0.214 0.157 0.312 0.303
N° of observations 768 1156 768 1156
N° of countries 86 127 86 127
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of trust fund aid
and covers the Bank’s fiscal years 2002-2012. All regressions include dum-
mies for the World Bank’s fiscal year. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses clustered at the recipient country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In Table 3.7, we disaggregate the data to analyze three specific sectors – education,
health, and environment – that are popular among trust fund donors (Figure 3.2 (d)),
and for which sector-specific indicators of the quality of policies (CPIA sub-ratings) are
produced. For this analysis, we use the relevant sector-specific IDA disbursements, as
well as the sector-specific CPIA sub-ratings. Most projects in the sample have objectives
in multiple sectors, and we assign projects to the sector which has the largest sectoral
share. We focus on the two sectors for which we have a respective CPIA subscore, namely
education and health. For environment, we use the theme code and the corresponding
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Table 3.7: Sector-specific selectivity of trust fund aid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GNI p.c. (ln) -2.407∗∗∗ -1.614∗ -1.635∗∗∗ -1.328 -0.486∗∗ -0.557
(0.323) (0.973) (0.358) (0.942) (0.245) (0.561)
Population (ln) 0.884∗∗∗ 14.531∗∗∗ 1.188∗∗∗ 10.615∗∗ 1.285∗∗∗ 15.249∗∗∗
(0.156) (4.508) (0.149) (5.235) (0.137) (2.715)
CPIA, Education 2.047∗∗∗ 1.647∗∗∗
(0.475) (0.547)
CPIA, Environment 1.017∗∗ 0.847
(0.496) (0.614)
CPIA, Health 0.397 -0.168
(0.359) (0.357)
Dependent variable TF TF TF TF TF TF
Sample Edu. Edu. Health Health Environ. Environ.
Estimation OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Adjusted R-squared 0.256 0.034 0.242 0.012 0.299 0.060
N° of observations 1367 1367 1368 1368 1368 1368
N° of countries 132 132 132 132 132 132
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the aid type noted in the bottom of the
respective column and covers the Bank’s fiscal years 2002-2012. Edu. refers to the education sector
and Environ. to the environmental sector. All regressions include dummies for the World Bank’s fiscal
year. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the recipient country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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CPIA rating.27 We find health and education aid to be poverty- and policy-selective in
OLS regressions with time dummies (Table 3.7, columns 1 and 3). While education aid
is responsive also to policy improvements over time within countries (column 2), health
aid is not (column 4). In contrast, environmental aid is responsive neither to policy
improvements over time within countries (i.e., in the fixed effects regression reported in
column 6) nor between countries (column 5).
In summary, we find consistent evidence that the cross-country allocation of aggregate
trust fund aid is poverty- and policy-selective and allocated more similarly to IDA aid than
to other aid. Controlling for population, per capita income, and the quality of policies, we
find no evidence that fragile, post-conflict, or disaster-affected countries receive more trust
fund aid. Sector-specific analyses, using sector-specific policy indicators, show that trust
fund aid in education and (to a lesser extent) health is sensitive to population, income
and the quality of policies, but allocations of environmental trust funds are unrelated to
the quality of environmental policies.
3.6 Conclusion
This Chapter provides the most comprehensive analysis to date of the cross-country al-
location of trust funds, a relatively new aid channel that can be described as a hybrid
between bilateral and multilateral aid. Donor rhetoric suggests that some World Bank-
administered trust funds are intended to support countries neglected by the IDA for legal,
political, and other reasons. Potentially, therefore, the cross-country allocation of these
trust funds may compensate for the performance-based allocation of IDA funds, “diluting”
the poverty- and policy-selectivity of total World Bank-administered aid. We test whether
donors’ allocations of trust funds tend to favor recipients with lower per capita incomes
and more favorable policy environments, as measured by the Bank’s CPIA. Results show
that World Bank trust fund allocations are similar to IDA, and dissimilar to other bilateral
aid (summed over all DAC donors) in terms of their policy- and poverty-selectivity.
The allocation of recipient-executed and single-donor trust funds, which are under closer
control of donor countries, appears to be more strongly motivated by strategic interests
of donor countries than trust fund aid in general. However, a more complete investigation
of the role of donor interest variables would require a different data set and different unit
of analysis (donor-recipient pairs) than we use in this Chapter.28 We also explore trust
27Criteria for the education, health and environment policy ratings in the CPIA can be
found at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-1244163232994/6180403-
1372096800800/CPIAcriteria2012.pdf (accessed on September 15, 2016).
28Factors related to donors’ and recipients’ domestic political economies are investigated by Dietrich
(2016) and Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2017).
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fund disbursements for three specific sectors, and find evidence that health and education
trust funds, but not environmental trust funds, are policy- and poverty-selective across
countries.
Overall, the evidence indicates that multi-bi funds administered by the World Bank
do not undermine the IDA’s allocation criteria, even if donors’ contributions to them
might partially crowd out their IDA contributions. There is very little evidence regarding
the latter issue of crowding out. We leave for future research the question of whether
the increase in trust funds has affected core contributions to IDA, and their potential
effects on other aspects of World Bank operations.29 The question of the additionality
of earmarked funds at the aggregate level remains open as donors might just reshuﬄe
funds away from multilateral organizations other than the World Bank they perceive as
less effective. Finally, as experience with trust fund aid accumulates, another important
research question will be its effectiveness, relative to core multilateral and traditional
bilateral aid, in contributing to growth and human development outcomes.
29One review of World Bank non-lending technical assistance projects rated the quality of fully-trust
funded projects lower than projects that were wholly or partially Bank-financed, and concluded that
the difference was attributable in part to less attention by management and staff to trust funded
projects (see IEG 2011b: Chapter 3).
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Table 3.8: Sources and definitions
Variable Definition Original Source
Trust fund dis-
bursements
Disbursements by World Bank
trust funds, logarithm, FY∗
Trust Funds and
Partnerships De-
partment at the
World Bank.
Other aid disburse-
ments
Bilateral ODA disbursements by
all donors net of trust fund and
IDA aid, logarithm∗
DAC, Table
DAC2a ODA
Disbursements
(OECD 2015).
GNI per capita Gross national income per capita,
Atlas method, logarithm∗
World Bank
(2016b).
GDP per capita Gross domestic product per
capita in PPP, logarithm∗
World Bank
(2016b).
Population Population of recipient and donor
countries, logarithm
World Bank
(2016b).
IDA aid ODA by the IDA, logarithm, FY∗ World Bank data
from S. Knack.
IDA dummy IDA eligible countries and IDA
recipient countries (incl. blend
countries, FY)
S. Knack and IDA
aid data.
G3 colonial herti-
age
Colonial heritage of the largest
three sovereign trust fund donors
(G3: United Kingdom, United
States, Netherlands)
Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA)
Factbook and
other sources.
G3 UNGA-
Alignment
Voting alignment in United Na-
tions General Assembly, calcu-
lated as in Kilby (2013), G3 refers
to largest three sovereign trust
fund donors (United Kingdom,
United States, Netherlands)
Voeten (2013), im-
portant years from
C. Kilby.
Table 3.8: (continues on next page)
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Table 3.8: (continued)
Variable Definition Original Source
Total G3 exports Total value of exports from
the largest three sovereign trust
fund donors (G3: United King-
dom, United States, Netherlands)
to recipient country, logarithm,
lagged∗
(IMF 2015).
CPIA scores Aggregated and sector-
disaggregated Country Policy
and Institutional Assessment
scores (1-6)
Aggregated CPIA
since 2006 from
World Bank
(2016b); Previ-
ous years from S.
Knack.
Post-conflict situa-
tion
Dummy equals one for country-
years eligible for IDA special allo-
cations for post-conflict countries
(World Bank
2014a).
Fragile state
dummy
Dummy equals one for country-
years classified as fragile situation
by the World Bank
Own coding based
on World Bank
(2014b).
Disaster affected
(total)
Number of disaster-affected peo-
ple in the recipient country, mov-
ing 3-year total, (contemporane-
ous, once and twice lagged), log-
arithm
EM-DAT: The
OFDA/CRED
International Dis-
aster Database by
Guha-Sapir et al.
(2015).
DAC recipients Historical list of DAC recipients
(1997-2013)
Dreher and Lan-
glotz (2015).
Notes: Data in calendar years if not marked as fiscal year (FY).
∗ Values are transformed to 2011 constant US$ using the GDP deflator from World Bank (2016b).
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CHAPTER4
Geopolitics, Aid and Growth
Joint with Axel Dreher and Kai Gehring
“UNSC membership offers a quasi-experiment
to assess the impact of unconditional aid.”
— Bueno de Mesquita and Smith
The debate on whether or not foreign aid is effective in promoting growth in recipient
countries is ongoing and heated. Some papers find aid to be effective (Galiani et al. 2017),
while others show that the effectiveness of aid is conditional on policies or institutions
(Svensson 1999; Burnside and Dollar 2000). Still others find that aid has no effect on
growth at all (Rajan and Subramanian 2008; Nowak-Lehmann et al. 2012). Arguably,
much of this controversy is due to the lack of an accepted identification strategy. En-
dogeneity between aid and growth looms large, and no consensus exists in the academic
literature as to which of the many papers contributing to the debate convincingly address
the identification problem.1 In this Chapter, rather than suggesting a new identifica-
tion strategy to estimate the effect of aid on growth, we narrow the lens and investigate
whether an important type of aid – aid given for political reasons – is less effective than
other types of aid.
Specifically, this Chapter investigates whether foreign aid given to temporary members
of the UNSC is less effective in promoting growth than aid given at other times. We discuss
a number of reasons why donors’ motives for giving aid can influence its effectiveness.2 As
we explain in more detail in Section 4.2, if donors are motivated purely by self-interest,
their allocation decision might not take into account the way the recipient uses the aid.
Donors may then fail to include growth-promoting policy conditions or waive them in case
1Dreher and Langlotz (2015) provide a detailed discussion.
2A handful of studies consider the impact of donor characteristics on aid effectiveness (Bobba and Powell
2007; Dreher and Kilby 2010; Bearce and Tirone 2010; Minoiu and Reddy 2010; Bermeo 2011). None
of these studies provides a convincing identification strategy.
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of non-compliance. Additionally, favoritism might allow projects to be pursued where
important preconditions are not met or might reduce the time and resources devoted to
the preparation of a project. The recipient might choose to use disbursed aid for purposes
other than development if punishment for non-compliance is less likely, resulting in inferior
growth outcomes on average. What is more, a politically motivated allocation of aid may
result in the approval of lower-quality aid projects in favored countries instead of more
promising projects elsewhere.
We exploit temporary membership on the UNSC to identify how geostrategic donor
motives change the effect of aid on recipient country economic growth. As we detail in
Section 4.2, temporary membership gives countries a powerful voice on the international
stage. Such power is associated with benefits. Kuziemko and Werker (2006) show that
temporary members receive a substantial increase in foreign aid commitments from the
United States in years they serve as temporary members of the UNSC. This pattern holds
for a broad range of donors, as shown in Dreher et al. (2009a,b) and Vreeland and Dreher
(2014): The United States, Japan, Germany, as well as multilateral organizations such
as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the
African Development Bank, and UNICEF, where major shareholders can to some extent
steer the organizations’ funds in line with their geopolitical interests.
We test whether and to what extent the aid received during a country’s tenure on the
UNSC affects growth differently compared to aid given at other times. We test the effect
of a recipient country’s geostrategic importance on the effectiveness of aid in promoting
growth by adding UNSC membership and its interaction with aid to specifications that
are otherwise identical to Clemens et al.’s (2012) first-difference permutations of Burn-
side and Dollar (2000). Specifically, we interact aid disbursements with nonpermanent
UNSC membership at the time the aid was committed. Our approach thus resembles a
difference-in-difference strategy, where we identify the differential effect of aid on growth
as temporary membership on the UNSC varies.3 The estimated effect of UNSC mem-
bership on aid effectiveness is causal to the extent that the difference in growth between
members and non-members of the UNSC following changes in aid cannot be attributed
to changes other than receiving more aid. The appropriateness of this approach is sup-
ported by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010), who show that economic growth is not
significantly different in countries at times they are elected to the UNSC compared to
other times.4 Pre-UNSC growth trends indicate that the common-trend assumption is
3This follows Dreher et al. (2013), who investigate the effect of recipient countries’ geostrategic impor-
tance on the evaluation of World Bank projects. Their results show that for projects approved during
times of macroeconomic crisis temporary UNSC membership reduces the probability of a positive
evaluation upon completion.
4Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) show that temporary members grow more slowly as a consequence
of serving on the UNSC and argue that this reflects the negative effects of aid. They do not include
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reasonable in our analysis.
While aid itself is arguably endogenous to contemporaneous growth, we are interested
in the interaction of aid with UNSC membership rather than the effect of aid. UNSC
membership is allocated quasi-randomly with respect to growth, aid and other potential
determinants of aid and growth (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010; Dreher et al. 2014).
We thus assume that UNSC membership is exogenous to (future) growth and interpret
the coefficient of the interaction term causally. More specifically, while the causal inter-
pretation of the effect of aid on growth rests on the assumptions in Clemens et al. (2012),
we do not have to rely on these assumptions to interpret the differential effect between
politically motivated and other aid in a causal way. We explain this in more detail below.
In a nutshell, omitted variables would have to be related to growth and to the interaction
between UNSC membership and aid, and follow a very specific time-structure to affect our
results. We perform placebo tests for different timings and a series of tests that include
potentially important omitted variables. None of this changes our conclusions.
Based on a sample of 54 countries over the 1974–2009 period, we find that the effect
of aid on growth is reduced by UNSC membership (see Section 4.4). This result holds
when we restrict the sample to Africa, which follows the strictest norm of rotation on the
UNSC and thus where UNSC membership can most reliably be regarded as exogenous
(Vreeland and Dreher 2014) and is robust to a battery of other tests. Our results have
at least two important implications. First, to the extent that aid is given for geostrategic
reasons, it should not be considered “development” aid. It might be effective in achieving
the donors’ geostrategic objectives, but it is less effective than other aid in promoting
developmental outcomes such as growth. Including such political aid in the category of
development aid is likely to blur the potentially measurable effects of “true” development
aid and is likely to add to frustration in the populations of donor countries granting the
aid, ultimately reducing even those parts of aid that could be effective in raising growth.
The second implication of our results concerns the instrumental variables scholars use
to identify the effect of aid on growth. A large number of studies base their analysis on
instruments that proxy the geopolitical importance of a recipient country to the donor,
implicitly or explicitly generalizing the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) to be
representative of all aid, rather than political aid exclusively.5 If geopolitical aid or aid
given to recipients with political leverage more generally is less effective than other aid,
the literature using political connections as instruments would not provide evidence of the
aid in any of their models however.
5The number of papers is too large to cite them all. A number of recent papers use (changes in) voting
alignment between the donor and recipient in the United Nations General Assembly (e.g., Gary and
Maurel 2013; Bjørnskov 2006; Creasey et al. 2015). Others use temporary membership in the United
Nations Security Council, which is the focus of this Chapter (Christensen et al. 2011; Drometer 2013;
Breitwieser and Wick 2016).
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ineffectiveness of overall aid, but rather of aid given to politically important countries.
Their estimates would represent a lower bound for the effects of overall aid, which could
explain the lack of a positive effect of aid on growth in a large number of studies (e.g.,
Rajan and Subramanian 2008).
4.2 A Theory of Politically Motivated Aid
It seems intuitive to assume that politically motivated aid is less effective than aid mainly
given to promote development.6 As Rajan and Subramanian (2008: 655) point out,
however, “to characterize strategic aid as ‘bad’ aid is mixing motives and consequences.”
According to Dreher et al. (2013), there are indeed good reasons why politically motivated
aid may be just as effective as other forms of aid. Cold War donors, for example, may have
wanted not only to curry favor with their client states, but also to help their allies succeed
economically. A case in point, the East Asian Tigers received tremendous amounts of
politically motivated assistance during the ColdWar that does not appear to have impeded
their economic development. Once an aid allocation decision has been made, the donor’s
aid bureaucracy must deliver the aid. The bureaucrats may want to implement effective
programs regardless of the motivations of the donor, so that the existence of political
favoritism in the allocation of aid need not imply its ineffectiveness. What is more, at
any given time there may be a plethora of unfunded investment projects with similar
potential effectiveness. Choosing among these projects according to political criteria may
not necessarily reduce the average effectiveness of aid.
However, Dreher and Kilby (2010) and Dreher et al. (2013) stress that there are also
strong reasons to expect that politically motivated aid is indeed less effective than average
aid. The first is that a politically motivated allocation of aid may result in the approval
of lower-quality aid projects in favored countries instead of more promising projects else-
where. This presumes that the allocation decision is made in the presence of declining
marginal returns, and political motivation results in projects with lower returns getting
priority.
A second argument supporting the hypothesis of ineffective political aid is that politi-
cally motivated projects reduce the motivation of the donor and/or recipient to invest as
much in the success of the project as they would otherwise. On the donor side, bureau-
crats will arguably take account of their employer’s incentive structure to some extent,
as that might help them to advance in their careers or just spare them tedious work. To
6Consider as example Morgenthau (1962: 303, as cited in Werker 2012): “Bribery disguised as foreign
aid for economic development makes of giver and recipient actors in a play which in the end they
may no longer be able to distinguish from reality. In consequence, both may come to expect results
in terms of economic development which in the nature of things may not be forthcoming.”
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the extent that developmental outcomes do not enter the employer’s utility function, less
effort might be spent on the ground to promote developmental objectives. Favoritism
might thus allow projects to be pursued where important preconditions are not met or
might reduce time and resources devoted to the preparation of a project (Kilby 2013,
2015). From the recipient’s perspective, aid inflows may delay important policy reforms
that would, among other things, also promote economic growth.
Focusing on the IMF and the World Bank, Stone (2008), Kilby (2009), and Noorud-
din and Vreeland (2010) suggest that political favoritism undermines the credibility of
conditionality, rendering it ineffective. Dreher and Jensen (2007) find that the conditions
attached to loans given to political allies of the IMF’s most important shareholders are
less stringent. The results of Nielsen (2013) show that donors punish nonallies when
they violate human rights by reducing aid but not their political allies. This does not
imply that politically important countries necessarily follow unsound economic policies.
Sometimes donors and recipients agree on policy; some recipient governments even invite
policy conditionality (Vreeland 2003). Other times, governments may follow a different
policy course than that recommended by the donor and still be successful. At other
times, however, politically important recipient countries may be unable or unwilling to
follow the donors’ conditions even though their economy would benefit from the proposed
adjustments.
Political motivations may also reduce the effectiveness of aid through a more subtle
channel: Faye and Niehaus (2012) show that politically motivated aid might help facil-
itate political business cycles, as donors provide more aid to their political allies prior
to elections. Aid thus helps incumbent governments to distort their economy, which can
reduce growth rates directly (after the short-term stimulating effect of expansionary elec-
toral policies evaporates). More importantly, this type of aid makes it more difficult for
voters to select the “best” politicians, as they receive distorted signals of competence.
What is more, election-related aid can be seen as a valuable prize, increasing the num-
ber of incompetent political actors who enter the political stage or even leading to coup
d’états (Werker 2012). This can on average lead to less competent politicians and might
thus reduce growth rates. Finally, Bobba and Powell (2007) suggest that aid-receiving
allies might feel more obliged to spend politically motivated aid in the donor country than
recipients of developmentally-oriented aid, even if goods and services could be bought at
a lower price and/or higher quality elsewhere.
In summary, while it is theoretically unclear whether political aid has a different effect,
there are many good reasons to expect that it is less effective than aid intended to promote
development. We therefore turn to the empirics to answer this question.
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4.3 Data and Method
Our proxy variable for geostrategic importance is a measure that has been shown in pre-
vious research to induce political favoritism: temporary membership on the UN Security
Council. Ten temporary members are elected by the UN General Assembly, while five
members serve on a permanent basis. Temporary members serve two-year terms, which
are not immediately renewable. A number of studies show that temporary members of
the UNSC receive substantial increases in aid, arguably due to the powerful geostrategic
positions these countries enjoy during their tenure on the Council. Donors who have been
shown to increase aid to members of the UNSC include the United States (Kuziemko and
Werker 2006), Germany (Dreher et al. 2015), and Japan (Vreeland and Dreher 2014), as
well as a number of multilateral organizations whose major shareholders have a substan-
tial say over the allocation of resources and can to some extent sway these organizations’
decisions according to their political interests (Vreeland and Dreher (2014) provide a
summary).
Even if formally elected by the UNGA, most decisions on who gets elected to the
UNSC are made at regional caucuses, where norms and rules differ between regions.7
Dreher et al. (2014) and Vreeland and Dreher (2014) investigate these rules. They show
that African nations typically rotate; Latin America and Asia hold competitive elections
where regional hegemons win most often; Western Europe mixes rotation and competitive
elections; and since the end of the Cold War, Eastern Europe shows no systematic pattern.
Though which countries get elected to the UNSC is not strictly random, hardly any
variable reliably predicts the timing of membership across regions. As Dreher et al. (2014)
summarize their results, “UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between
the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving
each country its turn. We also find evidence that richer countries from the developing
world win election more often, while involvement in warfare lowers election probability.
By contrast, development aid does not predict election.” We control for GDP per capita
and (internal and external) conflict either in all models, or in our tests for robustness,
while the effect of population size is hardly relevant in first differences. Controlled for the
variables in the model, UNSC membership can thus be considered exogenous to growth.
Arguably, the rotation among African countries provides the most reliably exogenous
variation on when countries serve on the UNSC across our sample period.8 We make use
7In around 80 percent of the elections only one country – nominated by a specific region – runs for
election (Vreeland and Dreher 2014). Decisions at the regional caucuses are thus crucial in these
elections.
8For Africa, Vreeland and Dreher (2014) find representation to be more likely for those countries with
higher debt service payments, larger GNI per capita, greater voting alignment with the United States
in the UNGA, and more corruption, controlling for country fixed effects. We control for these variables
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of this exogeneity by replicating our results for Africa.
To allow comparability with existing research, our analysis closely follows the approach
in Clemens et al. (2012), adding our variables of interest to their models. Clemens et al.
(2012) show that the most prominent previous attempts to control for the potential en-
dogeneity of aid rely on invalid instruments. Instead of suggesting more valid ones, they
address the potential endogeneity of aid by differencing the regression equation and lag-
ging aid, so that it can reasonably be expected to cause growth rather than being its
effect. Thus, they assume that the main (short-term) effects of aid on growth occur, on
average, one four-year-period after its disbursement. We base our analysis on their per-
mutations of Burnside and Dollar (2000) – the study that arguably gained most attention
in the recent literature on aid and growth. While we believe as do Clemens et al. (2012)
that OLS regressions are superior to two-stage least squares regressions with questionable
instruments, we stress that our estimate of whether aid affects growth could be biased in
either direction,9 and we refrain from interpreting the aid-growth relationship as causal.
Instead, we focus on how temporary UNSC membership causally changes the effect of aid
on growth.
In terms of timing, we follow Clemens et al. (2012) and assume that disbursed aid on av-
erage takes one four-year-period to become effective in increasing or decreasing economic
growth.10 We also assume that bottlenecks in the donor and recipient administrations
prevent aid committed from being disbursed immediately, so that the bulk of aid com-
mitted in one four-year-period is disbursed one period later, on average.11 In accordance
with these assumptions about the timing of the aid disbursement and growth effects of
aid we are interested in growth rates two periods after UNSC membership. We illustrate
the timeline derived from our considerations in Figure 4.1 (but also test different timings
below).
We expect that aid committed in period (t − 2), which is disbursed in period (t − 1),
is less effective in promoting growth in period (t) for countries that are UNSC-member
either in all regressions or in the Section 4.A.
9For example, donors might grant more aid to a new reform-oriented government. Increased growth
resulting from these reforms could then spuriously be attributed to the increases in aid. On the other
hand donors might give more aid to countries where they anticipate shocks to reduce future growth
rates.
10As summarized in Headey (2008), aid affects growth most substantially 5–9 years after it has been
disbursed, on average. If aid is disbursed evenly over time, the average positive distance between a
dollar being disbursed and growth in the contemporaneous four-year-period is 16 months (Roodman
2007; Headey 2008). Headey (2008) thus lags aid by one four-year period, so that the average positive
distance between disbursements and their potential effects is five years and four months.
11For example, a 1999 report of the British House of Commons’ Select Committee on International
Development reports a delay between European Commission aid commitments and disbursements of
almost five years (cited in Odedokun 2003: 7). See OECD (2003) for an in-depth discussion of reasons
for delayed disbursements.
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during period (t− 2). Figures 4.2 – 4.4 provide a first impression of the data. Figure 4.2
shows total aid commitments (in constant 2000 million US$) from all DAC-donors for
four-year-periods, to countries that either do not serve in any of the periods shown in the
figure, serve one, or serve two years of a period on the UNSC.12 We also show the amount
of aid UNSC members received in the period before serving on the UNSC (i.e., period
(t− 3)) and the first period in which they no longer serve (i.e., period (t− 1)). As can be
seen, aid commitments are substantially larger for countries that have served one or two
years out of a four-year-period on the UNSC, compared to countries that do not serve.
They are also larger for UNSC members compared to what these same countries received
in the previous period and to what they receive in the period after they have been on the
UNSC (these differences are statistically significant at the one-percent level).
Figure 4.3 focuses on net aid disbursements (also in constant 2000 million US$) one
four-year-period after a country has been on the UNSC. For comparison, the figure also
shows aid disbursements for countries that have not been on the UNSC in any of the peri-
ods shown in the figure, as well as disbursements at the time the country is on the UNSC
(i.e., UNSC(t−2)), and two periods later (i.e., UNSC(t)). The figures support the hypoth-
esized pattern: While commitments increase in the contemporaneous four-year-period of
membership (t-2); the accompanying disbursements increase in the period following UNSC
membership (t−1). Thus, aid commitments during UNSC membership indeed seem to be
disbursed on average one period later. Both commitments and disbursements move back
to their initial levels in periods (t− 1) and (t), respectively, increasing our confidence in
this time structure. Overall, the effects coincide with UNSC membership, and disappear
after the temporary member loses its extraordinary geopolitical importance.
Figure 4.4 shows mean yearly growth rates of per capita GDP for different lags of UNSC
membership. The first bar displays the growth rates for countries that are not members of
the UNSC. The other bars show the growth rates for different lags of UNSC membership:
Growth during UNSC membership, one period before, one period later, two periods later,
and three periods later. Figure 4.4 shows that compared to countries not on the UNSC,
temporary members subsequently experience lower growth rates.13
As expected, growth is lowest two periods after UNSC membership. Note that growth
rates are substantially higher one further period later (t+ 1). This pattern is in line with
our hypothesis that the increased aid committed in period (t−2) during temporary UNSC
membership (Figure 4.2), which is disbursed in large parts in period (t− 1) (Figure 4.3),
has an adverse effect on how aid affects growth in period (t) (Figure 4.4). While these
descriptive statistics imply no causality, their pattern lends support to our story.
12This is in line with Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010).
13This is in line with Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010).
190
4.3
D
ata
and
M
ethod
Figure 4.1: The proposed timeline
Notes: The figure shows the lag that we expect between aid commitments and its effect on growth. We expect aid committed due to temporary membership
on the UNSC in one four-year period to be disbursed in the next, and to be effective (or not) yet one four-year period later.
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Next we turn to our econometric specification. According to Clemens et al. (2012),
the appropriate method to test the effect of aid on economic growth accounts for the
non-linear effect of aid through a square term, removes country fixed-effects through
first-differencing, and lags aid by one period. As they argue, this minimizes potential
misspecification due to reversed causality between aid and growth, and omitted variables
bias.14 This is also our preferred estimation strategy. Following Clemens et al. (2012) our
reduced-form empirical model is at the country-period level:
∆Growthi,t = α + β ∆Aidi,t−1 + γ ∆(Aid2i,t−1) + δ UNSCi,t−2
+ ζ UNSCi,t−2 ∗ ∆Aidi,t−1 + ∆X ′i,t η + ∆i,t
(4.1)
where Growthi,t is a country i’s average yearly real GDP per capita growth over period (t).
Aidi,t−1 denotes the amount of aid (as a percentage of GDP) disbursed in the previous
period; UNSCi,t−2 indicates the share of years country i was a temporary member of
the UNSC two periods before.15 As we expect that aid commitments are, on average,
disbursed one period later, we twice-lag the share of temporary membership on the UNSC
(UNSCi,t−2).
All regressions include the complete set of (time-variant) control variables used by
Clemens et al. (2012), which we denote Xi,t.16 These variables are GDP per capita in
the first year of each period, Assassinations, the interaction of Ethnic Fractionalization
with Assassinations, M2/GDP (lagged), Policy, and period dummies.17 Our preferred
specification also includes aid squared to test decreasing returns to aid, again following
Clemens et al. (2012). Finally, we allow for a heteroskedastic error term that may be
arbitrarily correlated within countries.
Three potential concerns about our identification strategy deserve attention: First, one
could argue that UNSC membership should be included in differences instead of levels. To
us, it seems intuitive that the level rather than changes in UNSC membership conditions
the effectiveness of changes in aid. Nevertheless, our results are robust to first-differencing
the share of UNSC membership, as we show below. Second, it could be argued that
14In addition, they seem to prefer a measure of early-impact aid over all aid. This measure has been
shown to not be a robust predictor of growth (Rajan and Subramanian 2008; Bjørnskov 2013). What
is more, a major drawback with this measure is that disaggregated aid disbursements are not available
for the entire period, so that disbursements have to be estimated based on commitments. We therefore
prefer to focus on overall aid. However, we replicate the analysis using early-impact aid instead of all
aid below.
15We exclude the permanent UNSC members Russia and China from the analysis.
16Table A.1 reports the sources and definitions of all variables, while we show descriptive statistics in
Table A.2.
17The policy index is based on measures of budget balance, inflation, and openness to trade. The original
Burnside and Dollar (2000) study also includes time-invariant variables that are removed here as in
Clemens et al. (2012) through taking first-differences.
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Figure 4.2: Total aid commitments and temporary UNSC membership
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Notes: The figure shows total aid commitments, where (t) refers to the period we expect the aid to
impact on growth. “No UNSC” refers to countries that are not temporary member of the UNSC in any
of the periods shown; (t − 2) is the period of temporary UNSC membership. We show aid committed
while countries serve on the UNSC either one or two years of a four-year period (in t− 2), the amount of
aid committed to those who will serve on the UNSC in the next period (t−3) and those who have served
in the previous period (t− 1). Source: Own calculations; see Appendix Table A.1 for variable definitions
and sources.
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Figure 4.3: Total aid disbursements and temporary UNSC membership
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Notes: The figure shows total aid disbursements, where (t) refers to the period we expect the aid to
impact on growth. “No UNSC” refers to countries that are not temporary member of the UNSC in any
of the periods shown; (t − 2) is the period of temporary UNSC membership. We show aid disbursed
while countries have served on the UNSC in the previous period for either one or two years of a four-year
period (i.e., in (t − 1)), the amount of aid disbursed to those who serve on the UNSC in the current
period (t − 2) and those who have served two periods ago (t). Source: Own calculations; see Table A.1
in the Appendix of this chapter for variable definitions and sources.
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Figure 4.4: Mean GDP per capita growth rate in percent (in period t) and temporary
UNSC membership
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Notes: The figure shows GDP p.c. growth (averaged over four-year periods), according to whether or not
countries have served as temporary members of the UNSC, where (t) refers to the period we expect the
aid to impact on growth. “No UNSC” refers to countries that are not temporary member of the UNSC in
any of the periods shown; (t− 2) is the period of temporary UNSC membership. Growth rates are lowest
two periods after membership (i.e., in (t)). Source: Own calculations; see Table A.1 in the Appendix of
this chapter for variable definitions and sources.
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temporary UNSC membership should be interacted with aid squared as well. Political
motivation would then not only change the level of the marginal effect of aid, but also its
slope. Such an interaction effect, however, is not significant in our models (the p-value
being 0.99 in our preferred specification) and of a very small magnitude. As its inclusion
is not compelling in terms of theory and complicates the interpretation of results, we do
not include it here. Note however that this choice does not affect the results.18
A third and important concern is the potential endogeneity of aid. However, our co-
efficient of interest is the interaction between aid and UNSC membership (ζ in Equa-
tion 4.1). This coefficient can be estimated consistently under a set of assumptions that
do not require aid to be exogenous. Following Bun and Harrison (2014) and Nizalova and
Murtazashvili (2016), 4.A in the Appendix of this chapter provides a formal presentation
of these assumptions.
The first assumption is the exogeneity of nonpermanent UNSC membership, condi-
tional on the variables in the model. The second is that the endogeneity of aid due to any
omitted variable bias must be independent of UNSC status. More specifically, we assume
that any bias resulting from the (potential) endogeneity of aid (in t − 1) is the same in
countries on and off the UNSC (in t − 2). Both assumptions find support in previous
research. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010), Dreher et al. (2014), and Vreeland and
Dreher (2014) test the possibility that countries that become politically or economically
more important over time receive more aid, have a higher probability of being elected to
the UNSC and have higher rates of economic growth simultaneously. Temporary members
of the UNSC might be able to draw attention to their legitimate developmental needs,
giving them access to additional funds that are unrelated to political motives. These
authors find that election to the UNSC is hardly related to variables that also affect the
amount of development aid a country receives or that systematically affect growth across
regional caucuses. We tested whether growth differs in the period before countries enter
the UNSC compared to all other periods. It does not (p-value: 0.47).19 We tested whether
economic volatility differs between countries on and off the UNSC. To the extent that the
economies of countries elected to the UNSC are more volatile, such volatility could reduce
the effect of aid on growth. The variance of economic growth of countries on and off the
UNSC does not differ (p-value: 0.58). Finally, we make use of the varying regional norms
in how members get elected to the UNSC introduced above. As emphasized in Vreeland
and Dreher (2014), rotation of seats in the African region most strongly conforms to the
assumption of randomly assigned membership status. We therefore replicate our regres-
sions focusing on a sample of African countries and confirm our main results. Overall,
18See Table A.9 in Section 4.A in the Appendix of this chapter.
19This also holds two or three periods earlier, making the “common-trend assumption” plausible (see
column 2, row 1 of Table 4.2).
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conditional on the variables in our models, it seems reasonable to assume that UNSC
membership provides exogenous variation in the geopolitical importance of a country for
the two years of membership.20 Of course, the exogeneity of temporary UNSC mem-
bership does not guarantee that membership has no effect on growth two periods later
through channels other than aid. The existence of alternative channels would not affect
the consistency of the estimated interaction term except in the case that such an omitted
variable is also correlated with aid in a manner consistent with our timing. While we
control for several potential determinants of growth that UNSC membership could most
plausibly affect in section 4.A in the Appendix of this chapter, it is impossible to rule
out that other such variables exist. However, changes in these variables would need to
change the effect of aid on growth in order to threaten our results. While a large number
of variables have been suggested to increase or decrease the effectiveness of aid, many of
these interactions have been shown to be fragile (e.g., Doucouliagos and Paldam 2009).
But even if the effectiveness of aid depends on omitted variables that change due to tem-
porary membership on the UNSC, we can still test whether UNSC membership causally
changes the effectiveness of aid (though a differential effect of aid would then be caused
by changes in external circumstances rather than by changes in the quality of the aid).
This would no longer be the case if donors allocate their aid in response to UNSC
membership in a way that depends on omitted variables that in turn affect growth. For
example, donors might allocate more aid to countries experiencing economic downturns
when these countries are UNSC members, so that the endogeneity of aid due to economic
downturns would depend on UNSC status. Dreher et al. (2013) test whether the effect of
UNSC membership on the number of (World Bank) aid projects depends on borrowing
countries’ need. They find this not to be the case. To further test the importance of
potentially omitted variables in our regressions, we follow the approach of Altonji et al.
(2005). We compare the relative impact that unobserved variables would need to have
on our coefficients of interest compared to observable variables to make the interaction of
UNSC membership and aid indistinguishable from zero. To this end, we include the inter-
actions of temporary UNSC membership with variables indicating economic and political
crises (as well as the respective variables in levels) to our preferred specification.21 The
20Alternatively, we can replace the assumption that nonpermanent UNSC membership is exogenous
with the less restrictive assumption that any channel by which future growth affects UNSC status
is independent of aid. More specifically, we would have to assume that any bias resulting from the
(potential) endogeneity of UNSC(t − 2) is independent of ∆Aidt−1. While this assumption is more
lenient than assuming exogeneity of UNSC membership, it comes at the cost that the coefficient of
UNSC membership itself is no longer estimated consistently. What is more, we are convinced of the
exogeneity of UNSC membership, so we report this modified assumption for completeness only (see
Section 4.A in the Appendix of this chapter).
21Specifically, we include interactions with debt (as share of GNI), short term debt (as share of total
external debt), GDP per capita at the beginning of each period, and assassinations to our baseline
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coefficient of interest becomes larger rather than smaller and more precisely estimated.
Overall, we consider a violation of our identifying assumptions unlikely.
To convince the reader of the reliability of our estimations, we control for a large number
of variables in addition to those used in Clemens et al. (2012) which could potentially
affect how UNSC membership changes the effect of aid on growth, and follow the time
pattern we suggest: (changes in) the share of foreign direct investment, trade, and imports
in recipient countries’ GDP, various facets of institutional quality including internal and
external conflict, and voting alignment with the United States in the UNGA. Controlling
for these variables further increases our confidence that the difference-in-difference-like
estimation we suggest identifies a causal difference in the effect of aid on growth depending
on UNSC membership.
4.4 Results
Table 1 shows the main results, covering the 1974–2009 period. All variables are averaged
over four years. The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of real GDP
per capita; aid is measured as net Official Development Aid (ODA) as a percentage of
GDP.22 When we do not account for diminishing returns to aid by including aid squared,
the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant at the five-percent level
(column 1). When we include aid squared, the interaction becomes significant at the
one-percent level (column 2).23 According to column 2, for any increase in ∆Aid, the
effectiveness of this change in aid disbursements decreases with the share of the period
the recipient country has spent on the UNSC two periods before (i.e., when the aid
has been committed). The causal effect of a one percentage point increase in aid as a
percentage of GDP on yearly economic growth is 0.64 percentage points higher if the
recipient has not served on the UNSC compared to if it has served two years (i.e., 1/2
of the four-year period). Compared to the average growth rate of about 1.34 percentage
points in our sample, this is a substantial reduction of almost half the average growth rate.
The results thus support our hypothesis that aid committed during times of short-term
political importance is indeed less effective.
Figure 4.5 shows the marginal effects for the model of column 2 and the corresponding
regression. Detailed results are available on request.
22The original source for GDP per capita growth is the World Bank’s World Development Indicators;
ODA is total net ODA in current US$ from Table 2 of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee
in percent of GDP in current US$, taken from the World Development Indicators (see the Technical
Appendix to Clemens et al. 2012). Data for the 2006–2009 period are from Minasyan (2016) and
World Bank (2016c).
23We also tested whether the effect differs when we only take important years of UNSC membership into
account, as suggested in Kuziemko and Werker (2006). The results remain unchanged.
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Table 4.1: Politically motivated aid and growth, OLS, 1974-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Aid (t-1) 0.116 0.473∗∗ 0.142 0.345
(0.085) (0.208) (0.139) (0.329)
∆Aid squared (t-1) -0.010∗∗ -0.006
(0.004) (0.006)
UNSC (t-2) -1.384 -1.368 -1.737 -1.732
(0.832) (0.836) (1.216) (1.247)
UNSC (t-2) * ∆Aid (t-1) -0.981∗∗ -1.289∗∗∗ -1.446∗∗∗ -1.547∗∗∗
(0.429) (0.379) (0.295) (0.338)
∆GDP p.c. at start of period -3.607* -3.731∗∗ -1.472 -1.770
(1.904) (1.801) (4.068) (3.745)
∆Assassinations -0.198 -0.184 0.695 0.486
(0.179) (0.169) (0.942) (0.969)
∆Assassinations * 0.337 0.307 -3.610 -3.172
∆Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (0.341) (0.327) (3.354) (3.417)
∆M2/GDP -0.003 -0.004 0.043∗ 0.039*
(0.016) (0.014) (0.024) (0.020)
∆Policy 0.923∗∗∗ 0.940∗∗∗ 0.918∗∗ 0.913∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.165) (0.330) (0.324)
Sample All All Africa Africa
Adj. R-Squared 0.171 0.190 0.139 0.142
Number of Observations 393 393 145 145
Number of countries 54 54 24 24
Notes: The dependent variable is growth of real GDP per capita and covers the 1970–2009
period. All regressions use averages over four years, include variables in first differences
(except for the UNSC variable) and include period dummies. Robust standard errors in
parentheses clustered at the recipient country level. Source: Own calculations; see section
A.1 in the appendix of this Chapter for variable definitions and sources.
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Figure 4.5: Marginal effect of ∆Aid
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Notes: Marginal effect of changes in aid disbursements on changes in economic growth conditional on
varying temporary UNSC membership and the control variables (based on Table 4.1, column 2). The
histogram shows the distribution of ∆Aid in the regression sample: The upper and lower lines show
the 90% confidence interval with dots representing individual observations. Note that the significant
interaction term in the regression shows that these marginal effects differ significantly from each other.
The derivation of the marginal effects can be found in Section 4.A in the Appendix of this Chapter.
Source: Own calculations; see Section A.1 in the Appendix of this Chapter for variable definitions and
sources.
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90%-confidence intervals. The marginal effect of changes in aid on changes in growth
depends on the magnitude of the change in aid and on membership on the UNSC. As the
marginal effects depend on ∆Aid and ∆ (Aid2), any quantitative interpretation obviously
depends on whether the coefficients of these variables are estimated consistently, and
thus on the identifying assumptions in Clemens et al. (2012). As can be seen, the effect
declines for higher values of ∆Aid, reflecting diminishing returns to aid.24 The aid-growth
relationship is positive for countries that have not served on the UNSC when aid has been
committed,25 while being largely insignificant for countries that have served one year,
and significantly negative for those who served two years. For a country with the median
aid-to-GDP ratio (1.59 percent of GDP) the estimated effect of this aid on growth is
0.72 when the country has not served on the UNSC, but 0.21 when the country has
served one year on the UNSC, and 0.30 when it has served two years. The negative
consequences of the donors’ political motivations are thus not only statistically but also
economically significant. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.1 reproduce the regressions focusing
on Africa only. African nations follow the strictest norm of rotation on the UNSC among
all regional election caucuses, making the exogeneity of UNSC membership particularly
hard to challenge (Dreher et al. 2014). The coefficient on the interaction term is negative
and significant at the one-percent level independent of whether we exclude aid squared
(in column 3) or include it (in column 4). We also tested whether the effect of UNSC
membership on the effectiveness of aid is different for Africa, compared to other regions of
the world. We find this not to be the case, at conventional levels of significance (p-value:
0.69).26 The results so far are in line with our proposed timeline. However, this does not
preclude the potential importance of other sequences between membership on the UNSC
and aid disbursements. Thus, Table 4.2 reports results where we replicate the regressions
of column 2 in Table 4.1 using alternative timelines to examine whether and to what extent
other possible sequences are supported by the data. We test whether the effectiveness
of aid disbursed in periods (t), (t − 1), and (t − 2) is affected by UNSC membership in
periods (t + 1), (t), (t − 1), and (t-2). For example, if aid disbursed to UNSC members
would prove to be less effective in the period of membership (rather than one period
later), an explanation could be that contemporaneous membership affects compliance
with conditionality and thereby makes the aid less effective. While Table 4.2 shows the
coefficients and standard errors of the interaction terms only, note that the respective aid,
aid squared and UNSC variables are included in each regression (as are the remaining
24The marginal effect of a change in aid is linear in the lagged difference and in the twice-lagged level of
aid (see Section 4.A in the Appendix of this Chapter).
25This holds unless the change in aid exceeds 10 percent of GDP.
26Figure A.2 in Section 4.A in the Appendix of this Chapter shows the marginal effects. To the extent
that the effects of UNSC membership on aid effectiveness are homogeneous across regions this indicates
that selection on unobservables in the other regions is of no significant amount.
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control variables). As can be seen, the only significant coefficient is the one following our
previously proposed and theoretically most likely timeline (Aidt−1 ∗ UNSCt−2) that we
show here for comparison. The regressions thus support our proposed timeline, and our
considerations behind it. The table shows that this also holds when we focus on future
UNSC membership, which we included here as a placebo test.
We further test the robustness of our results in a number of ways. First, we replace
the share of years a country has served on the UNSC with a binary indicator variable
for a country’s presence on the UNSC. Second, we first-difference the UNSC variable
rather than including it in levels. Third, we lag all control variables by one period rather
than including them contemporaneously. Fourth, we employ early-impact aid as defined
in Clemens et al. (2012) instead of all aid.
Fifth, in light of the identifying assumptions discussed above, we include a number
of additional variables (as changes between (t − 2) and (t − 1)) which could potentially
induce omitted variables bias. Most importantly, we control for changes in the insti-
tutional environment by including the ICRG variables measuring Bureaucracy Quality,
Corruption, Democratic Accountability, Ethnic Tensions, External Conflict, Government
Stability, Internal Conflict, Investment Profile, Law & Order, Military in Politics, Political
Risk Rating, and Religious Tensions. One at the time, we also include imports of goods
and services (as a share of GDP), trade (as a share of GDP), Foreign Direct Investment
inflows (as a share of GDP), the recipient country’s voting alignment with the United
States in the UN General Assembly, and debt service (as share of GNI). Controlling for
these additional influences considerably reduces any remaining risk of omitted variable
bias. As our final test for robustness, we employ Clemens et al.’s (2012) permutations of
Rajan and Subramanian (2008) instead of those of Burnside and Dollar (2000).27
The results are shown in Table 4.3. They show that our main result is unaffected by
all of these additions. The robustness of our results to the inclusion of a large number of
variables increases our confidence that the main specification above does not violate the
identifying assumptions, so that the estimates above are consistent.
Finally, we turn to explanations for our results. As we have discussed in Section 4.2,
the previous literature identified a number of transmission channels for individual donors.
Dreher et al. (2013) show that political motives reduce the quality of World Bank projects.
Also for the World Bank, Kilby (2015) reports that political allies are allowed to start
projects with inferior preparation. Stone (2008) finds that political favoritism undermines
the credibility of IMF conditionality.
27In a previous version of this Chapter we estimated all main models in this framework and also show
regressions using those of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010). See Dreher et al. (2014) for details.
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Table 4.2: Politically motivated aid and growth, different timelines
(1) (2) (3)
Interaction Coefficient/
Std.err.
Interaction Coefficient/
Std.err.
Interaction Coefficient/
Std.err.
∆Aid(t)∗ UNSC(t+1) -0.360 ∆Aid(t-1)*UNSC(t+1) -0.215 ∆Aid(t-2)*UNSC(t+1) 0.575
(0.694) (0.480) (0.741)
∆Aid(t)*UNSC(t) -0.377 ∆Aid(t-1)*UNSC(t) 0.157 ∆Aid(t-2)*UNSC(t) 0.104
(0.444) (0.915) (0.539)
∆Aid(t)*UNSC(t-1) 0.270 ∆Aid(t-1)*UNSC(t-1) 0.003 ∆Aid(t-2)*UNSC(t-1) 0.407
(0.470) (0.412) (0.421)
∆Aid(t)*UNSC(t-2) 0.152 ∆Aid(t-1)*UNSC(t-2) -1.289*** ∆Aid(t-2)*UNSC(t-2) -0.114
(0.166) (0.379) (0.384)
Notes: The dependent variable is growth of real GDP per capita. All regressions use averages over four years and include variables in first
differences (except for the UNSC variable). They include the corresponding aid, aid squared, and UNSC terms and all other control variables
(as in column 2 in Table 4.3). The dependent variable covers the 1974–2009 period. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the
donor country level. Source: Own calculations; see Section A.1 in the Appendix of this Chapter for variable definitions and sources.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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In order to test these transmission channels in our broad sample of donors, we would
require data on aid conditionality and compliance with these conditions, project success,
and time and resources invested in project preparation. These data do not exist for a
broad sample of donors. Data exist, however, on different aid modalities and the sectoral
composition of aid across recipient countries that are on the UNSC and those that are
not. Previous research argues that the effectiveness of aid depends on the sector the aid
is given to and the modalities through which it is delivered (Bjørnskov 2013). To the
extent that UNSC membership affects composition and modalities,28 the effectiveness of
aid would change.
Table A.10 in Section 4.A in the Appendix of this Chapter reports the amount of aid
committed to individual sectors while countries have been temporary members of the
UNSC compared to other times (in constant 2011 million US$), for the 1973–2011 period.
There are substantial differences between those countries on the UNSC and the rest. When
we perform a simple t-test for equality of a certain category’s share in total aid committed
to UNSC members and nonmembers we find that the share increases significantly in 7 of
the 26 sectors, and decreases in one sector. For example, UNSC members receive larger
general budget support (+46%), more aid for other social infrastructure (+105%), more
food aid (59%), but less emergency aid (+39%). According to Nunn and Qian (2014), US
food aid increases the risk of civil conflict. Bjørnskov (2013) shows that a category of aid
that includes emergency aid increases growth. Both increases in food aid and reductions
in emergency aid are thus likely to reduce the effectiveness of aid.
Strong differences also arise when we focus on the aid modality (as we show in Ta-
ble A.11 in Section 4.A in the Appendix of this Chapter). The results indicate increases
in all types of aid for temporary members of the UNSC. In particular, budget aid in-
creases by 192% during UNSC membership, while the increase in project aid is 95%.
Loans increase by 137% and grants by 32%. The increases of these types of aid in a
recipient’s overall aid are all statistically significant at the five-percent level. Note that
budget support is the type of aid that offers most flexibility to the recipient government
and is thus particularly attractive to use for political reasons. To the extent that these
different types of aid affect economic growth differently, the different composition of aid
could also explain the effect that we identified.
28Bayer et al. (2014) provide initial evidence. Their results show that countries prefer to work with UN
agencies rather than the World Bank in implementing projects under the Global Environment Facility
while being on the UNSC.
204
4.4 Results
Table 4.3: Tests for robustness
Interaction
coefficient
Observations
(1) UNSC dummy -0.626∗∗∗ 393
(2) UNSC in first-differences -0.384∗∗ 393
(3) Control variables lagged -1.012∗∗ 359
(4) “Early impact” aid -1.470∗ 354
(5) Including all ICRG institutional measures -0.975∗∗ 214
(6) Including Imports/GDP -1.254∗∗∗ 378
(7) Including Trade/GDP -1.261∗∗∗ 378
(8) Including FDI/GDP -1.125∗∗∗ 317
(9) Including voting with U.S. in UNGA -1.260∗∗∗ 385
(10) Including Debt/GNI -1.397∗∗∗ 367
(11) Rajan & Subramanian specification -1.365∗∗ 351
Notes: The dependent variable is growth of real GDP per capita and covers the 1974–2009
period. All regressions use averages over four years, include variables in first differences
(except for the UNSC variable, which is estimated in first differences in row 2 only) and
add additional controls as indicated. All regressions include the corresponding aid, aid
squared, and UNSC terms and, except for row 11, the same control variables as column 2
in Table 4.1. Row 1 includes a binary indicator for temporary UNSC members instead of
the share of years, while row 2 includes the share of UNSC membership in first differences
rather than in levels. Row 3 lags all control variables by one period. Row 4 substitutes
(net) Aid with (gross) “Early impact” aid as defined in Clemens et al. (2012) and, following
their models, also includes repayments/GDP and (repayments/GDP) squared. We interact
the linear “Early impact” and the repayment term with the UNSC variable. Row 5 includes
the ICRG variables (Bureaucracy Quality, Corruption, Democratic Accountability, Ethnic
Tensions, External Conflict, Government Stability, Internal Conflict, Investment Profile,
Law and Order, Military in Politics, Political Risk Rating, and Religious Tensions), all of
which are available since 1984 only. Row 6 includes the (lagged) first difference of Imports of
goods and services (as a share of GDP), row 7 adds Trade (as a share of GDP), row 8 adds
Net FDI inflows (as a share of GDP), row 9 adds the recipient country’s voting alignment
with the United States in the UN General Assembly, and row 10 includes total debt service
(as a share of GNI). Row 11 focuses on Clemens et al.’s (2012) permutations of Rajan
and Subramanian (2008). Their control variables are Aid Squared, Initial GDP/capita,
Initial Policy, (log) Initial Life Expectancy, Institutional Quality, (log) Inflation, Initial
M2/GDP, Budget Balance/GDP, Revolutions, and period dummies; all data are averaged
over five-year-periods. Variations in sample size arise from incomplete information on the
additional variable(s) included. For each of the above tests for robustness, Section 4.A in
the Appendix of this Chapter shows full results for the aid and UNSC variables and their
interaction. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the recipient country level.
Source: Own calculations; see Section Table A.1 in the Appendix of this Chapter for variable
definitions and sources.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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4.5 Conclusion
In this Chapter we addressed the question of whether a recipient country’s short-term
geopolitical importance reduces the effectiveness of the development aid it receives. We
made use of a straightforward proxy for the geopolitical importance of a country. Specif-
ically, we exploited the quasi-random variation in aid disbursements resulting from the
recipient being of extraordinary geopolitical importance during its temporary membership
on the UNSC. The previous literature has shown that temporary members of the UNSC
receive substantial increases in aid (Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Dreher et al. 2009a,b).
To the extent that political motives for the allocation of aid negatively affect its conse-
quences, the aid a country receives while serving on the UNSC should be less effective
on average. The literature also shows that the time spent to prepare aid projects, the
number of aid conditions as well as punishment of non-compliance with such conditions
differ for politically important aid recipients. Overall, we therefore expect aid given to
countries of short-term political importance to be less effective in promoting growth than
aid given at other times.
Rather than suggesting our own econometric model, we augment Clemens et al.’s (2012)
permutations of Burnside and Dollar (2000) with our exogenous measure of politically
motivated aid. Our results show that aid committed while a recipient is a member of
the UNSC is less effective in increasing economic growth. This holds when we restrict
our sample to African countries, which follow the strictest norm of rotation for UNSC
membership.
While we did not aim to test whether aid is effective, but rather, whether aid effective-
ness is reduced due to the short-term political importance of recipients, our findings have
direct implications for the existing and future aid effectiveness debate. To the extent the
reader accepts the regressions presented in Clemens et al. (2012) as a causal test for the
effectiveness of aid, our results imply that overall aid increases growth, while aid given
to countries at the time they are of geopolitical importance is insignificant or harmful to
growth. In any case, aid to important countries is less effective than aid given at other
times. Political motives channel more aid to temporary UNSC members whose subse-
quent growth rates might increase to the extent that the marginal effect of aid remains
positive. This increase could however come at the cost of reduced aid and larger losses in
growth elsewhere, inducing UNSC-related cycles in growth.
An important implication of our results relates to the identification strategy in the
previous aid effectiveness literature, much of which tries to identify the causal effects
of overall aid by instrumenting for aid using political variables. Our results show that
geopolitical variables are of limited use as instruments for overall aid when “political aid”
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is different. More specifically, our results suggest that the estimated effects of politically
motivated aid – often reported as the effect of all aid in previous studies using such
instruments – represent the lower bound of the true effect of all aid.
In terms of increasing the effectiveness of aid, there are arguably two possibilities. First,
the giving of foreign aid could be separated from political motives, so that it truly becomes
“development aid.” Given the incentives of donors to use aid to achieve their geopolitical
goals this is unlikely to happen. Second, researchers should identify the exact channels
through which geopolitical motives reduce the effectiveness of aid. The choice of a suitable
remedy would depend upon which of the channels outlined above is responsible for the
reduced effectiveness of aid. We leave such analysis for future research.
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4.A Appendix: Figures, Tables and Additional Notes
for “Geopolitics, Aid and Growth”
Table A.1: Sources and definitions
Variable Definition Original source
UNSC Membership Share of years a country has served as
a temporary member on the UNSC in
a given period.
Dreher et al. (2009b).
Democracy Dummy that is 1 if the country is a
democracy during at least half the pe-
riod under consideration.
Cheibub et al. (2010).
Dummy for Africa Dummy that is 1 if the recipient is an
African country.
World Bank (2012b).
GDP p.c. growth Average over annual growth rates of
real GDP p.c. based on constant local
currency.
World Bank (2007b)∗.
Net ODA Net total Official Development Assis-
tance in % of GDP.
DAC (2007), Table
DAC2a∗, World Bank
(2016c)∗∗.
Log Initial
GDP/capita
Logarithm of initial GDP p.c. in in-
ternational prices.
Penn World Tables
6.2∗.
Budget Balance Overall Budget Balance, including
grants. Measured as cash sur-
plus/deficit in % of GDP.
World Bank (2007b),
World Bank (2016c)∗∗,
IMF (2005)∗.
Inflation Natural log of (1+ Consumer Price
Inflation).
World Bank (2005),
World Bank (2007b),
IMF (2005)∗.
M2 (% of GDP) Money and Quasi-Money (M2) in %
of GDP.
World Bank (2007b)∗.
Assassinations Average number of assassinations. Banks (2012, 2007)∗.
Assassinations x Eth-
nolinguistic Fraction-
alization
Interaction between Assassinations
and Ethnolinguistic Fractionaliza-
tion.
Banks (2012, 2007),
Easterly and Levine
(1997), Roeder
(2001)∗.
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Policy Good Policy Index based on Budget
Balance/GDP, Inflation and Trade
Openness (cf. Burnside and Dollar
(2000)
Clemens et al. (2012).
Openness Wacziarg-Welch (2008) extension of
the Sachs and Warner (1995) Open-
ness Index.
Wacziarg and Welch
(2008), updated by
Clemens et al. (2012)∗.
UNGA alignment U.S. Voting alignment of recipient coun-
try with the U.S. on all votes in the
United Nations General Assembly.
Voeten (2013).
ICRG Institutions Government Stability, Socioeconomic
Conditions, Investment Profile, Inter-
nal Conflict, External Conflict, Cor-
ruption, Military in Politics, Religion
in Politics, Law and Order, Ethnic
Tensions, Democractic Accountabil-
ity, Bureaucracy Quality.
Howell (2011).
US Bilateral Develop-
ment Aid
Official Development Aid Disburse-
ments from the US in % of GDP.
DAC (2012), Table
DAC2a (ODA Dis-
bursements), February
2012.
ODA Commit-
ments/GDP
ODA commitments, total, in % of
GDP.
DAC (2007), Table
DAC3a.
Total debt service Total debt service, in % of gross na-
tional income.
World Bank (2012b).
Short-term debt Short-term debt, in % of total exter-
nal debt.
World Bank (2012b).
Imports/GDP Imports of goods and services as share
of GDP.
World Bank (2012b).
Trade/GDP Trade as share of GDP. World Bank (2012b).
FDI/GDP Foreign Direct Investments net in-
flows as share of GDP.
World Bank (2012b).
Notes: ∗Our source is Clemens et al. (2012), http://www.cgdev.org/doc/Working\%20Papers/CRBB-
Replication-Files.zip, accessed 06.06.2012. Data for the 2006-2009 period are
from Minasyan (2016). More details are provided in “Technical Appendix to
Counting chickens when they hatch: Timing and the effects of aid on growth,”
http://www.cgdev.org/doc/Working\%20Papers/counting_chickens_technical_appendix.pdf,
last accessed 12.05.2016.
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∗∗ When updating Clemens et al.’s (2012) data until 2009, we used data from the World Bank accessed
via the wbopendata module in Stata, which cover more countries than Minasyan (2016). Due to data
availability for the 2005-2009 period, the budget balance is defined as revenue (including grants) minus
expense and minus net acquisition of nonfinancial assets.
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics
Variables Count Mean SD Min. Max.
Net ODA/GDP 393 4.41 6.16 -0.13 42.52
UNSC membership, share 393 0.08 0.17 0.00 0.50
UNSC membership dummy 393 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
GDP per capita growth 393 1.34 3.28 -12.96 17.05
Log Initial GDP/capita 393 8.04 0.80 6.14 10.06
Budget Balance 393 -0.16 1.12 -7.25 6.70
Inflation 229 0.28 0.45 -0.01 3.22
M2/GDP 393 4.50 16.01 0.02 135.78
Institutional Quality 393 4.34 1.48 1.58 8.14
Assassinations 393 0.46 1.30 0.00 11.50
Policy 393 1.60 1.32 -3.86 3.91
Openness 229 0.29 0.43 0.00 1.00
ODA Commitments/GDP 389 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.44
US Aid/GDP 393 0.68 1.22 0.00 12.48
Democracy (t-2) 386 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
Autocracy (t-2) 386 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00
Imports/GDP 384 30.97 14.62 0.00 92.96
Trade/GDP 384 58.87 27.67 11.44 203.36
FDI/GDP 381 1.59 2.63 -28.62 15.59
Total debt service 367 67.15 67.73 4.22 939.35
Short-term debt 379 13.80 8.73 0.73 54.97
Average Voting Alignment with U.S. 389 33.62 10.69 14.2 64.55
Bureaucracy Quality 311 1.74 0.93 0.00 3.50
Corruption 311 2.60 0.93 0.00 5.00
Democratic Accountability 311 3.38 1.23 0.00 6.00
Law & Order 311 2.93 1.13 0.67 6.00
Political Risk Rating 310 57.11 11.36 26.96 80.83
Ethnic Tensions 311 3.72 1.49 0.33 6.00
Religious Tensions 311 4.32 1.37 0.00 6.00
Military in Politics 311 3.05 1.55 0.00 6.00
Internal Conflict 311 7.78 2.42 0.31 12.00
External Conflict 311 9.33 2.15 2.17 12.00
Government Stability 311 6.97 2.09 1.85 11.00
Investment Profile 311 6.39 1.91 1.17 11.50
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Table A.3: Sensitivity to coding of the UNSC variable and additional covariates
(1) (2) (3)
UNSC
dummy
UNSC
differenced
Lagged
explanatory
variables
∆Aid (t-1) 0.484∗∗ 0.404∗∗ 0.379∗∗
(0.211) (0.195) (0.153)
∆Aid squared (t-1) -0.010∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.006∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Dummy UNSC (t-2) -0.511
(0.333)
Dummy UNSC (t-2) ∗ ∆Aid (t-1) -0.626∗∗∗
(0.165)
∆UNSC (t-2) 0.039
(0.844)
∆UNSC (t-2) ∗ ∆Aid (t-1) -0.384∗∗
(0.182)
UNSC (t-2) -1.814∗
(1.003)
UNSC (t-2) ∗ ∆Aid (t-1) -1.012∗∗
(0.402)
Adj. R-Squared 0.19 0.19 0.22
Number of Countries 54 54 54
Number of Observations 393 393 393
Notes: The dependent variable is growth of real GDP per capita. All regressions use averages
over four years and include (first differences of) Initial GDP/capita, Assassinations, Ethnic
Fractionalization*Assassinations, M2/GDP (lagged), Policy, and period dummies. The depen-
dent variable covers the 1970-2009 period. Column 1 includes a dummy for temporary UNSC
membership instead of the share of years on the Council. Robust standard errors in parentheses
clustered at the donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.4: Sensitivity to using early impact aid
(1)
∆Early Impact Aid (t-1) 0.576∗∗
(0.231)
∆Early Impact Aid squared (t-1) −0.032∗∗
(0.014)
UNSC (t-2) −1.635
(0.980)
UNSC (t-2) ∗ ∆Early Impact Aid −1.470∗
(t-1) (0.750)
Adj. R-Squared 0.197
Number of Countries 54
Number of Observations 354
Notes: The dependent variable is growth of real GDP per capita.
All regressions use averages over four years and include (first dif-
ferences of) Initial GDP/capita, Assassinations, Ethnic Fraction-
alization*Assassinations, M2/GDP (lagged), Policy, and period
dummies. The dependent variable covers the 1970-2005 period.
“Early impact” aid is defined following Clemens et al. (2012) and
the specification also includes repayments/GDP its square as in
their specifications, since “early impact” ODA is a gross flow while
aggregate aid is a net flow. Consistent with our modification of
other regressions, we interact the linear repayment term with our
UNSC variable. Otherwise, the specification is similar to Table 1,
column 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the
donor country level.
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
213
4
G
eopolitics,A
id
and
G
row
th
Table A.5: Sensitivity to additional covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ICRG Imports/GDP Trade/GDP FDI/GDP UNGA Debt/GNI
∆Aid (t-1) 0.269∗ 0.464∗∗ 0.461∗∗ 0.325∗∗ 0.502∗∗ 0.453∗
(0.135) (0.209) (0.207) (0.126) (0.212) (0.245)
∆Aid squared (t-1) -0.006∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.010∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.010∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
UNSC (t-2) -2.251∗∗ -1.573∗ -1.553∗ -1.64 -1.376 -1.347
(1.077) (0.896) (0.889) (1.020) (0.840) (0.865)
UNSC (t-2) ∗ ∆Aid (t-1) -0.975∗∗ -1.254∗∗∗ -1.261∗∗∗ -1.125∗∗∗ -1.260∗∗∗ -1.397∗∗∗
(0.386) (0.357) (0.370) (0.361) (0.358) (0.411)
Adj. R-Squared 0.28 0.19 0.18 0.23 0.19 0.18
Number of Countries 53 54 54 54 54 51
Number of Observations 214 378 378 317 385 367
Notes: The dependent variable is growth of real GDP per capita. All regressions use averages over four years, include
variables in first differences (except for the UNSC variable) and include period dummies. Control variables are Initial
GDP/capita, Assassinations, Ethnic Fractionalization*Assassinations, M2/GDP (lagged), Policy, and period dummies.
The dependent variable covers the 1970-2009 period. Column 4 includes the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
variables Bureaucracy Quality, Corruption, Democratic Accountability, Ethnic Tensions, External Conflict, Government
Stability, Internal Conflict, Investment Profile, Law and Order, Military in Politics, Political Risk Rating, and Religious
Tensions (available from 1984). Column 2 adds imports of goods and services (as a share of GDP), column 3 adds Trade
(as a share of GDP), column 4 adds net Foreign Direct Investments inflows (FDI, as a share of GDP), Column 5 includes
the recipient country’s voting alignment with the United States in the UN General Assembly, and column 6 adds debt
service (as a share of GNI). The specification is similar to Table 1, column 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses
clustered at the donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.6: Results for democracies and autocracies
Democracy (t-2) Autocracy (t-2) Democracy (t-1) Autocracy (t-1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Aid (t-1) 0.078 (0.089) 0.156 (0.125) 0.118 (0.074) 0.137 (0.141)
UNSC (t-2) 0.416 (0.823) -2.677∗ (1.412) 0.184 (0.784) -2.157 (1.392)
UNSC (t-2) ∗ ∆Aid (t-1) -0.006 (0.306) -1.273∗∗∗ (0.335) -0.452 (0.518) -1.221∗∗∗ (0.433)
Adj. R-Squared 0.256 0.149 0.238 0.162
Number of Countries 32 46 36 45
Number of Observations 157 236 180 213
(5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Aid (t-1) 0.632∗∗∗ (0.209) 0.406 (0.246) 0.596∗∗∗ (0.142) 0.411 (0.290)
∆Aid squared (t-1) -0.013∗∗∗ (0.004) -0.008 (0.005) -0.012∗∗∗ (0.003) -0.009 (0.006)
UNSC (t-2) 0.293 (0.807) -2.645∗ (1.430) 0.066 (0.769) -2.167 (1.404)
UNSC (t-2) ∗ ∆Aid (t-1) -0.731∗ (0.422) -1.407∗∗∗ (0.322) -0.701∗∗ (0.320) -1.578∗∗ (0.541)
Adj. R-Squared 0.288 0.158 0.274 0.171
Number of Countries 32 46 36 45
Number of Observations 157 236 180 213
Notes: The dependent variable is growth of real GDP per capita. All regressions use averages over four years and include
(first differences of) Initial GDP/capita, Assassinations, Ethnic Fractionalization*Assassinations, M2/GDP (lagged), Policy,
and period dummies. The dependent variable covers the 1970-2009 period. A regime is defined as democratic if it is classified
as such in at least half a period by Cheibub et al. (2010). In columns 3 and 4 the regime type refers to the period of aid
disbursement (t-1). Otherwise, the specification is similar to Table 1, column 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses
clustered at the donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure A.1: Sensitivity of marginal effects to the addition of a triple interaction between
aid squared and the share of years of UNSC membership
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Notes: Marginal effect of changes in aid disbursements on changes in economic growth conditional on
varying temporary UNSC membership. The marginal effect is based on a regression that includes aid,
aid squared, the interaction between aid and UNSC membership and between aid squared and UNSC
membership. The histogram shows the distribution of ∆Aid in the regression sample.
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Table A.7: Politically motivated aid commitments and aid disbursements, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Aid disbursements (t-1) 0.499∗∗ 0.105 0.487∗∗
(0.236) (0.091) (0.226)
Aid disbursements squared (t-1) -0.011∗∗ -0.011∗∗
(0.005) (0.004)
Aid commitments (t-2) -10.140∗∗ -9.299∗∗ -9.084∗∗ 8.455 6.324
(4.244) (4.596) (4.494) (11.931) (12.221)
Aid commitments squared (t-2) -41.872∗ -40.826∗
(23.343) (23.117)
UNSC (t-2) -1.28 -1.645∗ -1.378 -1.516∗ -1.234
(0.860) (0.888) (0.825) (0.897) (0.825)
UNSC (t-2)*Aid disbursements (t-1) -1.306∗∗∗ -0.955∗∗ -1.343∗∗∗
(0.400) (0.438) (0.380)
UNSC (t-2)*Aid commitments (t-2) 10.66 10.039 5.527 6.573
(24.061) (23.374) (20.583) (18.801)
Adj. R-Squared 0.195 0.164 0.171 0.171 0.201
Number of Observations 383 383 383 383 383
Notes: The dependent variable is growth of real GDP per capita. All regressions use averages over
four years and include (first differences of) Initial GDP/capita, Assassinations, Ethnic Fractionaliza-
tion*Assassinations, M2/GDP (lagged), Policy, and period dummies. The dependent variable covers the
1970-2009 period. The table adds aid commitments (and their interaction with UNSC membership) to the
regression from Table 1, column 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the donor country
level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.8: Politically motivated aid and growth, OLS, Rajan & Subramanian specifica-
tion
(1) (2)
∆Aid (t-1) 0.149∗ 0.356∗∗
(0.085) (0.148)
∆Aid squared (t-1) -0.007
(0.004)
UNSC (t-2) -0.866 -0.947
(1.420) (1.402)
UNSC (t-2) ∗ ∆Aid (t-1) -1.094∗ -1.365∗∗
(0.590) (0.647)
Adj. R-Squared 0.30 0.31
Number of Countries 64 64
Number of Observations 351 351
Notes: The dependent variable is growth of real GDP per
capita. The regressions use averages over five years and
include (first differences of) Initial GDP/capita, Initial
Policy, (log) Initial Life Expectancy, Institutional Quality,
(log) Inflation, Initial M2/GDP, Budget Balance/GDP,
Revolutions, period dummies. The dependent variable
covers the 1966-2005 period (using the full extended sam-
ple provided by Clemens et al. 2012: Table 9). Ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the donor
country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.9: Sensitivity to the addition of a triple interaction between aid squared and
the share of years on the UNSC
(1)
∆Aid (t-1) 0.476∗∗
(0.213)
∆Aid squared (t-1) -0.010∗∗
(0.004)
UNSC (t-2) -1.228
(0.835)
UNSC (t-2) ∗ ∆Aid(t-1) -1.302
(0.799)
UNSC (t-2) ∗ ∆Aid squared (t-1) 0.000
(0.021)
Adj. R-Squared 0.184
Number of Countries 54
Number of Observations 393
Notes: The dependent variable is growth of real
GDP per capita. All regressions use averages over
four years and include (first differences of) Initial
GDP/capita, Assassinations, Ethnic Fractionaliza-
tion*Assassinations, M2/GDP (lagged), Policy, and
period dummies. The dependent variable covers the
1970-2009 period. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses clustered at the donor country level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure A.2: Marginal effects for the subsample of African countries from a nested model
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Notes: Marginal effect of changes in aid disbursements on changes in economic growth in African countries
conditional on varying temporary UNSC membership. The marginal effect is based on a nested model that
includes the interaction between the Africa indicator and all explanatory variables. The point estimate for
[UNSC(t-2)*∆Aid(t-1)*Africa] is negative but insignificant, suggesting that the growth effect of politically
motivated aid is not significantly different in Africa. The histogram shows the distribution of ∆Aid in
the regression sample.
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Assumptions for Consistent Estimation of the Interaction Term
In the following, we sketch the two alternative sets of assumptions that assure the con-
sistent estimation of the interaction term. The first set of assumptions is based on
Bun and Harrison (2014) and Nizalova and Murtazashvili (2016). For consistency of
presentation, we keep the notation as in Chapter 4 but refer directly to the relevant
assumptions in Bun and Harrison (2014). For clarity of presentation, we omit exoge-
nous control variables, period-fixed effects and aid squared, all of which do not af-
fect the result about the consistency of the interaction term. As Bun and Harrison
(2014: 4) note, the addition of the other control variables “does not change the the-
oretical results. The analysis below holds exactly when we replace y, w and x [their
notation] by the residuals of their projection on these additional exogenous regressors.”
Notation
The simplified version of our main model is
∆Growthi,t = α + β∆Aidi,t−1 + δUNSCi,t−2 + ζUNSCi,t−2 ∗∆Aidi,t−1 + ∆i,t (4.2)
where i refers to the countries and t to the 4-year periods. ∆Aidi,t−1 is the endogenous
variable, referred to as xi in the notation of Bun and Harrison (2014). The error can be
written as:
∆it = λ∆Zi,t−k + ∆υi,t (4.3)
with Zi,t−1 being a potentially time- and country-varying unobserved effect,
k {∈ 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . }, and
(∆Aidi,2, . . . ,∆Aidi,T−1, UNSCi,1, . . . , UNSCi,T−2,∆i,3, . . . ,∆i,T ) being i.i.d.
Assumption set 1
Assumption 1.1
E [∆i,t | UNSCi,t−2] = 0, (4.4)
i.e., UNSC membership is exogenous (cf., Bun and Harrison 2014: 4). In their notation,
the exogenous regressor is ωi,t.
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Assumption 1.2
E [∆Aidi,t−1∆i,t | UNSCi,t−2] = [∆Aidi,t−1∆i,t] , (4.5)
i.e., the “degree of endogeneity” (direction and extent of omitted variable bias) of the
endogenous variable does not depend on the exogenous variable (cf., Bun and Harrison
2014: 5, Eq. 2.5). Then we have:
Cov (UNSCi,t−2∆Aidi,t−1,∆i,t) = E [UNSCi,t−2] ∗ E [∆Aidi,t−1∆it] = 0, (4.6)
assuming that E [UNSCi,t−2] = 0 (cf., Bun and Harrison 2014: 5, Eq. 2.6).29 As-
sumption 1.2 is a relatively weak condition, present in various statistical data generating
processes. In our setting, the assumption is plausible because temporary UNSC member-
ship is quasi-exogenously assigned.30 Moreover, the assumption is also reasonable in the
case of relevant omitted variables as discussed by Bun and Harrison (2014: 6) because
the endogeneity in our case is not caused by simultaneity. The OLS estimator of the co-
efficient of the interaction is consistent under additional reasonable conditions. Bun and
Harrison (2014) derive the following term as part of the expression for the inconsistency
of the interaction term:31
E [∆Aidi,t−1UNSCi,t−2]E
[
∆Aidi,t−1UNSC2i,t−2
]
−E
[
UNSC2i,t−2
]
E
[
∆Aid2i,t−1UNSCi,t−2
] (4.7)
This term equals zero under typical conditions regarding higher-order dependencies
between the endogenous and the exogenous variables of interest.32 So in many empirical
applications, the term leading to inconsistent estimation of the interaction term is zero.
For example, it holds in all cases when the relation between ∆Aidi,t−1 and UNSCi,t−2
follows a linear form (c.f., Bun and Harrison 2014: 7-8) ). Note that the coefficient δ
for UNSC membership, assumed to be exogenous, is also consistently estimated under
Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2. While we are convinced that UNSC membership positions
are quasi-randomly allocated among UN members and exogenous to growth two 4-year
periods after UNSC membership, the following assumptions would assure the consistency
of our interaction term even if UNSC membership would not be exogenous. Note that
29The assumption of a mean of zero comes without loss of generality and is made to simplify the analysis.
Because we always include a constant in the regression, all results also hold with rescaling of these
variables Kiviet and Niemczyk (2012).
30See discussion about randomly assigned treatment in Bun and Harrison (2014: 5), last paragraph.
31See Proposition 1 in Bun and Harrison (2014: 7).
32As Bun and Harrison (2014: 7) note “multivariate elliptical distributions are sufficient, but not neces-
sary, for these higher-order dependencies to vanish.”
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this second set of assumptions is weaker than the first set of assumption because they do
not imply consistent estimation of the UNSC coefficient.
Assumption set 2
If Assumption 1.1 is violated, i.e., UNSCi,t−2 is not exogenous to growth
E [∆i,t | UNSCi,t−2] 6= 0 (4.8)
we need to assume that:
Assumption 2:
We need that E [∆Aidi,t−1UNSCi,t−2,∆i,t = 0] to consistently estimate the coefficient
of the interaction term.
This condition is fulfilled if the “degree of endogeneity” of one endogenous variable of
interest is independent of the other endogenous variable of interest. Note that the
endogeneity of the two variables might therefore not be caused by the same omitted
variable. Formally,
Assumption 2.1 (equivalent to Assumption 1.2):
E [∆Aidi,t−1∆i,t | UNSCi,t−2] = E [∆Aidi,t−1∆i,t] (4.9)
i.e., the correlation of aid with the error term is independent of UNSC membership.
Assumption 2.2
E [UNSCi,t−2∆i,t | ∆Aidi,t−1] = E [UNSCi,t−2∆i,t] (4.10)
The correlation of UNSC with the error term is independent of changes in aid flows.
Framed in terms of the structure of potential omitted variables
E [∆Aidi,t−1∆Zi,t−k | UNSCi,t−2] = E [∆Aidi,t−1∆Zi,t−k] (4.11)
i.e., the correlation between the omitted variable and the dependent variable is
independent of UNSC membership (e.g., the effect of institutions on growth is not
affected by past UNSC membership) and
E [UNSCi,t−2∆Zi,t−k | ∆Aidi,t−1] = E [UNSCi,t−2∆Zi,t−k] (4.12)
i.e., the relationship between the omitted variable and the regressor does not depend on
the level of aid.
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Marginal Effect of a Change in Aid
[Growthi,t −Growthi,t−1] = α + β [Aidi,t−1 − Aidi,t−2] + γ
[
Aid2i,t−1 − Aid2i,t−2
]
+ δUNSCi,t−2 + ζ [Aidi,t−1 − Aidi,t−2] ∗ UNSCt−2
+ [Xi,t −Xi,t−1]′ η + µi,t
(4.13)
[Growthi,t −Growthi,t−1] = α + β [Aidi,t−1 − Aidi,t−2]
+ γ [Aidi,t−1 + Aidi,t−2] ∗ [Aidi,t−1 − Aidi,t−2]
+ δUNSCi,t−2 + ζ [Aidi,t−1 − Aidi,t−2] ∗ UNSCi,t−2
+ [Xi,t −Xi,t−1]′ η + µi,t
(4.14)
[Growthi,t −Growthi,t−1] = α + β [Aidi,t−1 − Aidi,t−2]
+ γ [Aidi,t−1 − Aidi,t−2 + Aidi,t−2 + Aidi,t−2]
∗ [Aidi,t−1 − Aidi,t−2]
+ δUNSCi,t−2 + ζ [Aidi,t−1 − Aidi,t−2] ∗ UNSCi,t−2
+ [Xi,t −Xi,t−1]′ η + µi,t
(4.15)
Replacing Aidi,t−1 + Aidi,t−2 = ∆Aidi,t−1:
[Growthi,t −Growthi,t−1] = α + β [∆Aidi,t−1]
+ γ [∆Aidi,t−1 + Aidi,t−2 + Aidi,t−2] ∗ [∆Aidi,t−1]
+ δUNSCi,t−2 + ζ [∆Aidi,t−1] ∗ UNSCi,t−2
+ [Xi,t −Xi,t−1]′ η + µi,t
(4.16)
δ [Growthi,t −Growthi,t−1]
δ [∆Aidi,t−1]
= β + γ ∗ 2 ∗ (Aidi,t−2 + ∆Aidi,t−1)
+ ζ∆Aidi,t−1 ∗ UNSCi,t−2
(4.17)
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Transmission Channels
Table A.10: Sectoral allocation of total aid committed, 1973-2011, constant 2011 million
US$
Sector Non-UNSC
member
(mean)
UNSC
member
(mean)
Increase
in %
t-test
(p-value)
Education 37.62 56.36 50% 0.00
Health 27.48 34.70 26% 0.09
Population 25.79 40.38 57% 0.01
Water and Sanitation 36.62 68.99 88% 0.00
Government /Civil Society 47.78 56.19 18% 0.43
Other Social Infrastructure 18.44 37.74 105% 0.00
Transport and Storage 62.16 93.57 51% 0.00
Communication 10.38 19.70 90% 0.00
Energy Generation and Supply 53.87 100.60 87% 0.00
Banking and Financial Services 13.30 16.93 27% 0.28
Business and other Services 10.14 11.15 10% 0.78
Agriculture and Fishing 53.73 138.60 158% 0.00
Industry/Mining 26.75 69.36 159% 0.00
Trade/Tourism 4.85 5.33 10% 0.77
Environment 14.48 37.49 159% 0.00
Other Multisector 32.96 45.04 37% 0.01
General Budget support 81.13 118.40 46% 0.09
Food Aid 29.10 46.36 59% 0.01
Other Commodity Assistance 33.78 64.37 91% 0.00
Debt 78.08 110.00 41% 0.46
Emergency Reponse 27.50 16.86 -39% 0.15
Reconstruction Relief 14.47 11.37 -21% 0.71
Disaster Prevention 3.26 1.95 -40% 0.57
Admin of Donors 1.73 2.12 23% 0.43
Refugees 3.33 1.92 -42% 0.33
Unspecified 7.03 12.79 82% 0.01
Notes: Differences in aid commitments by aid type for temporary UNSC and non-UNSC members.
The t-value indicates significance of the difference between the shares of the respective aid type for
UNSC and non-UNSC members.Source: OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) aid activities
database.
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Table A.11: Allocation of total aid committed, 1973-2011, constant 2011 million US$
Type of Aid Non-UNSC
member
(mean)
UNSC
member
(mean)
Increase
in %
t-test
(p-value)
Budget Aid 69.71 203.60 192% 0.00
Project Aid 240.20 469.40 95% 0.00
Tied Aid 66.44 121.20 82% 0.00
Partially tied Aid 85.40 181.00 112% 0.00
Untied Aid 189.70 308.50 63% 0.00
Loans 229.60 545.10 137% 0.00
Grants 268.80 354.60 32% 0.03
Notes: Differences in aid commitments by aid type for UNSC members and non- mem-
bers. The t-value indicates significance of the difference between the shares of the
respective aid type for UNSC members and non-members.Source: OECD/DAC CRS
aid activities database.
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